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Formally, China has a highly centralized system to control the conversion of 
farmland to non-farming uses. Its rigidity and other problems, however, have led to a 
large informal and decentralized market that serves to accommodate the demand for 
developable land. This dissertation, based on a case study in a county on China’s 
eastern coast, finds that the informal land market has played an essential role in 
promoting local economic growth, improving the financial situations of local 
governments and villages, and benefiting some low-income people. As far as 
economic efficiency is concerned, the Chinese land system functions reasonably well 
given the existing institutional arrangements, though at high transaction costs. 
However, the land conversion process, governed largely by the “law of the jungle”, is 
highly unfair because it favors the powerful, the bold and the wealthy.  
The recent piecemeal policies by China’s national government to fix the system 
have produced few positive or even negative effects. The dissertation concludes that 
the success of future attempts to improve the land conversion system hinges on the 
willingness and capability of the national government to change the “rules of the 
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1. Purpose of the dissertation 
This dissertation examines the land conversion process in China, a country that is 
experiencing rapid urbanization, and assesses whether the resulting land use is 
efficient and equitable. Conceptually, “efficiency” means that land is put to its highest 
and best use so that it generates the highest rent over time; and “equity” means that 
the distribution of the benefits from land conversion is socially fair. In practice, both 
efficiency and equity are complicated to assess, as will be discussed in detail later in 
the dissertation.   
The reason why land conversion does and should occur is that land can be put to 
higher and better uses and generate greater economic returns than before. Therefore, 
the process of land conversion entails net benefits for the society, and may be seen as 
a game played by various players - including farmers, developers and public officials, 
etc. - each trying to receive more benefits within the boundaries set by the 
institutional arrangements of a society. This dissertation aims to gain a deeper 
understanding regarding how the existing institutions may be improved in order to 
make the game of land conversion more efficient and fair.  
 
2. Approach of the dissertation 
The dissertation is based on a case study in a county of approximately 800,000 
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people on China’s rapidly developing eastern coast. In order to protect the human 
subjects involved in the study, the county will be given the fictitious name of Dragon. 
Many other names in the case study will also be kept confidential, and will be 
identified by their categories plus letters, such as “Industrial Park B”, “Village M”, 
“Leather Factory A”, and “Farmer E”, etc.. In addition, some factual data about the 
county, such as location, population, area, and GDP, etc., are provided in approximate, 
rather than exact, terms, so that they do not lead to identification of the county. 
Otherwise, all information is authentic. Any quotes are taken directly from the 
interviews and have not been altered except to reflect the fictitious county and often 
names. 
I paid seven visits to Dragon, each lasting one to three weeks, between July 2005 
and February 2009, and collected data through document review, on-site observations 
and interviews. The documents reviewed included those publicly available in printed 
or electronic forms, such as the county’s Yearbooks and government reports, and 
non-confidential internal documents of the local governments obtained through 
private sources. On-site observations were made through a number of field trips, 
guided by local people, to specific sites covered by the study. The interviews took 
several forms: pre-structured interviews with individuals, focus group meetings, and 
conversations with local people that were not pre-structured. In total, I talked to at 
least 60 people, including farmers, developers, urban residents and local officials. 
Although the data collected are sufficient for me to draw conclusions with 
confidence, I acknowledge that they fall well short of perfection for several reasons: 
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First, the local governments in China are very opaque, and much information is not 
available to the public. Second, the study unavoidably touched on the conflicts of 
interest among various players in land conversion. Some interviewees chose not to 
disclose certain sensitive information. Therefore, the data acquired on these issues 
were often incomplete. Third, the local statistical system is not credible, and much of 
the published official data on critical issues were fraudulent in the first place, as will 
be described in detail in the dissertation. In addition, some figures quoted in the 
dissertation are only approximate, often because they are only estimates made by 
local interviewees and it is impossible or difficult to verify them on a fully confident 
basis. Despite such uncertainty, these figures are used because they are believed to 
provide close approximations to actual situations.     
 The Chinese land system keeps evolving all the time. While I was writing this 
dissertation, some new polices were introduced by the Chinese government to 
improve the system. For example, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
passed a resolution in October 2008 to deepen rural reform, including changes to rural 
land tenure and existing land market rules. The real effects of these new policies will 
not become clear immediately, and therefore cannot be assessed by the dissertation. 
However, wherever appropriate, their potential consequences are discussed based on 
the findings of the case study.    
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3. Main findings of the dissertation  
Although a case study of one county only, this dissertation is more ambitious than 
most others because it undertakes to explore and analyze the Chinese land system as a 
whole, rather than focusing on any one player or limited area of land practice.  
The study finds that a large informal local land market has developed in response 
to a rigid and highly centralized land use system. In general, the informal market 
improves land use efficiency by promoting local economic growth, creating 
employment opportunities for local people, and improving the financial circumstances 
of local governments, villages and individuals. Of course, there are also various forms 
of incompatible land uses - but many of them cannot be attributed to the informal 
nature of these land conversions per se, and some are probably not avoidable under 
any system. Yet, achieving economic efficiency through the informal market imposes 
high transaction costs on the players involved and the society as a whole. 
This dissertation shows that all the players benefit from land conversion. Even 
farmers, as the weakest group, have experienced improved living standards, in terms 
of absolute income, after land conversion. Moreover, some low-income people 
working or living in the city benefit from the informal land market, which creates jobs 
and makes housing more affordable. This is not to say, however, that the distribution 
of the benefits from land conversion is equitable, because the process of land 
conversion is subject to the “law of the jungle” and favors the powerful, the bold and 
the wealthy. 
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Most of the recent efforts by the national government to fix the system focus on 
changing individual “policy acts”, not the “rules of the game”,1 and consequently 
have had little or no beneficial impact, and some may even have had the effect of 
decreasing efficiency without improving fairness by disrupting the informal market, 
which is essential to making the land system work.  
Future policies to fix the system, if successful, will need to, essentially, formalize 
the informal market. However, the necessary conditions for doing this, such as 
transparency in the administration of public resources and accountability of public 
officials to citizens, are largely absent in the current political structure that stresses the 
centralized control of power. Therefore, the success of future policies to improve the 
system hinges on the willingness and capacity of the national government to reform 
the existing political and economic institutions in a fundamental way.    
 
4. Organization of the dissertation 
The organization of the dissertation resembles that of a book.2 Although a bit 
unconventional for a Ph.D. dissertation in this respect, this approach has the 
advantage of being able to present the case study and relate it to the larger picture in a 
coherent and interesting way.  
The Introduction describes the main drivers of land conversion in China and the 
                                                        
1 This is a distinction drawn by James M. Buchanan, and will be discussed in the Introduction of the dissertation.   
2 To some extent, the organization of the dissertation resembles that of Richard Babcock’s The Zoning Game 
(1966) or Marion Clawson’s Suburban Land Conversion in the United States (1971). 
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institutions that guide the Chinese land conversion process, discusses major policy 
issues identified by the existing literature, and introduces Dragon, the county selected 
for the case study. Part One describes the respective interests, strategies and behaviors 
of the various players in the land conversion process, and discusses the 
ineffectiveness of the referee institutions in ensuring fair play. Part Two assesses the 
workings of the system, including the impracticability of centralized planning, the 
central role of the informal market, the importance of personal relations to the 
informal market, the contribution of informal land conversion to local economic and 
social development, and the efficiency and equity consequences of the system. Part 
Three presents policy implications. 
 
5. Other explanations 
The dissertation often relates to parallel stories in other policy areas in order to 
provide a general political and social context for a better understanding of the Chinese 
land system. Moreover, although the case study focuses on Dragon County, it 
sometimes draws on the experiences of other regions, particularly County A, which is 
a neighbor county of Dragon. In addition, while the discussions center on the 
conversion of farmland to urban uses, they inevitably also address the conversion of 
land from one urban use to another.     
Two key terms used in the dissertation are “formal” and “informal” land 
conversion. The former refers to land conversion carried out according to the official 
 7 
procedures defined by the Chinese laws and policies, whereas the latter refers to land 
conversion without approval from the competent authorities. I try to avoid using the 
term “illegal”, which often conveys such meanings as “bad” or “immoral”, for the 




This introduction sets the stage for a detailed description of the land conversion 
process in Dragon, the county selected for the case study, in the following chapters. It 
first explains why land conversion is so important for the Chinese society. Next, it 
introduces the institutions that guide the Chinese land conversion process, including 
land tenure, land market regulations, land use plans, and the Chinese bureaucratic 
structure, etc. This is followed by a brief description of key policy issues identified by 
the existing literature. Then, it discusses the conceptual analytical framework of the 
dissertation. Lastly, it introduces Dragon County, including its main economic and 
social indicators and a brief history of its urbanization process.       
 
1. Drivers of land conversion in China 
The conversion of rural land to urban uses is important for any society, but 
particularly for China. China’s population accounts for 22% of the world’s total; but 
its arable land, where most of the population and cities are concentrated, is only 7% of 
the world’s total.3 In 2005, arable land accounted for less than 15% of China’s 
territory;4 and the per capita arable land area in China was only 0.27 hectares, which 
was less than 40% of the world average, one eighth the U.S. level, and half the Indian 
level.5 Despite the scarcity of arable land in China, there is great pressure for the 
conversion of arable land to urban uses due to rapid urbanization, sustained 
                                                        
3 Xin Hua News Agency (Oct. 24, 2005) 
4 CIA-the World Fact book about China 
5 Xin Jing Bao (2006), Yingling Liu (2006) 
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population growth, and rapid economic development.  
Rapid Urbanization  
Chinese cities have been expanding rapidly, in both size and number, over the 
past two to three decades. Between 1978 and 2004, the level of urbanization in China 
increased from 18% to 42%, the number of people living in cities6 increased from 
170 million to 540 million, and the number of cities increased from 193 to 661.7 In 
1978, China had only 13 cities with a population of over 1 million, 27 cities with a 
population of 500,000 to 1 million, 59 cities with a population of 200,000 to 500,000, 
and 115 cities with a population of less than 200,000. By 2003, these numbers 
increased to 49, 78, 213 and 320, respectively.8 
Compared with other developing countries with similar economic levels, China's 
urbanization is about 10 percent lower. 9  Some experts estimate that China’s 
urbanization level may reach 45% by 2010 and 65% by the middle of the 21st 
century. 10  Other experts estimate that China’s urbanization will increase to 
approximately 60% within the next twenty years,11 resulting in almost 1 billion 
Chinese people living in cities by 2020.    
Population growth  
Population growth is another important contributing factor to the pressure for 
land conversion. Despite the Family Planning Program since the 1970s, China’s 
                                                        
6 In China, a city shall have at least 10,000 permanent residents (State Council 1986, 1993).  
7 Xinhua News Agency (Nov. 9, 2005) 
8 Xinhua News Agency (Nov. 9, 2005) 
9 Li Shantong (2008) 
10 Yang Chongguang (2003)  
11 Wang Haikun (2002) 
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population is still growing rapidly, having increased from approximately 500 million 
in the 1950s to more than 1.3 billion now. According to an estimate by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, China’s population may reach approximately 1.45 
billion in 2025-2030 before it starts to stabilize.12 Virtually all the population growth 
expected during 2000-2030 will be concentrated in the urban areas, due to rural-urban 





















Figure 1 China’s Population Growth between 1950 and 2005[14] 
 
Economic development  
China is in the process of rapid industrialization. Between 1979 and 2007, 
China's GDP increased at an average annual growth rate of 9.7 percent.15 Empirical 
evidence has shown that industrialization has been an important contributing factor 
to the conversion of farmland to non-farming uses,16 since many non-rural economic 
                                                        
12 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2005)  
13 United Nations Population Division (1999)  
14 Website of the National Population and Family Planning Commission of China 
15 Wang Haibo (2008) 
16 Zhang Xiaobo et al (2004)   
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activities require the use of land as an input of production. Moreover, 
industrialization, especially the rapid development of rural enterprises, offers more 
non-farm job opportunities, thus raising wages and making farming less attractive as 
surplus labor is exhausted.17 As the living standards of the Chinese people rise, there 
is a growing demand for better housing conditions. The per capita living floor area 
for urban residents increased from 3.6 m2 in 1978 to 8.8 m2 in 1997 and 23.7 m2 in 
2003, while that for rural residents increased from 8.1 m2 in 1978 to 22.5 m2 in 1997 
m2 and 27.2 m2 in 2003.18  
 
2. Institutional setting for land conversion 
The Chinese land conversion process is guided mainly by the following 
institutions: 
Land tenure 
In China, farmland is owned by village collectives. A village often divides its 
farmland into two types: one is “grain land” (Kou Liang Di), divided equally and 
contracted to all villagers for farming; and the other is “reserve land” (Ji Dong Di), 
managed collectively by the village to accommodate population changes or rented to 
farmers in order to cover the village’s discretionary expenses such as infrastructure 
construction and maintenance. Farmers used to be required to pay an agricultural tax 
                                                        
17 Zhang Xiaobo et al (2004)   
18 State Council’s Information Office (1998, 2004) 
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based on the productivity of the farmland contracted to them, but have been exempted 
from it by the national government since 2004.19  The farmland contracted to 
individual farmers can be subleased or transferred to other farmers, provided it is still 
used for farming.  
 All non-agricultural lands are owned by the state - which means that the 
conversion of farmland to non-agricultural uses requires, as a first step, the transfer of 
land ownership from the village to the state. Developers who wish to obtain the use 
right to land must apply to the government. The duration of the use right to state land 
is typically 70 years for residential use and 50 years for industrial use.  
Land market regulations 
When acquiring land from a village collective, the government pays compensation 
to the village. According to the Land Administration Law (2004), a compensation 
package typically consists of three parts:  
- Compensation for the land, which is 6-10 times the average annual value 
of the produce on the land in the last three years before the land 
acquisition  
- Compensation for farmers’ resettlement, which is typically 4-6 times the 
average annual value of the produce on the land in the last three years 
before the land acquisition, but sometimes based on per capita 
calculations  
- Compensation for existing crops on the land, the level of which is set by 
the provincial government  
In practice, the level of compensation varies from region to region, but usually stays 
relatively fixed within a particular jurisdiction. There are no legal stipulations 
                                                        
19 This will be described further in Chapter 2. 
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regarding how the compensation shall be distributed within a village collective, which 
is often a source of conflicts between village leaders and farmers, as will be discussed 
later.  
After the ownership of land is transferred from the village to the state, developers 
acquire land use rights from the government through auctions or public tender. In 
some cases, a developer can obtain land through “negotiations” with the government, 
if the latter believes that the proposed project will be able to generate significant 
social benefits, such as job opportunities or technology spillover. The land use rights 
acquired in these ways are tradable on the secondary market, with permission from 
the government. 
In addition, the government also “allocates” land directly for public infrastructure 
for whose construction the government is directly responsible. Some state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) may also obtain land use rights through “direct allocation” or by 
paying prices that are lower than market prices. The land use rights acquired in this 
way are usually forbidden from being sold on the secondary market unless the 
shortfalls from the standard market land prices, assessed by the government, are paid. 
A new policy has just been introduced in October 2008 that some collectively 
owned lands (mainly lands already used by township and village enterprises or 
occupied by farmers’ housing) will be allowed to enter into the land market directly, 
without the transfer of ownership to the state. The potential consequences of this 
policy are not yet clear, as will be discussed in Chapter 12.       
 14 
Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLUPs) and Urban Plans (UPs)   
The amount of rural land that can be converted in a given period within a 
jurisdiction is limited, and is regulated by the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP). 
The CLUP defines the development functions of different regions in a jurisdiction, 
and sets up specific land use targets, i.e. the amount of land used for each purpose 
such as farming, urban development, roads, and water conservancy facilities, etc. 
Figure 2 is an example of what a real CLUP looks like. A most important feature of a 
CLUP is that it aims to control the supply of developable land and achieve a “dynamic 
balance”, which means that any farmland converted to urban uses must be made up 
for by reclaiming an equivalent amount of land elsewhere within the same province. 
The main reason for such a strict farmland protection policy is a concern by the 
national government for food security, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.    
CLUPs are developed, in a strictly top-down process, at five levels: national, 
provincial, municipal, county and township.20 (The Chinese hierarchical political 
structure is illustrated in Figure 3.) The CLUP of a jurisdiction must be based on that 
of the immediately higher-level jurisdiction. For example, a provincial CLUP sets 
developable land quotas for its municipalities; likewise, a municipal CLUP sets 
quotas for its counties.  
A CLUP covers all aspects of land use within a jurisdiction, but has a high level 
of generality. It sets general land use objectives (such as farmland protection objective) 
and outlines regional land use functions in broad terms, but does not include detailed 
                                                        
20 National Land Administration (1997) 
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requirements for specific sites.  
 Land use on specific sites is regulated by the Urban Plans (UPs), which not only 
specify the types of use for individual land parcels, but also dictate building codes 
such as density and height – just like a U.S. zoning map. There are several types of 
urban plans for a city in terms of the level of details they regulate, as will be described 
in Chapter 7.  
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Figure 2 The Comprehensive Land Use Plan of Municipality A (1997-2010) 
 
 
Chapter 1 Preface (1.5 pages): This explains the purpose of the plan.   
Chapter 2 Planning objectives (1.5 pages): They mainly include: a) general economic 
and social development objectives, such as GDP, level of urbanization; and b) land use 
objectives, such as the amount of farmland that must be preserved, and the level of forest 
coverage, etc. 
Chapter 3 Distribution of land among different uses (2 pages): This includes specific 
targets regarding the amount of land that may be used for different purposes, such as urban 
construction, roads, mining, and irrigation facilities, etc.    
Chapter 4 Definition of the development functions of different regions (5 pages): This 
includes a) a definition of the development functions of various regions within the 
municipality, such as commercial and industrial centers, tourist centers, grain production 
areas, fruit production areas, and mining areas, etc.; and b) specific land use targets for 
agriculture, forestry, parks, urban areas, beach, and other uses.  
Chapter 5 Land preservation objectives (1 page): This includes specific objectives 
regarding how much farmland shall be protected fully, and general requirements regarding 
the protection of landscape and historic sites.  
Chapter 6 Land reclamation objectives (1 page): This mainly includes specific targets 
regarding how much land shall be reclaimed from un-utilized mountains or other sources 
for farming, parks or other uses. 
Chapter 7 Land use by large public programs (1 page): This includes objectives of 
land use for roads, water conservancy, and ecological conservation, etc.    
Chapter 8 Land use of coastal areas and islands (1 page): This includes general 
principles for the zoning of the coastal areas and islands. 
Chapter 9 Land use by the counties under Municipality A (3/4 page): This mainly sets 
developable land quota for the counties. 
Chapter 10 Implementation of the plan (1.5 pages): This includes general 
requirements for “conscientious” implementation.  
Chapter 11 Supplementary provisions (1/4 page): This explains the attached maps and 
approving authorities of the plan.  
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Figure 3 Chinese Hierarchical Political Structure 
 
China’s political structure and land administration system 
China’s political system is dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Nominally, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is the decision-making body of the 
National 
(1.3 billion people) 
Provincial 
(There are 31 provincial-level jurisdictions, including provinces, 




(Typically, there are 10-20 municipalities in a province. Each 
municipality typically has a population of a few million.)  
 
County 
(Typically, there are 5-10 counties within a municipality. Each 
county typically has a population of a few hundred thousand to 
more than 1 million.) 
Township 
(Typically, there are about 20 townships within a county. Each 
township typically has a population of tens of thousands.) 
Village 
(Typically, there are several dozen villages within a township. 
Each village typically has a population of several hundred to 
several thousand.) 
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government, and the People’s Courts can act independently. In practice, the CCP 
literally controls all three (executive, legislative, and judiciary) branches of the 
government. At any level, the highest-ranking public official is the secretary of the 
CCP Committee, not the mayor, although in some cases the same person holds both 
positions.  
Higher-level governments have absolute authority over lower-level ones, whereas 
coordination among the agencies at the same level is generally weak. This is easy to 
understand because all public officials are appointed from the above, not elected. The 
only exception is at the village level where the leaders are elected, as will be 
described in detail in Chapter 1. 
Most agencies in a local government are directed by the above through “dual 
tracks”. For example, a county’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) is controlled 
by the mayor of the county on human and financial resources, but directed by the 
municipal EPB on technical matters. Some local agencies are designed to be relatively 
independent of local influence, and administered through “single track”. For example, 
a county’s Taxation Bureau (TB) is controlled by the municipal TB on both human 
and financial resources and technical matters, and is thus relatively free, at least 
nominally, from the control of the mayor of the county.  
As far as land administration is concerned, the Ministry of Land and Resources 
(MLR) at the national level and the Bureaus of Land and Resources (BLRs) at local 
levels are responsible for the planning and administration of land resources, and for 
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supervising and checking illegal activities in land use. They are eligible to impose 
administrative penalties for illegal activities, or transfer those that constitute criminal 
offenses to judicial departments.   
Prior to 2006, the BLRs were under “dual track”. In order to reduce the influence 
of the local governments during land use planning and the implementation of national 
land policies, the national government started to implement a so-called “vertical” land 
administration system in 2006. Under the new system, the director and vice directors 
of a county BLR are appointed directly by the municipal BLR, but the financial 
resources of the county BLR are still controlled by the county mayor.  
In addition, in order to strengthen supervision over the provincial governments on 
land policies, the national government established the Land Supervision and 
Inspection (LSI) system in 2006. The LSI Headquarters, headed by the Minister of 
Land and Resources, are located within the MLR. Nine Land Supervision and 
Inspection Bureaus (LSIBs), which are directly under the leadership of the LSI 
headquarters at the MLR, are established in different regions of the country to oversee 
the implementation of farmland protection objectives and the enforcement of land use 
laws and regulations by provincial-level governments.     
  
3. Key policy issues identified by the existing literature 
 The existing literature has identified two outstanding issues: one is that there 
exists a large informal land market, and the other is that farmers are, in general, 
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treated unfairly in the distribution of the benefits from land conversions.21  
 
3.1 Existence of an informal land market 
Informal land conversion has been widespread in China since the so-called “Land 
Enclosure Movement”, which started in Guangdong Province in the early 1990s and 
extended rapidly to other regions. Various cities tried to copy the model of 
Shenzhen22 to establish “economic development zones (EDZs)” in order to attract 
foreign investment.23 According to the Ministry of Construction, when the national 
government started to check this problem in March 1993, China had had more than 
6,000 county- or higher-level EDZs, covering a total area of 15,000 km2 - larger than 
China’s total urbanized area (13,400 km2) at the time.24 A MLR survey covering 24 
provinces showed that, by 2003, China still had 5,638 development zones of various 
types with a total planned area of 36,000 km2, which was larger than all the existing 
developed urban land area of China, and 70% of which was developed insufficiently 
or held idle.25 
A salient feature of this enclosure movement was to “enclose” but not 
“develop”.26 During the enclosure process, local officials sold land use rights at low 
prices; and the prices of the land use rights on the secondary market were usually 
                                                        
21 Key cites will be given later in the text. 
22 Shenzhen was a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) established by the national government in the early 1980s to 
serve as a “window” and model for opening up to the outside world.  
23 He Qinglian and Zhang Xiangping (2000)  
24 He Qinglian (1998) 
25 Xie Yang (2006) 
26 He Qinglian and Zhang Xiangping (2000)  
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multiples or even tens of times that on the primary market.27 He Qinglian (1998) 
notes that,  
In the heat of the enclosure movement, developers colluded with government 
officials to acquire land, and then sold it on the secondary market…. People 
believed that one would become rich as long as one could acquire land. Chinese 
and foreign “investors” having strong personal relations with provincial, 
municipal or county leaders often went to the latter to ask for land bluntly. The 
land use planning agencies at the county and municipal levels existed in name 
only.28  
The informal land market has not subsided in recent years. An inspection by the 
MLR through satellite remote sensing showed that, between October 2003 and 
September 2004, 52.8% (in terms of area) of all newly developed land in the 70 
counties inspected had been converted informally; in some counties, informal land use 
accounted for 70-90% of all new land development.29 A follow-up MLR inspection 
revealed again that, in some cities, up to 60-90% of all land use was informal.30 31 
Between 1999 and 2005, more than 1 million informal land use cases were identified, 
involving over 5 million mu (i.e. more than 300,000 hectares) of land.32 According to 
the statistics reported by the provinces themselves, in the first five months of 2005, 
there were more than 25,000 informal land use cases across the country, involving 
more than 10,000 hectares of land.33 In the first five months of 2006, 25,153 informal 
land use cases were identified by the MLR.34 Between October 2005 and October 
2006, informal land conversion accounted for more than 80% of all land conversion 
                                                        
27 He Qinglian (1998) 
28 He Qinglian (1998) 
29 Wang Yijuan (2006) 
30 Wang Yijuan (2006) 
31 Xinhua News Agency (June 6, 2006) 
32 Fei Yangsheng (2006) 
33 Zhao Wuming (2005) 
34 Xinhua News Agency (June 16, 2006)  
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cases in 17 of 90 selected cities monitored by the MLR using satellite remote sensing 
technologies.35 During a land use inspection campaign between September 15, 2007 
and January 15, 2008, the MLR uncovered 31,700 cases of informal land use, 
involving approximately 3,364,000 mu.36  
The local governments have been widely blamed for the existence of the informal 
market. In an official statement37 made in June 2006, the MLR states that  
Illegal land use has become more and more widespread, and, increasingly, the 
local governments are taking a leading role in colluding against the national 
government. 
Specifically, the following two factors are thought to have contributed to the existence 
of the informal market.   
Political needs of local governments 
The interest of the national government in protecting farmland is not shared by 
local governments, since the external benefits brought by a local government’s effort 
to protect farmland will be shared by other jurisdictions.38 Local governments are 
more interested in promoting local economic growth, for which land conversion is 
often an essential condition. Growth has been the most important policy objective in 
China since Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, and the economic 
growth rate has been the most important gauge for the performance of local officials. 
Other things being roughly equal, mayors who do better in stimulating the local 
                                                        
35 Beijing Youth Daily (Nov. 5, 2007) 
36 Ministry of Land and Resources (2008)  
37 Xinhua News Agency (June 16, 2006)  
38 Qian Wenrong (2004)  
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economy and creating employment opportunities have a greater chance of getting 
promotion. A high-level official from Yancheng Municipality, Jiangsu Province makes 
this point clearly and bluntly when interviewed by Outlook Oriental Weekly:  
A number of departments and agencies (from the higher-level government) are 
responsible for evaluating the performance of local officials, including the 
Department of Organization (of the CCP Committee), the Department of 
Discipline Inspection (of the CCP Committee), the Bureau of Auditing, and others. 
However, it is the Department of Organization that makes promotion decisions, 
and its most important criterion has always been economic growth.39 
In addition to the GDP growth rate, another important measure of economic 
achievement is large development projects.40 Typically, the first thing that a new 
mayor does after taking office is to develop new urban construction plans with a view 
to leaving a legacy.41 Thus, selling land use rights becomes a convenient way of 
generating local revenue in order to execute such plans.42  
Local government officials are also more concerned with their present interests 
than with land use efficiency over a long term, and may therefore supply more land 
than optimal.43 They can artificially “create” demand for land in order to collect more 
land conveyance fees.44 The large difference between the cost of land acquisition 
from villages and the benefit from land conversion has provided strong incentives in 
that regard. Wang Meihan (2005) and Li Junjie (2006)45 note that land conveyance 
fees are, by nature, land rents for many years that are collected in lump sum in 
                                                        
39 Hu Ruifeng (2004)  
40 Qian Wenrong (2004)  
41 Feng Yuan and Yang Xiaoyan (2004)  
42 Jiang Ping, Zhou Qiren, Bai Nansheng and Bai Nansheng (2005)  
43 Qian Wenrong (2004)  
44 Jiang Ping, Zhou Qiren, Bai Nansheng and Bai Nansheng (2005)  
45 Quoted in Fei Yangsheng (2006) 
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advance.46 This means that a local government can collect, once and for all, the rents 
from land users who will use the land for the next 50-70 years. By collecting land 
conveyance fees, the current local governments are actually “over-drawing” the 
revenue of the succeeding governments. In some cases, future governments will have 
to be responsible for providing services for the land converted by the current 
governments, but are at the mercy of their predecessors regarding how much land 
conveyance fees are left for them to use.  
Financial needs of local governments  
A number of authors have written about the problems created by China’s 
financial reform47 in 1993-1994 for local governments. With the reform, China’s 
fiscal revenue has been concentrated towards the national and provincial governments, 
but appropriate transfer payment policies have been absent. Whiting (2001) notes that 
the financial reform forced local officials to “manipulate” their implementation of the 
taxation and credit policies made by the national government. This is in line with the 
theories put forward by some scholars on the behavior of local governments in China 
or other countries.48 For example, Jean Oi (1992) and Qiu et al (2004)49 think that 
China’s local governments driven by financial incentives after the financial reform 
demonstrate many characteristics of private firms. Andrew Walder (1995) argues that 
local governments have greater incentives than higher-level governments to seek 
benefits for themselves. Charles Tiebout (1956) and William Fischel (2001) make 
                                                        
46
 Wang Meihan (2005) 
47 The reform will be described in detail in Chapter 3. 
48 Qi Xiaojin et al (2006) 
49 Jean Qi (1992) and Qiu et al (2004) are quoted in Qiu Haixiong and Xu Jianniu (2004)  
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similar point. 
Not surprisingly, local governments often resort to land sale as a way of 
generating revenue.50 Ding (2007) notes that one of the most remarkable impacts that 
compulsory land acquisition and public land leasing has had is the creation of a new 
revenue stream for local governments. Typically, almost all the land conveyance fees 
are kept by local governments. In 2003, for example, the national government 
received only 2% of the total revenue from the conveyance of state-owned land.51 
Although local governments are required to pay certain fees,52 the level of these fees 
is minimal compared to the net benefits from land conversion. Moreover, the land 
conveyance fees are often not reflected in the “regular” budgets of local 
governments.53  Sometimes, they are simply used by local government leaders as 
“pocket money”, in the words of an MLR official.54 In many counties or cities in 
rapidly urbanizing regions, land sales account for up to 30-50% of the total local 
revenue.55 In 2005, China’s total fiscal revenue exceeded 3 trillion yuan for the first 
time in history. During the same year, the revenue received by local governments 
from land sale that was not reflected in regular government budgets was as high as 
550 billion RMB. 56  Another estimate shows that, in 2007, the aggregate land 
conveyance fees across the country were 913 billion yuan, which was almost 30% of 
                                                        
50 Nan Xianghong and Shangguang Ximing (2008)  
51 Qu Futian et al (2005) 
52 This will be described in detail in Chapter 4. 
53 The difference between regular budget (Yuan San Nei) and extra budget (Yu Suan Wai) is that the former is the 
budget for a local government to maintain normal operations, while the latter can be used by a local governments 
for urban construction and expansion. 
54 Ministry of Land and Resources Website (September 8, 2006)  
55 Tao Ran and Xu Zhigang (2005); Chen Fang, Zhang Huaping and Zhang Honghe (2004)  
56 Guo Wei (2006) 
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the total fiscal revenue of the country.57 
 
3.2 Distribution of the benefits from land conversion 
Conflicts surrounding the distribution of the benefits from land conversion may 
impose a long-term threat to social stability58, due to large number of land related 
disputes, as will be described later. The existing studies conducted in various regions 
have produced some common findings, which mainly include:59  
- The compensation to farmers is too low  
- Local governments and developers get the largest share of the increased 
value of land, while farmers receive a minimal portion 
- Farmers’ participation in the land conversion process is very limited  
- Farmers often lack the capabilities to adjust to urban life, and the living 
standards have lowered for some farmers after land conversion.  
Some of these findings are highlighted below.  
On the livelihoods of farmers after losing land 
The compensation received by farmers accounts for only a small proportion of 
the total benefits from land conversion. Guo Xiaoming (2005) documented that, in 
Chengdu Municipality of Sichuan Province and in Zhejiang Province, farmers 
received 5-10% of the benefits, villages 25-30%, and the government and developers 
60-70%. Another study by Han Jun et al60 and Li & Xu (2004) showed similar 
results.  
                                                        
57 Nan Xianghong and Shangguang Ximing (2008)  
58 Ding (2007); Wang Hongru (2006)  
59 Key cites will be provided later in the text. 
60 Han Jun et al. from the Rural Economy Group of the Development Research Center of the State Council, quoted 
in Wang Chunguang et al (2005). 
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A survey done by Yu Jianxing and Yang Shengyi (2003) in Ningbo Municipality, 
Zhejiang Province in 2002 showed that almost all the farmers surveyed thought that 
the compensation they received was far from enough to support their living, medical 
care or retirement. For many farmers, losing land meant losing their primary source of 
income. Gao Yong (2004) noted that the situation in the western regions was worse 
than in the eastern regions - because the level of compensation was usually lower, and 
there were fewer employment opportunities for farmers after they lost land. His study 
in the western regions showed that, in some areas, the highest level of compensation 
paid to farmers for both their land and their resettlement was 18,000 yuan per mu (i.e. 
1/15 of a hectare), not including the compensation for the existing crops on the land. 
This was only equivalent to 1.5 times the average annual disposable income of local 
urban residents.  
Many of the farmers who lose land have experienced a lowered income. A survey 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2003) found that 46% of the 
urbanized farmers covered by the survey experienced a decreased net income after 
losing land.61 The farmers experiencing the greatest decrease were those who used to 
depend mainly on agriculture for income, particularly in less developed regions. In 
Yunnan Province, for example, the annual per capita net income of the urbanized 
farmers who had lost land decreased by 26%.62 A study by Wang Chunguang and 
Chen lei (2004) in Zibo, Shandong Province63 showed that the number of farmers 
who lost land was large, and these “urbanized” farmers were often concentrated in 
                                                        
61 Rural Survey Team of National Bureau of Statistics (2003), quoted in Zhang Shifei and Liu Conglong 
62 Rural Survey Team of Yunnan Province (2003) 
63 Wang Chunguang & Chen Lei (2004) 
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certain parts of the city. The compensation paid by the government for land 
conversion was mostly kept by the villages, but the village leaders were ineffective in 
managing collective resources due to corruption and unclear property rights. 
Consequently, about 20% of the farmers in the study area had difficulty in making a 
living.  
Despite decreased net income, these farmers’ expenditures have increased in the 
meantime. Prior to losing land, these farmers produced many life necessities by 
themselves. Now, they have to buy them on the market. Those who move to cities also 
need to pay for heating, electricity and water, etc. According to a survey by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (2004), the average living expenses for farmers 
increased by approximately 30% after losing land in most of the regions surveyed.64 
A survey conducted in Jiangxi Province in 2003 showed that about 30% of the 
urbanized farmers experienced decreased net income, while their living expenses 
increased by approximately 30%.65  
Therefore, with decreased net income and increased living expenses, many 
farmers have experienced a significant decline in the quality of life. One survey in 
Zhejiang Province showed that 35% of the urbanized farmers reported difficulty in 
making a living.66 Another survey in Jiangsu Province showed that, among the 2 
million farmers who had lost land over the years, about 300,000 were below the 
poverty line.67 The situation in the less developed regions could be even worse. For 
                                                        
64 Ministry of Employment and Social Security (2004), quoted in Zhang Shifei and Liu Conglong (2005) 
65 Ministry of Employment and Social Insurance (2004), quoted in Zhang Shifei and Liu Conglong (2005) 
66 Zhu Mingfen (2003) 
67 Xu Yuanming (2004)  
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example, one survey in Yunnan Province showed that 20% of the urbanized farmers 
depended solely on the compensation from land conversion for living, 26% faced 
food problems, and 25% had an annual per capita net income of 625 yuan or less.68 In 
addition, surveys in Tianjin Municipality and Nanjing Municipality showed that less 
than 20% of the urbanized farmers had any kind of insurance.69  
Moreover, many farmers have difficulty adapting to urban life. A survey of 58 
villages by the Rural Research Center of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1999-2000 
showed that approximately 34% of the urbanized farmers did not have jobs.70 Several 
surveys conducted in the early 2000s showed that, in Chongqing Municipality, the 
unemployment rate for farmers was 30%, 4 times that of the entire municipality;71 in 
Shannxi Province, only 38% of the urbanized farmers were able to find jobs;72 and in 
Ningxia Autonomous Region, 43% of the urbanized farmers were unemployed.73 
Apart from a lack of education and skills by the farmers, the high cost of hiring 
local farmers by employers was identified by Zhang and Liu (2004) as a reason for 
farmers’ difficulty in getting jobs. In some economically advanced regions, an 
employer had to pay a much higher cost to hire a local, urbanized farmer than a 
“non-local” person coming from other, poor areas. In Xiamen Municipality, Fujian 
Province, for example, employers were required to pay social security and other fees 
                                                        
68 Rural Survey Team of Yunnan Province（2003）  
69 Tianjin Municipality’s Bureau of Employment and Social Insurance: “Survey Report on the Social Insurance for 
Farmers Who Have Lost Land to Urbanization in Tianjin” (Internal Report), Quoted in Zhang Shifei and Liu 
Conglong (2005) 
70 Fan Ping (2004) 
71 Ministry of Employment and Social Insurance: “Study on Social Insurance for Farmers Who Have Lost Land to 
Urbanization in Hunan and Chongqing” (Internal Report). quoted in Zhang Shifei and Liu Conglong (2005) 
72 Rural Survey Team of National Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
73 Rural Survey Team of Ningxia Autonomous Region (2003) 
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for local employees, and the cost of hiring a local worker could be 4-7 times higher 
than that of hiring a temporary worker coming from less developed regions. Therefore, 
the local farmers who had lost land but lacked relevant skills were much less 
competitive than non-local people on the job market.  
Even if some farmers do get employment, they face other problems. For example, 
Tangjun et al (2004)74 documented that, in Fengtai District, Beijing Municipality, the 
local governments typically required state-owned enterprises or organizations to 
provide jobs and be responsible for paying social security fees for the farmers who 
lost land due to compulsory land conversion. However, due to a lack of relevant 
training and skills, these farmers were more likely than others to be laid off if these 
entities were not doing well, and might therefore not be able to sustain paying for 
social security. Along the same lines, Zhejiang Rural Survey Team (2002)75 found 
that most companies were actually very unwilling to accept these farmers, who lacked 
the qualifications required by profit-seeking entities. Therefore, instead of finding 
entities to receive the farmers, most local governments would simply make lump sum 
cash or in-kind compensation to farmers. Zhu Mingfen (2003) observed that, since 
many farmers were “near-sighted” in spending, such cash compensations were often 
not sustainable. However, presumption about farmers’ nearsightedness may serve as a 
justification for a low level of compensation. 
It is worth mentioning in passing that, contrary to the existing surveys cited above, 
this dissertation finds that the farmers who lost land in Dragon City have actually 
                                                        
74 Tangjun and Zhang Shifei (2004)  
75 Rural Survey Team of Zhejiang Province (2003) 
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experienced improved living standards. There are two reasons for this. First, Dragon 
County carried out a reform in 2005 on the compensation system for compulsory land 
acquisition. Now, the level of compensation is much higher than before, and a pension 
system has been established for the farmers who have lost land. Second, Dragon 
County has a relatively high economic level with booming industrial development, 
and farming typically accounts for an unimportant portion of a farmer’s total income. 
These will be described in more detail later. 
On land disputes 
Land conversion has been a major source of disputes.76 In 2003, land conversion 
related disputes accounted for 27% of all the appeals received by the Office of Letters 
and Calls (OLC)77 of the MLR.78 In some rural areas, these disputes have become so 
serious that farmers’ actions to appeal to the government are “organized, antagonistic 
and persistent”.79  
In this regard, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the National Soft 
Science Program jointly conducted a study between August 2003 and June 2004.80 
They analyzed more than 60,000 phone calls and other voice messages received by a 
national media between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2004, and found that about 
15,000 (25%) were about rural land issues. (In China, newspapers and TVs serve as 
informal “referees” for disputes between individuals and the government, and 
                                                        
76 Lian Yuming and Wu Jianzhong (2006) 
77 An OLC is an office within a government agency to receive letters or calls of complaints from the public 
against public officials, as will be described and discussed in Chapter 6. 
78 Lian Yuming and Wu Jianzhong (2006) 
79 Guo Xiaoming (2005) 
80 Yu Jianrong (2005) 
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typically receive many letters or calls of appeals, as will be explained further in 
Chapter 6.) They also analyzed 4,300 appeal letters received by another national 
media since August 2003, and found that 1,325 (31%) were about rural land disputes. 
They surveyed 720 farmers who came to Beijing in person to appeal to the national 
government, and found that more than 70% of them had come for land disputes. They 
also surveyed 130 cases of rural “riots” involving police intervention, and found that 
87 (67%) were caused by land disputes.  
The study team randomly selected 837 out of all the appeal letters on land disputes 
received by the afore-mentioned national media, and found that 60% of them were 
about land acquisition. Among them, 277 (33%) were about compulsory land 
acquisition using force, 192 (23%) about low or even zero compensation, and 34 (4%) 
about resettlement arrangements. Among these 837 letters, almost 80% were sent by 
individual villagers, indicating that individual farmers were the most dissatisfied. 
Villager Groups and Villagers’ committees accounted for 19%, indicating that village 
leaders sometimes shared the same interests and might cooperate with farmers in 
order to protest against other players during land conversion (See Table 1). Among 
those being accused, local governments and village leaders accounted for the majority 
(See Table 2). The study team also found that county and municipal governments 
were blamed mostly for compulsory land acquisition, while township authorities and 
village leaders mostly for disputes related to farmland lease rights.   
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Table 1 Classification of the Accusing Parties in Land Disputes81 
 
 
Table 2 Classification of the Accused Parties in Land Disputes82 
 
The study also found that conflicts were most frequent in the eastern coastal 
regions where economic growth was most rapid, particularly Zhejiang, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Hebei, and Guangdong provinces. The conflicts often took the form of open 
protest or demonstration by farmers, and frequently developed into confrontation 
between the protestors and the police, causing significant social tension. 
 Another empirical study by He Jingxi (2006) in the rural areas of Chengdu 
Municipality, one of the most developed regions in western China, found that the 
frequency and intensity of land disputes were related to the role that farmland played 
                                                        
81 Source of data: Yu, Jianrong (2005) 
82 Source of data: Yu, Jianrong (2005) 
Total observations: 837 
Accused Parties No. of Cases Percentage 
Municipality-level authorities 108 13 
County-level authorities 221 26 
Township-level authorities 217 26 
Village leaders 192 23 
Authorities of development zones 67 8 
Developers 32 4 
Total 837 100 
 
Total observations: 837 
Accusing Parties No. of Cases Percentage 
Jointly signed by villagers 629 75.1 
Villager groups 123 14.7 
Villagers’ committees 34 4.1 
Rural organizations such as Elderly Villagers Associations 22 2.6 
Individual Villagers 29 3.5 
Total 837 100 
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in farmers’ livelihoods. Farmers with no alternative ways of making a living tended to 
expect higher compensation from land conversion, and were more likely to end up in 
conflict with the government. The study also found that farmers often did not think 
that compulsory land acquisition by the government was justified in the first place, 
which was a main cause for disputes. This is a key point. However, if paid more, 
farmers may actually favor conversion, as will be illustrated by the story of Dragon in 
the following chapters.  
 
4. Conceptual analytical framework of the dissertation 
   This dissertation aims to develop some insights into the Chinese land conversion 
process through a case study. The author is modestly hoping that the readers of this 
dissertation will include not only scholars but also others who have a practical interest 
in the topic. In order to make the case study interesting to read, he deliberately 
postpones much theoretical discussions until the end of Part II of the dissertation. This 
may appear a bit “unconventional” for a dissertation, but has the advantage that some 
theoretical concepts can be explained and discussed in a more illuminating way after 
the story about the county selected for the case study has already been told.  
The case study deals with a current, important and complex policy subject 
holistically; consequently, it appears as a broad, panoramic study rather than a 
microanalysis. 83  It is thus useful to explain the analytical framework of the 
                                                        
83 This is a key feature of a qualitative study, as identified by Rossman and Rallis, 1998, quoted in Creswell 2003, 
P 182. 
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dissertation upfront, so that the reader will better understand how the author tries to 
weave the various “threads” of the case study into a comprehensive story that serves 
as a basis for answering the overall research question.  
As already mentioned in the Preface, the research question of this dissertation is 
whether the Chinese land conversion process leads to efficient and equitable land use. 
The hypothesis is that the institutions guiding the land conversion process, as 
described earlier, are responsible for inefficient and inequitable land uses. 
Conceptually, there are two ways to test the hypothesis. One is to identify inefficient 
and inequitable land uses, then trace back to the causes; and the other is to identify 
potential weaknesses of the institutions, then find out if they have led to inefficient 
and inequitable land uses. This is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 Conceptual Analytical Model 
 
Three distinctions critical for understanding the Chinese land conversion process 
The Chinese land conversion process may be seen as a game played by various 
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players – such as the government, developers, the village, and farmers – who pursue 
their own interests based on the existing institutions. Three distinctions are important 
for understanding the complex interactions among these players.  
A first distinction is drawn by James M. Buchanan between two levels of 
processes: one is the constitutional stage of decision-making, and the other is policy 
acts within the existing constitutional regime. The former provides the “rules of the 
game”, while the latter are the individual plays of the game. In different terminologies, 
Chairman Mao Zedong makes a similar distinction between “root causes” and 
“symptoms”. One of his famous admonitions to Chinese officials was that they should 
not “treat the head only for headache, and the feet only for foot-ache”,84 implying 
that, in addressing policy problems, one should aim to address the root causes (i.e. the 
“rules of the game”), not the symptoms (i.e. the individual plays).  
Along these lines, this dissertation distinguishes between two types of institutions: 
those providing the rules which determine how the game shall be played, and those 
which are the outcomes of the actions taken by the players based on the rules. For 
instance, China’s top-down political structure for developing land use plans is a “rule 
of the game”, because it determines how the plans shall be made; whereas the CLUPs 
and UPs developed as such are “policy acts”, which are the results of the interactions 
of the players based on the constraints of the rules. Such a distinction is crucial for 
understanding the Chinese land system and other related policies. This dissertation 
will show that many Chinese land policies have failed because they try to address the 
                                                        
84 This is called “Tou Tong Yi Tou, Jiao Tong Yi Jiao” in Chinese. 
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“policy acts” that appear to have gone astray – without attempting to change the 
“rules” on which these policy acts are based. 
A second distinction is between “formal” and “informal” institutions. Formal 
institutions typically take the form of laws or regulations designed for the entire 
country – or at least for an entire jurisdiction, and can be either “rules” or “policy 
acts”. This dissertation will illustrate that many of these institutions are designed to be 
vague or ambiguous, so as to maximize the power of the government. Viewed from a 
game theory perspective, they provide many opportunities for public officials and 
other players to pursue personal gains by engaging in rent-seeking acts.  
There are also informal institutions, which are social customs or norms based on 
which people interact with each other. In particular, this dissertation will describe the 
central importance of personal relations networks to the workings of the Chinese land 
system and the Chinese society in general, and analyze the historical, economic and 
political context for this phenomenon. In many circumstances, informal institutions 
actually play greater roles than formal ones. 
A third distinction is between “legality” and “legitimacy”. Legality means 
compliance with the formal institutions. However, if formal institutions are developed 
and enforced in a top-down manner with little or no public participation, there are 
good reasons to question their legitimacy. In other words, non-compliance with these 
institutions is not necessarily illegitimate. Moreover, when formal institutions are 
poorly designed, illegality may actually serve to make the system work. For instance, 
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this dissertation will argue that, if the Chinese farmland protection policy had been 
followed in a strict manner, China’s economic growth would not have been so rapid 
during the last decade. In this light, this dissertation may appear to be somehow 
“sympathetic” towards certain illegalities, because it views such behaviors as the 
“rational choice” of the players who try to maximize personal gains by taking 
advantage of the shortfalls in the institutions that are designed as such. This, of course, 
should not be misconstrued as meaning that all forms of illegality are good. 
Corruption, for example, is a widespread phenomenon in the land conversion process, 
and is morally bad.  
Some initial notes about efficiency and equity  
To analyze the efficiency and equity consequences of land conversion, the 
dissertation draws on various microeconomic tools and philosophical views, which 
will be discussed in theoretical terms in Chapter 11. For now, it is necessary to make a 
few initial notes.  
First, efficiency and equity need to be assessed from both temporal and spatial 
perspectives. From a temporal perspective, what appears to be efficient or equitable 
land conversion at one point may turn out to be a poor decision in the long run. This 
dissertation analyzes the land use history of Dragon County between the mid-1990s 
and the late 2000s. Although this seems to be a reasonable length of time for the 
effects of some land conversion decisions to manifest, there are also many cases 
where the discussions about efficiency and equity consequences are just 
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“speculative”. 
The spatial effects are much more complex, and can be viewed at three levels: 
local, national and international. At the local level, land conversion promotes 
economic growth, generates jobs, increases (or decreases in some cases) the value of 
the real estate properties in nearby neighborhoods, and even causes pollution, etc. At 
the national level, a central concern has been that China’s food security may be 
affected if an excessive amount of farmland is converted to non-farming uses.  
In order to stay focused, this dissertation will address the local- and national-level 
effects only. Yet, it should be mentioned that the effects of land use changes go 
beyond national boundaries. A notable example is that China’s rapid industrialization, 
for which land is an important input, in the last several decades has given rise to 
serious air pollution problems, which are believed by many to have affected 
neighboring countries such as Japan and Korea.85 Another example more directly 
relevant to the topic of the dissertation is that land use changes affect global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in at least two ways. First, the conversion of 
farmland to industrial and commercial uses will inevitably lead to increased energy 
use and consequently more GHG emissions. Second, if China is to import more food 
from the international market as a result of farmland loss, the transportation of food 
will also lead to increased GHG emissions. The latter aspect is part of a complex issue 
regarding the effects of international trade on GHG emissions. As the Chinese 
                                                        
85 Japanese scientists have been studying this issue since the 1990s. This issue has also been a focus of attention 
from the media. A recent example of media report is “China’s pollution quietly takes its toll on Japan” by Kyoko 
Hasegawa, The Taipei Times, April 5, 2008. 
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economy expands rapidly, consumption in China will increase, so will be the demand 
for the import of goods which China does not have a comparative advantage in 
producing. Both the production and transportation of these goods will cause GHG 
emissions. As far as the current situation is concerned, China is also a large exporter 
of goods in which GHG emissions are “embodied”. For example, Weber et al. 
(2008)86 find that, in 2005, around one third (i.e. 1,700 Mt) of China’s CO2 emissions 
were due to production of exports, and this proportion had risen from 12% (i.e. 
230 Mt) in 1987 and only 21% (i.e. 760 Mt) in 2002. In a case study about the carbon 
emissions “embodied” in the goods imported by Norway from developing countries, 
Reinvang et al. (2008) find that China is the developing country where Norway’s 
carbon footprint is largest and increasing most rapidly, almost tripling from 2.4 Mt in 
2001 to 6.8 Mt in 2006.87  This means that, in 2006, each Norwegian emitted 
approximately 1.5 tons of CO2 on average by consuming goods imported from China. 
(China’s per capita carbon emission was only 3.2 tons in 2003.88) Of course, global 
warming is not a focus of this dissertation. Yet, this is just one example showing how 
land use can be connected, directly or indirectly, to global issues that are very 
complex and challenging to deal with – as has been the case with international 
negotiations on climate change.  
A second note is that both efficiency and equity are value-laden terms. In 
particular, a central question the dissertation addresses is whether the Chinese 
                                                        
86 Weber, Christopher; Peters, Glen P.; Guan, Dabo; and Hubacek, Klaus (2008) 
87 Reinvang, Rasmus and Peters, Glen (2008) 
88 Quoting Xie Zhenhua, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, by Jiang 
Baocheng and Li Baojie (2008) 
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farmland protection objective is economically efficient. An answer to this question, as 
will be illustrated through the case study, requires one’s assessment of the trade-offs 
between the economic benefits brought about by land conversion and the potential 
risks associated with a lack of ability for food self-sufficiency due to farmland loss. 
Farmland protection is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving an end. Yet, 
different players have different interpretations of the “end”. It is thus essential to 
assess efficiency based on a thorough review of the historical, political, social and 
economic context. As will be described and discussed in Chapter 3, there is now a 
debate in China regarding whether China should relax the farmland protection 
objective. This dissertation argues in favor of the current policy, but acknowledges 
that such a debate is likely to continue for a long time because people’s propositions 
on this issue depend on their personal interpretations of social values and that it is 
difficult – if possible at all - to find a clear-cut answer. 
A third note is that a centrally planned system, as the Chinese land system clearly 
is, has the inherent disadvantage of being unable to allocate resources efficiently due 
to what is called the “economic calculation problem” by Ludwig von Mises – the 
impossibility of the government being able to make the economic calculations 
required to organize a complex economy.89 This dissertation will show that informal 
processes often serve to fix the problems in such a system, but through high 
transaction costs. In this regard, Mancur Olson, drawing on examples from the Soviet 
Union and other former communist countries, argues that informal processes have 
                                                        
89 Mises, Ludwig von Mises (1951): Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. In a similar way, János 
Kornai, in his 1988 book The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, uses the term “shortage 
economy” to describe a centrally planned economy due to its inability for efficient resource allocation. 
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inherent limitations.90 His proposition is that the rulers of a highly centralized system 
lack a sufficiently “encompassing interest”,91 and thus have less incentives to define 
or enforce contract rights or property rights. Consequently, there are “self-enforcing 
transactions”, with goods exchanged on the spot for money or other goods. The credit 
market is lacking in these countries, so transactions over distance or time are risky. 
This means they cannot benefit from credit arrangements and other central features of 
modern economies. This dissertation shows that the lack of certainty in informal 
processes and of clarity in property rights in China have indeed incurred significant 
economic and social costs. But apart from that, it also shows that informal processes 
favor the wealthy more than the economically disadvantaged, and will lead to a 
widening of income disparity and increase social tension, making economic 
development unsustainable. 
Transaction costs are critical for understanding the behaviors of both firms and 
public polices. Oliver E. Williamson 92  argues that contractual arrangements 
developed by firms can be understood correctly only when interpreted in light of the 
real-world transaction costs that characterize particular business situations. In other 
words, contractual arrangements that appear to be inefficient may actually represent 
innovative and efficient ways of reducing transaction costs involved in business 
dealings. Echoing Williamson, Avinash K. Dixit argues that many apparently 
inefficient outcomes can in fact be understood as consequences of constraints 
                                                        
90 Mancur Olson (2000) 
91 The bigger the majority in whose interests the government is ruling, the larger the encompassing interest. 
92 Williamson, Oliver E. (1985) 
 43 
imposed by various transaction costs, or as creditable attempts to cope with them.93 
In general, this dissertation finds these propositions apply to public policies as well. 
For example, a main conclusion of the dissertation is that China’s farmland protection 
objective, which appears to be “over-strict” and inefficient, is actually a wise way of 
dealing with widespread local non-compliance, which is an inevitable consequence of 
the existing Chinese political system. 
Clearly, there is a need to minimize transaction cost by improving the institutions, 
such as establishing clear property rights. Yet, Douglas North explains that the state 
first maximizes returns for the ruler and then, subject to this constraint, tries to reduce 
transaction costs throughout the economy; and that where the ruler is an individual or 
the representative of a small group, the interests of rulers will not normally coincide 
with those of society as a whole.94 This dissertation delves into how China’s central 
policy-makers address land policy issues, and discusses what have constrained them 
from improving the existing institutions.   
 
5. Introduction to the county selected for the case study 
 Most of the existing literature focuses on certain aspects of the land conversion 
process in the form of surveys, theoretical discussions, or news stories. I have found 
no empirical studies that look at the motives, strategies and behaviors of the various 
players and the efficiency and equity consequences of their dynamic interactions in a 
                                                        
93 Dixit, Avinash K. (1996) 
94 North (1981)  
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holistic way.   
 I choose Dragon County as the site for a case study that aims to fill this literature 
gap, for three reasons: First, it is a coastal county in China’s rapidly developing 
eastern part. Urbanization has been very rapid in the past 10-15 years, and will 
continue to be so in the future. Second, 87 percent of all the farmland in Dragon is 
“prime farmland” that is supposed to be protected fully, so the county faces the dual 
challenges of rapid urbanization and farmland protection. Third, the county is 
relatively small in size, which makes an in-depth case study manageable for a 
dissertation.  
 This section will introduce Dragon County and its capital Dragon City, including 
their main social and economic indicators, urbanization history, and future 
development plans.    
Dragon County 
Dragon County, as I will call it, is located on the eastern coast of China. For 
confidentiality reasons, the municipality to which Dragon County belongs will be 
called Phoenix Municipality, and the province to which Phoenix Municipality belongs 
will be called Province A.   
Dragon County consists of approximately 1,000 villages in about 20 townships 
with a total area of close to 2,000 km2 and a population of more than 800, 000 in 2005. 
It has about 140 km of coastline, with more than 10 bays of various sizes and a few 
small islands. There are more than 100 rivers of various lengths running through the 
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county. The climate is temperate monsoon. On average, the annual temperature is 
12℃, the number of non-frost days is more than 200 per year, and annual 
precipitation is almost 800 mm.  
The topography of the county is a mixture of plains and hilly land. It has 
approximately 2.2 million mu (i.e. approximately 147,000 hectares) of crop, forest or 
grassland, among which about 1.1 million mu is cropland, and almost 600,000 mu is 
forested area. The county is rich in fishery resources. More than 260 types of fish and 
shrimps are found in its bays.      
According to official statistics, in 2005, the county’s per capita GDP was 36,000 
yuan, the average disposable income of urban residents was 11,000 yuan (i.e. 
approximately $1,600), and the per capita net income of farmers was close to 6,000 
yuan. In terms of economic strength, the county was ranked among the top 100 in 
more than 2,000 counties in China. Agriculture, manufacturing and services 
accounted for 10%, 62%, and 28% respectively of the economic structure in terms of 
value added in 2005. Within the agricultural sector, farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fisheries accounted for 33%, 1%, 21% and 44% respectively in terms 
of value added.  
The main products of manufacturing include rubber, textile machineries, home 
appliances, electronic parts, and food processing, etc. The main export products 
include home appliances, electronic parts and processed food, etc. Most new 
manufacturing companies are relatively large, with an initial investment of at least 5 
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million yuan, because, as will be explained later, it is more difficult for small 
companies to acquire land from the local governments.  
Dragon has a highly educated local work force. Almost all the workers below the 
age of 35 have received at least 9-12 years of formal school education. In addition, 
there is a large population of young people coming from other regions to run small 
trade businesses or seek jobs in Dragon.     
The level of urbanization of the county was 50.6% in 2007, and the annual 
population growth rate is about 3-4%.  
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The case study focuses on Dragon City, the capital of Dragon County, although 
other areas of the county are also covered. Dragon City is located in the northeastern 
part of the county, facing the ocean on the east and surrounded by low hills or 
cropland on the other sides. Transportation to other regions from the city is very 
convenient by road. A National Road95 and a highway run through or by the city (See 
Map 1). It is 70 km2 to Phoenix City, the capital of Phoenix Municipality, by road, 
and about 20 km2 to a ferry station in County A, from where it takes about 20 minutes 
to go to Phoenix City by ferry.  
Since the 1950s, the city has undergone great changes in size (See Map 2). In the 
1950s and 1960s, the city was limited to a small area along Main Road A, which is the 
section of the National Road that ran across the city, and clustered around the 
long-distance bus station. In the 1980s and the 1990s, as the city became more 
populated, the section of the National Road that went through the city changed its 
route from Main Road A to Main Road B, which is about 1 km to the east, in order to 
avoid the crowded downtown. The city expanded eastwards accordingly, but was 
largely limited to the area between Main Road A and Main Road B. Since the early 
1990s, the city has been growing more rapidly. By 1995, the city extended as far as 
Main Road D, which is about 1.5 km to the east of Main Road B. As a consequence, 
the Dragon City Section of the National Road had to change its route again to Main 
Road D. 
                                                        
95 A national road is a road that runs across provinces. 
 48 
 
Map 2 Illustrative Map of Dragon City (Not Drawn to Scale) 
 
The most significant expansion of the city occurred after the late 1990s. In order 
to stimulate the growth of the city, the county government decided to implement an 
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Main Road A. Phase I of the program (AAP1) was completed in 1998. Approximately 
2,500 apartments of various sizes were constructed, and sold to urban residents at a 
fixed price of 650 yuan (which was about $80 according to the exchange rate of the 
time) per m2 of floor area.96 Incidentally, the so-called “sales price” of apartments or 
housing in China is, strictly speaking, “rent price”. This is because all land in cities is 
owned by the state, as mentioned earlier, and that individuals have only the use right 
to the land occupied by their apartments or housing for typically 70 years. 97 
Nevertheless, the price of these AAP1 apartments was unbelievably low. The main 
reason was that the county government wanted to attract a critical mass of urban 
residents to move to this coastal area in order to stimulate the development there. 
Phase II of the program (AAP2) followed shortly, with more than 3,000 apartments 
built, drawing more people to move to this new area.  
In the meantime, in an effort to attract investment and thereby promote local 
economic growth, the county government established the Dragon Economic 
Development Zone (EDZ), which covered a large area between the eastern coast and 
the old city and was largely empty at the time. In order to stimulate the development 
of the EDZ, the county government moved the main government building and a 
number of government agencies from the old downtown to the EDZ in 2000.   
As new investment projects filled up much of the land in the EDZ rapidly, the 
                                                        
96 In Chinese terms, this refers to sales price of per m2 of “constructed floor area”, which equals the actual usable 
floor space within an apartment plus the floor space occupied by the walls of the apartment plus the total public 
space of the neighborhood divided by the number of apartments in it. Typically, for an apartment of 100 m2 in 
terms of constructed floor area, the actual usable floor space within the apartment is approximately 60-70 m2.         
97 According to the Property Rights Law of China, passed in 2007, the users of residential land can, in principle, 
have the use right renewed after 70 years. However, the law does not state how this will be done.  
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county government decided in 2002 to establish Industrial Park A, located to the south 
of the affordable apartments and between Main Road D and the eastern coast, in order 
to accommodate more investment. In addition, a college town, located to the southeast 
of Industrial Park A, was planned to attract universities and colleges to establish 
campuses there. Then, in 2004, the county government decided to establish Industrial 
Park B, located to the north of the EDZ, to develop manufacturing industries, and in 
the meantime change the development focus of Industrial Park A to services and 
residential use.  
In 2007, Dragon city covered more than 52 km2, and its population was 340,000. 
According to the Comprehensive Urban Plan of Dragon City, which will be described 
in detail in Chapter 7, Dragon City shall cover 48 km2 (which has already been 
exceeded) in 2010 when the population is expected to reach 400,000, and 70 km2 by 
2020 when the population is expected to reach 600,000.  
Dragon County’s long-term urbanization blueprint 
According to the blueprint of the county, urbanization will continue at a rapid 
pace in the future, and three urban clusters shall emerge within the boundary of 
Dragon County in the long term (i.e. beyond 2020). As shown in Map 3, Cluster A 
shall include Dragon city and several satellite towns, and its economy shall depend 
mainly on high-tech and light industries, education-related services, and tourism. 
Cluster B shall consist of Township E - which is about 20 km to the south of Dragon 
City - and its surrounding areas, and shall be developed into a tourist and residential 
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center. Cluster C shall be made up of Township F -which is about 30 km to the south 
of Dragon City - and its surrounding areas, and shall become a heavy industry center.   
 In order to support the development of these three clusters, the county has been 
building a major road along the coast. The sections that pass through Dragon City 
have been completed for several years. The other sections are under construction but 
unfinished.  
 
Map 3 Illustrative Map of the Planned Urban Clusters within Dragon County for the Long Term 
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PART I  THE PLAYERS AND THE REFEREES 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
 
Part I of the dissertation will introduce and describe the motives, strategies and 
behaviors of the various players in the land conversion game, who mainly include:   
- The village;  
- Farmers;  
- Higher-level governments, which refer to municipal, provincial and national 
governments; 
- Local governments, which refer to county and township governments; and  
- Developers, consisting mainly of industrial developers, commercial real 
estate developers, and land speculators. 
 
 
Figure 5 The Players of the Land Conversion Game and Their “Formal” Relationships   
 
Figure 5 is a graphical illustration of their formal relations, which, based on the 
existing Chinese institutions described earlier, are governed by a hierarchical structure: 
The higher-level governments set land use planning objectives for local governments; 













farmers, and then sell the land use rights to developers. In the figure, the players are 
connected by downward arrows - representing top-down relations - with the exception 
that the village and the farmers have a two-direction relationship because village 
leaders are elected by and thus supposed to be responsive to the needs of the farmers. 
Land speculators are connected to local governments through a “dotted” downward 
arrow - representing an “informal” top-down relationship - because land speculation 
by private parties exists in practice but is not formally allowed, as will be explained 
later.  
Part I will also describe and discuss the role of the referees, which mainly include 
the courts, the Offices of Letters and Calls, and the party’s Disciplinary Inspection 
Committee, etc. They are part of - and controlled by - the government, and therefore 
not shown in Figure 5. 
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CHAPTER 1 VILLAGE 
 
1. Introduction 
 The village is China’s lowest-level jurisdiction. In Dragon County, a village 
typically has one hundred to a few hundred households, each consisting of 2-4 people 
on average. All households in a village live in a concentrated area, surrounded by 
farmland. Figure 6 shows the layout of the residential area of a typical village in 
Dragon with, say, 30 households.     
 
Figure 6 Layout of the Residential Area of A Typical Village with 30 Households 
 
This chapter will first discuss the inherent problems with the collective ownership 
of farmland by the village; then describe the decision-making mechanism of a village, 
and explain the complex relations between village leaders and farmers and between 
village leaders and the township government in administering collective resources; 
and lastly assess the importance of land to a village’s financial situation.  
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2. Collective ownership of farmland 
The land tenure system is critical for understanding the village. This section will 
first review briefly the evolution of the Chinese land tenure system, and then discuss 
key issues identified through the case study in Dragon County. 
Evolution of the Chinese land tenure system 
The Chinese land tenure system has undergone many changes since ancient 
times. 98  In Xizhou Era (11th-7th century B.C.), the king delegated land to his 
immediate subjects, but retained absolute power over all land. In turn, his immediate 
subjects could delegate land to their inferiors, but retained their control over the land. 
It was a multi-level ownership system: The king, his subjects and their inferiors 
co-owned the land, but lower-level owners had to defer to higher-level ones. Such a 
system often led to confusion in property rights and social conflicts.  
By the Spring and Autumn Period (770-474 B.C.) and the Warring States Period 
(475-221 B.C.), the old land tenure system had broken down, and the king started to 
grant land directly to landlords or farmers. Private ownership became dominant. This 
was the beginning of the separation of private ownership from state ownership. The 
Qin and Han Dynasties (221 B.C. – A.D. 220) continued to see such separation. 
However, the state was weak in protecting private land property rights. Force was 
constantly used by some people to seize land from others, which was an indication of 
weak property rights.   
                                                        
98The following review of the Chinese land tenure history draws on Wei Tian’an (2003) and Luo Fuyong & Ke 
Juanli (2006) 
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Land property rights became better defined in the Xijin, Sui and Tang Dynasties 
(265-907). The state tried to protect the ownership of land by both “big” landlords and 
“small” farmers. However, the land owners of the time had to face many restrictions 
regarding the amount of land they were allowed to own, ownership transfer, and land 
reclamation, etc. Due to these limitations, transfer of land ownership was not common, 
and land property rights still remained largely unclear. 
During these and the following feudal periods, the state was ineffective in 
protecting the economic interests of private land owners. The political power of 
individuals provided better guarantees of land ownership rights. Therefore, both big 
landlords and small farmers had strong incentives to seek political power or protection. 
This was an important phenomenon in the development of the land tenure system in 
China.99 In some ways, the informal land system today still reflects these ancient 
Chinese tendencies. 
In the early 1900s, Sun Yat-sen led a revolution to establish the Republic of China 
(1912-1949). According to the statistics of the time, landlords and rich farmers, who 
constituted 15% of the population, owned 81% of all land; while most other farmers 
worked for the landlords as tenants. Sun Yat-sen put forward his “egalitarian land 
rights” policy in order to win political support from farmers for the revolution he led. 
Under this policy, landlords were required to report to the government the prices of 
the land they owned. The government could choose to buy the land if the reported 
prices were low, or levy taxes according to the reported prices if they were high. 
                                                        
99 Wei Tian-an (2003)  
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Through such a policy, Sun hoped to reduce the amount of land owned by big 
landlords. However, the policy was not implemented effectively, because the 
government did not have sufficient financial capacity to buy up much land from the 
landlords, and the landlords could shift the burden of land taxes to tenants.     
By the time the People’s Republic of China (1949 to present) was established, 
landlords owned about 50-80% of all land in China, and “rich farmers” owned about 
10-15%.100 The new regime carried out a land reform according to The Land Reform 
Law promulgated in June 1950. By the end of 1952, more than 300 million farmers 
who previously had no or little land were granted land to be owned privately. Then, in 
the late 1950s, the private ownership of land was abolished to make way for collective 
ownership, which has been in effect until the present day.  
Main problems with the collective ownership of farmland in Dragon County 
Like all other regions in China, Dragon County has had collective ownership of 
farmland since the 1950s. However, the way collective ownership is administered has 
changed dramatically over the years. In the 1960s and the 1970s, land was farmed 
collectively and the harvest shared by all villagers. This communist style of farming 
was nicknamed “eating out of the same big pot”. Following the economic reforms in 
the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the county started to implement 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in the early 1980s. Land was contracted 
to individual households for 15 years, and farmers were allowed to make independent 
farming decisions and keep most of the harvest for their own use.   
                                                        
100 Chen Jing (2005) 
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In 1994, the county underwent another rural land reform. Each village divided its 
land into “grain land”, contracted to individual farmers, and “reserve land”, to be 
administered by the village collective; and the term of farmers’ grain land contracts 
was extended by 30 years, on top of that of their original contracts signed in the early 
1980s. (In October 2008, the CCP Central Committee passed a resolution to further 
extend the duration of farmers’ land use contracts by an infinite period. The likely 
effects of this new policy will be discussed in Chapter 12.) On average, each farmer in 
Dragon received approximately 1 mu (i.e. 1/15 of a hectare) of grain land.  
  This case study covers a number of rural villages in a few townships (see Map 
4), and reveals three major problems with the collective ownership of farmland. A 
first problem is that the bundle of rights entailed in collective ownership is very 
limited, for two reasons, among others. First, as mentioned before, collectively owned 
farmland can be used for no other purpose than farming. Otherwise, it has to be 
converted to “state-owned” land first. 101  Second, the state, represented by the 
government, has the power to acquire land from villages based on “public interest”. It 
is worth mentioning that full property rights to land - which would include exclusive 
ownership, absolute right to income from the property, and free transfer rights102 - do 
not exist in any modern society. A society always exercises some kinds of control over 
land property rights. Land ownership is exclusive, but not absolute.103 Even private 
land ownership in other countries has limitations. In the United States, for example, 
                                                        
101 This limitation has been relaxed a bit in Guangdong and other regions, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
12.  
102 Yuan Cheng (2004); Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf (2000), p77 
103 Barlowe (1972) 
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governments can limit land property rights in the interest of public health or safety, 
such as setting up soil conservation zones, or enforcing forest-cutting restrictions. 
Under eminent domain, governments can appropriate private property for public uses 
without the consent of the owner as long as the property is taken under due process of 
law and with the payment of just compensation. 104  However, in China, the 
government monopolizes the land market through compulsory land acquisition – not 
only for public purposes but also for use by private parties.105 The concept of “public 
interest” is very vague in China, and its determination is largely subject to the will of 
government leaders who guide land conversion decisions, as will be discussed further 
later. 
                                                        
104 In the US, the state exercises five types of social control on property rights: police power, eminent domain, 
taxation, spending, and proprietary powers. The purposes of these social controls are, respectively, to limit 
property rights in the interests of public health or safety (such as setting up wind-erosion, soil conservation zones, 
or enforce forest-cutting restrictions), to appropriate private property for public uses without the consent of the 
owner as long as the property is taken under due process of law with the payment of just compensation, to collect 
revenue; to achieve particular objectives in land use, and to acquire and administering land resources for their own 
use (Barlowe P391).  
105 Task Force on China’s Land Reform, State Council’s Development Research Center (2006) 
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Map 4 Villages and Townships Covered by the Study 
(Not Drawn to Scale) 
A second problem with collective ownership is about the reserve land. According 
to a national government requirement, the reserve land shall not exceed 5% of all the 
land of a village. However, during the 1994 Land Reform, most villages set aside 
more reserve land. The village typically uses an auction process to lease its reserve 
land to farmers, usually for 10-20 years as a term. Whoever offers the highest price 
receives the contract. However, village leaders sometimes manipulate the auction 
process in favor of their relatives or close friends, as will be described with specific 
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A third problem with collective ownership is its difficulty in accommodating 
population or land changes. Land tenure stability is important for long-term 
agricultural productivity, because farmers would not take as much care of the land if 
they cannot keep it for long. Therefore, the Land Administration Law stipulates that 
the current grain land contracts signed between farmers and their village collectives 
shall remain unchanged for 30 years - which, in principle, rules out the possibility of 
any redistribution of grain land within a village before the expiration of the current 
contracts.    
However, the membership of a village changes constantly because there are often 
births, deaths, and new marriages, and that some people go to cities to attend college 
or work and do not return. Therefore, there is a need to accommodate such changes on 
a periodical basis. In theory, the reserve land of a village can be used to serve this 
purpose partially. In reality, the reserve lands are often not available because, as 
mentioned earlier, they are usually on rent for a term of 10-20 years.   
There are generally two approaches in Dragon to deal with this problem. One 
approach, adopted by most villages, such as H, L, M and N (See Map 3), is not to 
allow any redistribution of grain land before the expiration of the current contracts - 
no matter what happens. This approach is called, in Chinese terms, Zeng Ren Bu Zeng 
Di, Jian Ren Bu Jian Di, which literally means “not giving land to new members, and 
not taking land away from those who are no longer members”. The other approach, 
adopted by some villages that have relatively more reserve land, is to turn some 
reserve land into grain land for some new members of the collective. However, even 
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these villages do not take land away from those who have passed away or left the 
village permanently.  
These two different approaches have led to a practical problem: some farmers 
have two shares of grain land, whereas others have no land at all. For example, farmer 
D, who is from Village L but married to a man from Village I, has two shares of grain 
land because she is allowed to retain her grain land in Village L and has received a 
new share in Village I. (Incidentally, it is a general custom in most rural areas of 
China that women move to their husbands’ villages after getting married.) It is 
conceivable that, in the villages that do not allow any form of land redistribution, 
those who were born after the land reform in the early 1990s do not have any land. 
This was not a big issue during the 1994 Rural Land Reform, for two reasons: 
First, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 2, farming was (and still is) not an 
attractive source of income. Second, despite the unattractiveness of farming, farmers 
who had grain land were required to pay agricultural tax at the time. However, two 
recent developments have made this issue a central concern for the farmers who do 
not have grain land. First, the exemption of agricultural tax since 2004 means that 
grain land is actually provided to farmers for free. Second, given the urbanization 
blueprint of Dragon County as described earlier, the farmers in the affected townships 
realize that their areas may soon become urbanized, which means that those having 
grain land now have a chance of receiving a decent amount of compensation for their 
land taken.     
A related, albeit different, issue is what a village does if it has lost a portion, but 
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not all, of its land to compulsory land acquisition. Typically, the village distributes the 
compensation for the land converted among the affected farmers only, so the other 
farmers keep their land but do not receive any payments. However, a survey done by 
Li and Xu (2004) in 17 villages in Anhui, Hainan and Guangxi Provinces has different 
findings, as shown in Table 3. They note that Strategy 3, which is also the one adopted 
by the villages in Dragon, is most welcomed by the farmers surveyed. Strategy 1 and 
2 require a redistribution of the remaining land and therefore disrupt the stability of 
the land use rights of farmers. Strategy 4 and 5 usually apply to reserve land only.  
Table 3 Strategies Used by Villages in Distributing Compensation  
in 17 Villages Surveyed by Li and Xu (2004) in Anhui, Hainan and Guangxi 
 
 Strategies No. of Land 
Conversion Cases 
1 The village distributes the compensation to all villagers, then 
redistributes the remaining land among all villagers.  
7 
2 The village keeps the compensation, then redistributes the remaining 
land among all villagers.  
6 
3 The village distributes the compensation to the farmers who lose land 
without redistributing the remaining land among all villagers. 
12 
4 The village distributes the compensation to all farmers without 
redistributing the remaining land. 
4 
5 The village keeps the compensation without redistributing the 
remaining land. 
5 
 Total cases of land conversion in 17 villages  34 
 
3. Village leaders 
The administrative power of a village resides in the villagers’ committee elected 
by all villagers. A villagers’ committee can have a maximum of six members: the 
chairperson who is also the legal person of the village, an accountant, a cashier, a 
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family planning officer, a dispute mediation officer, and an administrative assistant.  
Each village also has a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) branch elected by all 
CCP members in the village. CCP members account for a small proportion of all 
villagers, typically about 5-10% in most villages in Dragon. In order to become a CCP 
member, one needs to apply to the CCP branch and show that he meets the necessary 
qualifications. On average, CCP members are more active and more highly educated 
than other villagers. Being a CCP member does not carry much personal benefits for a 
farmer, except that he may become a candidate for a member of the CCP branch, 
which is a paid job. (In cities, CCP members generally have better chances than 
non-members to get promotion at government agencies or state-owned enterprises, 
other things being equal. Therefore, people have greater incentives to become CCP 
members there.) A village’s CCP branch typically consists of a party secretary, an 
officer responsible for organizational matters, and an officer responsible for publicity 
matters. 
Both the villagers’ committee and the CCP branch serve for 5 years as a term. In 
most villages in Dragon County, the members of the CCP village branch also serve as 
members of the villagers’ committee. One reason for this is that villagers’ committee 
elections are usually held after CCP branch elections, so the elected party officials are 
more likely than others to attract attention and be elected into the villagers’ committee 
as well. Another, and more important, reason is that villagers usually do not want to 
have too many officials, since they are paid by the village collective. Having the CCP 
branch members serve on the villagers’ committee as well can save money for the 
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village. CCP members who are also village committee members are typically not paid 
twice. In some small villages, there can be only three officials in total: a party 
secretary who is also the villagers’ committee chairperson, an accountant who is also 
the cashier, and an administrative assistant.             
As already mentioned, the CCP controls tightly all levels of the Chinese 
bureaucracy at the township level and above. At the village level, however, the 
villagers’ committee does not need to defer to the CCP branch, because they are both 
elected. The study shows that villagers are generally confused about the respective 
roles of the CCP branch and the villagers’ committee.106 The villagers’ committee 
chairperson and the party secretary of a village do not always get along well. In some 
villages, there can even be confrontations between them regarding important 
decisions. However, in many villages, the villagers’ committee chairperson is also a 
CCP member, and should therefore have no problems – in principle - in deferring to 
the decisions by the CCP village branch.  
On important issues, the party secretary of a village usually convenes “expanded 
meetings”, attended by all members of the CCP branch and the villagers’ committee, 
and by the representatives of other villagers. On issues such as the redistribution of 
land among villagers, a plenary meeting attended by all villagers is required.  
Generally speaking, being a village official is an attractive job. It is only a 
part-time job, so the village officials can have time to take care of farming or other 
personal businesses. In the villages covered by the study, the monthly salaries of the 
                                                        
106 It is actually designed to be confusing, as will be discussed later. 
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party secretaries and villagers’ committee chairpersons range from a few hundred to 
5,000-6,000 yuan. The salaries of other village officials are lower but, in general, are 
much higher than the average income of farmers from farming only. In addition, the 
position of a village official is usually a sign of social status in the village. In most 
cases, only those who are from widely respected families are competitive enough to 
win elections.    
 Competition for village officials is often very intense. Candidates adopt various 
strategies in order to win, including lobbying, bribing, or promising personal favors to 
voters. In Village I, township D, for example, candidates in a close competition 
typically pay 50-100 yuan to wavering key voters to vote for them. The study also 
shows that village elections are often subject to manipulation by big families, i.e. the 
offspring of one common ancestor. These families share the same family name and 
maintain closer relationship with one another than with others, so it is usually easier 
for a candidate from such families to receive more votes.  
 Such election problems are certainly not unique for Dragon County, but 
widespread in many other regions. 107  An official from the Department of the 
Grass-roots Government and Community Building of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
makes the following comments when interviewed by the China Daily,108 
(There are various kinds of cheating by candidates and their supporters, such as) 
selling or buying votes, forging ballots, threatening, promising personal favors, 
preventing some voters from casting ballots… In some areas, some clan and even 
vicious forces have intervened. In order to ensure that their favorites succeed in 
the elections, they typically adopt measures such as threat, surveillance or even 
hiring hooligans to do physical harm to some people… 
                                                        
107 Han Xue (2007); Guan Xiaofeng (2007) 
108 Guan Xiaofeng (2007) 
 68 
 Bribery… is becoming more and more common in village elections in recent 
years. There are practical difficulties in preventing or stopping bribery. One is 
that the anti-bribery law is mostly about “principles”, and often not feasible for 
implementation… A second difficulty is that it is difficult to collect evidence on 
bribery. Some villagers who report about bribery are not willing to serve as 
witnesses because they do not want to identify themselves or are afraid of being 
revenged against.   
Relations with farmers 
The relationship between village leaders and farmers is one of cooperation and 
conflict. On the one hand, village leaders want to pursue their own personal interests, 
provide favors to their relatives and friends, and fulfill the promises made to those 
who voted for them. On the other hand, they need to behave in a relatively 
“reasonable” manner so that they maintain a certain degree of authority in the village.      
This can be illustrated with several examples. A first example concerns Farmer C 
from Village N in Township F. He and his wife, both about 60 years old, have been 
living in the village during their lifetime. In the early 1990s, he and his wife changed 
their Hukou (i.e. the address of one’s permanent residency registered with the 
government) to another township for some reason, although they still lived in the 
village. As a result, they were not able to receive a share of grain land during the 1994 
Rural Land Reform, since only those whose Hukou was in the village were eligible. 
They did not take this very seriously at the beginning, but instead rented 2 mu of 
reserve land from the village at a price of 180 yuan/mu/year. Their net income from 
each mu of the land was only 300-400 yuan per year, but their main purpose was not 
to earn income, because their son and two daughters were all working in Dragon City 
with decent salaries and would send them enough money if needed. Instead, they just 
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wanted to “have something to do” because otherwise they would have nothing to 
occupy their time in a constructive way.    
With the exemption of the agricultural tax and the anticipation that this area will 
be urbanized in the future, they now want to receive a share of grain land. The current 
party secretary (Party Secretary A) promised to them while running for election 
several years ago that he would help transform the 2 mu of reserve land they were 
farming into “grain land” for them. Since land redistribution is not allowed by the 
village rules, he has been waiting for a good opportunity to do it. However, by now, 
this has turned out to be impossible: The village is located within the planned “Urban 
Cluster C” (see Map 3), and a section of the Coastal Road (which is less than 1 km 
from the village) is already under construction, so all other villagers have realized that 
the value of land is to rise. Therefore, if Party Secretary A does the favor for Farmer C, 
other households who lack land - due to birth, marriage, or other reasons - will surely 
make the same request. Farmer C comments that, “it looks as if he is not going to 
fulfill his promise, because he also needs to do his job.”  
A second example involves Party Secretary B from Village L, Township E. The 
previous leases of several dozen mu of reserve land of his village expired in 2004, and 
the village was about to auction the land. Party Secretary B’s brother-in-law from 
another village wanted him to help acquire as large a parcel as possible. Party 
Secretary B promised to help, but only to the extent that he did not embarrass himself 
in the village. His brother-in-law wanted to get all the reserve land available, but he 
deferred to a proposal made by the other members of the villagers’ committee that one 
 70 
applicant receive 10 mu at a maximum. In the end, he successfully helped his 
brother-in-law win a bid for 10 mu at a reasonable price by choosing an early auction 
date on which several potential bidders were not able to show up at the auction.              
 A similar case involves the sale of two residential lots by Village I, Township D 
in 2007. The two lots were collective properties of the village, but had not been used 
for some years. Farmer E wanted to buy these two lots to open a roadside store, 
because the two lots faced the main village street. Both the party secretary and the 
villagers’ committee chairperson were close friends of his. Therefore, he lobbied them 
to sell the two lots. They agreed. He then lobbied them to sell the two lots in one bid, 
because he wanted to have them both in order to build a relatively large store and he 
figured that no more than several villagers could actually afford to buy the two lots 
together. The party secretary and the villagers’ committee chairperson disagreed, 
because other villagers objected strongly to that proposal. In the end, the two village 
leaders decided to help Farmer E by scheduling the auction just a few days after 
announcing the sale, so as to leave interested buyers unprepared. Eventually, Farmer 
E won the bid for one lot but lost on the other.   
The case study in Dragon shows that the types of personal favors that village 
leaders can provide to villagers are limited, especially in remote, poor villages. 
Consequently, they have very limited control over the villagers, and are often 
incapable of enforcing village rules or implementing the policies of the government. A 
most telling example is about the collection of agricultural tax. Before the tax was 
cancelled in 2004, many villages had difficulty collecting it from farmers. Many 
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farmers simply refused to pay. In Village I, for example, one household owed as much 
as 40,000-50,000 yuan of the tax, and the villagers’ committee could not do anything 
about it. Farmer J comments that, 
I still owe about 7,000 yuan to the village. At the beginning, I was paying as 
required. Then I found that others were not paying. So I stopped paying too. It 
would be too foolish to pay when others did not. In the end, nobody in the village 
was paying. What could the village leaders do? What could the government do? 
We simply said that we were too poor to pay. What do you think they could do to 
a poor farmer?  
In some villages, the villagers’ committee has even encountered considerable 
difficulty in taking back reserve land from the farmers when their land use contracts 
expire. Some farmers simply refuse to return the land, and do not pay rent to the 
village.  
 Relations with the township government 
Since village leaders are elected, it can easily be taken for granted that a township 
government has no direct control over the leaders of its villages. In reality, this is not 
the case, because a township government has several forms of leverage over village 
leaders.  
One important form is that a township government determines how much village 
leaders are to be paid based on its evaluation of their performance on the job. The 
evaluation is conducted every year based on a “points system”. The evaluation criteria 
include tidiness of village streets, implementation of the family planning policy, 
maintenance of public infrastructure, public security, and investment promotion, etc. 
Leaders who receive more points than required are eligible to claim a “bonus” in the 
form of a monetary payment above their regular salary. The salaries and bonuses of 
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village leaders that are determined in this way are paid by the villages themselves.  
This evaluation system has several problems. First, it is an open secret among 
local farmers and officials that village leaders often make up information in order to 
receive more points. Second, the salaries and the bonus are not paid by the township 
government, but out of the villages’ own pockets. Therefore, the township officials 
would be happy to grant bonuses to village leaders, who then are expected to provide 
personal favors to the township officials in return. Therefore, this evaluation system 
encourages collusion between village leaders and township officials.  
Another form of leverage that a township government has is related to the 
administration of the financial resources of its villages.  In the early 1990s, each 
village had an independent account, and had a financial management committee to 
oversee that the village leaders spend in a reasonable manner. Since 1996, most 
townships in Dragon County have set up a unit called “Financial Administration 
Guidance Station (FAGS)” to administer the accounts of villages. In principle, all the 
income of a village should go into the account administered by the township FAGS. A 
village has to apply to the township in order to use the money in its own account.  
The FAGSs have played some supervisory role over the spending of village 
leaders. However, there are two problems: First, some FAGSs do not maintain a 
separate account for each village. Instead, they have one account for all villages. This 
makes it convenient for the townships to take advantage of a large pool of money. 
Sometimes, when a township government needs money urgently, it would simply use 
the money in the villages’ accounts without seeking permission from the villages. 
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Second, many village leaders have “secret pockets”, and much of their villages’ 
income is not reflected in the FAGS accounts – which, in the words of Local Official 
A, “explains why everybody wants so much to become a village leader, even in the 
villages which are seemingly too poor to cover even the basic salaries of village 
leaders”.  
A township government sometimes also provides personal favors directly to 
village leaders. For example, it sometimes organizes “study tours” attended by the 
leaders of its villages. Such tours usually include mainly - if not “only” - visits to 
famous historic or scenic sites in other provinces or even foreign countries. The costs 
of the tours incurred by the village leaders (and often the township officials as well) 
are covered by the village collectives. 
Role in compulsory land acquisition   
The role of village leaders during compulsory land acquisition is very limited. As 
long as the government has made a decision, there is little village leaders and farmers 
can do to change it. A former Party Secretary of Village H comments that, “If the 
government wants to do something, who can stop it? There is nothing you can do (but 
to defer).” In most cases, village leaders’ role is limited to conveying the official 
notices of the government to farmers, and “assisting” the township government to 
“persuade” farmers to defer to the decisions made by the government.    
 Nevertheless, village leaders have considerable discretion over the distribution of 
the compensation received from the government. A few years ago, in most 
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compulsory land acquisition cases, both the township government and the village 
would take a slice off the compensation before it reached the farmers - even if the 
conversion involved grain land. During the process, it was also common for township 
officials and village leaders to try to conceal information from farmers. This used to 
be a major source of conflicts, but the situation has improved significantly in the last 
few years, as will be explained in the next chapter.  
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic in Dragon, I was advised by my local 
contacts not to conduct an in-depth survey or investigation in the villages affected by 
compulsory land conversion, as originally planned, regarding how much of the 
compensation was intercepted by township governments and village leaders 
respectively. Doing so could perturb the local communities and attract unnecessary 
attention. Nevertheless, according to a limited number of interviewees who are 
familiar with these villages, the compensation distribution process in many villages in 
Dragon is to some extent similar to that described by other, existing studies, such as 
the one by Qi et al (2006) based on a survey in three villages in Hubei, Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu Provinces.   
Qi et al find that, during compulsory land conversion, village leaders try to forge 
informal relationships with township leaders on the one hand and establish relations 
networks within their villages on the other. Village leaders often provide favors to the 
members of their networks, and are therefore not isolated in the village. They utilize 
their networks to prevent other farmers from uniting to influence the distribution of 
the benefits from land conversion. Villagers, on the other hand, realize that the 
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interest groups centered on the village leaders might have under-the-table deals in the 
distribution of compensation, and that village leaders’ control of information prevents 
them from knowing how much the compensation is. Therefore, they may organize 
themselves to protect their own interests. Their self-organizing activities take both 
“legal” and “illegal” forms. Legal forms mainly include appealing to the Office of 
Letters and Calls of the government, which might raise the conflict between them and 
the village leaders into a confrontation; while illegal forms mainly include “blocking 
land development activities organized by the government” or simply 
“trouble-making”. Village leaders, who do not want to see themselves confronted, 
would try to provide favors to the “elite” among these villagers so as to turn 
“enemies” into “friends”. If the threat from villagers appears to be getting out of their 
control, they may make concessions.     
Whether village leaders are hardliners depends on whether they are “strong” by 
themselves in the village, which often depends on whether they are regarded as the 
most capable people in the village. Qi et al find that, in areas with rich resources, the 
positions of village leaders are usually taken by those who are not only capable but 
also skillful at establishing relations with upper-level officials. These village leaders 
are usually more “interest oriented”, and more strongly organized as a group. Since 
they are much richer than most other villagers, and because of conflicting personal 
interests between them and the villagers, these village leaders are usually hardliners. 
In villages which are poor and do not have valuable resources, the incentives of 
village leaders to compete for power are weaker.  
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Qi et al also note that land is the main connection between village leaders and 
villagers. The power of village leaders is mainly reflected in the redistribution of land 
within the village, the collection of agricultural taxes, and the administration of 
irrigation facilities. However, if all the collectively owned land of a village is 
converted to state-owned land, the most important connection between village leaders 
and farmers will no longer exist, and the power of village leaders over villagers will 
be significantly weakened. In such cases, land conversion is often seen by village 
leaders as a last opportunity to seek large personal benefits for themselves. Therefore, 
the scale and process of land conversion affect the strategies of village leaders 
directly.   
 In sum, the process is governed, to a large extent, by the “law of the jungle”, so to 
speak. This dissertation will show in the following chapters that this law applies to 
other sets of relations during the land conversion process and to the Chinese society at 
large.    
  
4. The financial situation of villages 
A village must have financial resources to take care of collective affairs, such as 
repairing roads and bridges, cleaning streets, and providing tap water, etc. Prior to the 
1990s, the village collected land contract fees (i.e. the predecessor of the agricultural 
tax cancelled in 2004) from farmers, and each farmer was required to contribute 10-20 
days of free labor each year to the collective - to offset a portion of the land contract 
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fees.  
The situation has changed dramatically in recent years. In addition to the 
cancellation of the land contract fees, it has become increasingly difficult for the 
village to ask farmers to provide labor on a voluntary basis. As discussed earlier, 
village leaders have no direct control over farmers. As long as a farmer can take care 
of his own business and has no personal favors to ask for, he has no particular reason 
to defer to the village leaders’ request for free labor - except out of moral obligations. 
Therefore, many villages are having a difficult time managing collective affairs.  
The case study finds that some villages, mostly located far from Dragon City and 
township capitals, are too poor to pay their leaders the salaries “promised” by the 
township governments. In some villages, the leaders are “owed” several thousand 
yuan of salary. In order to deal with this problem, some townships have implemented 
a transfer payment mechanism, through which the wealthy villages contribute a 
portion of their extra income to support the poor ones. Technically, this has been easy 
to do because, as mentioned earlier, a township government controls the accounts of 
all its villages through the FAGS. However, the problem is that, for some townships, 
most – if not all - villages lack sources of collective income such that this transfer 
payment system exists in name only.  
In 2003, each village in Dragon County had about 130,000 yuan worth of debts 
on average. These debts mainly included two parts: The first part is loans from banks 
for running village-owned enterprises. The second part is borrowings from wealthy 
farmers in order to take care of collective affairs. The reason for borrowing from 
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private parties is that it is often difficult for villages to obtain loans from banks, which 
require a complicated procedure. Due to the informal nature – and thus higher risks - 
of these borrowings, the lenders often charge higher interest rates than a bank. Of 
course, some villages also have fixed assets such as village-owned real estate 
properties. However, it is fair to say that, in general, the financial situations of most 
villages in Dragon County are not great. Some villages even do not have any kinds of 
disposable assets or financial resources.  
This is not to say, however, that all villages are poor. To the contrary, many 
villages are doing fine, and a significant number are very wealthy. The case study 
shows that geographical location seems to be the most important determinant of a 
village’s financial capacity. Villages located close to Dragon City or township capitals 
are generally much wealthier. One reason for this is that they cooperate with 
developers to engage in informal land conversions, as will be described in detail in 
Part II of the dissertation. Another reason is that their village-owned enterprises, such 
as construction companies and small manufacturing plants, are more likely to be 
successful due to proximity to transportation facilities and market. Most of these 
enterprises have been privatized by now, but they contribute tax or land use fees to the 
villages.     
In addition to geographical location, the amount of reserve land also accounts for 
the variation of a village’s financial capability. Villages with more reserve land are in 
a better financial situation, other things being equal. The amount of reserve land is 
particularly important for the villages in remote areas because they have few - if any - 
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other sources of collective income, as explained by the Party Secretary of Village L:  
Our village has 500 mu of farmland remaining, among which 300 mu is equally 
distributed to villagers as grain land and the rest (i.e. 200 mu) is administered by 
the village as reserve land. Some of the reserve land is rented to enterprises (for 
non-farming purposes), who pay higher rents than farmers.109 The rents from the 
reserve land are used to cover the cost of collective undertakings by the village. 
(Since the reserve land generates sufficient revenue for the village,) villagers do 
not need to pay for collective undertakings… The leaders of some villages (which 
have more reserve land) have much easier time than those of others (with less 
reserve land). 
Natural endowments also contribute to the financial capacity of a village. For 
example, the coastal villages typically rent the beach to local farmers for fish or 
shrimp farming. The price is usually around 300 yuan/mu/year. Some of these villages 
also sell sand to construction companies. In China, sand is a state-owned resource, 
and selling sand without permission from the government is illegal. However, there is 
a large informal sand market in Dragon, because sand is an essential material for the 
making of concrete during construction, and is in high demand in Dragon and its 
neighboring counties with a booming real estate sector in recent years. Village I, for 
instance, made several hundred thousand yuan in 2006 by selling sand on its beach. 
Incidentally, although selling sand provided easy money for the village, it also caused 
significant environmental damage. The villagers complain that many of the conifer 
trees that used to grow very well in the sandy beach areas have been destroyed, and 
that the heavy-duty trucks loaded fully with sand have caused much damage to the 
road going by the village.  
 
                                                        
109 As mentioned earlier, renting land to enterprises for non-farming purposes is not allowed by the Land 
Administration Law. 
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5. Summary  
Although the village is the owner of farmland, the bundle of rights that belong to 
it is limited. The government is given an upper hand by the Chinese law during land 
conversion, because it can take land from the village in the name of “public interest” 
without due process of law. In addition, the collective ownership of farmland has 
inherent difficulties in accommodating population or land changes, which is often a 
source of conflicts.  
Village elections are often very competitive but are subject to manipulation by 
large families, and bribery is a common strategy by candidates. Elected village leaders 
pursue personal interests and provide favors to their relatives and friends, but also pay 
attention to the “public opinions” within the village. They are controlled, to a 
significant degree, by the township government, since the latter is in a position to 
grant legal status to the earnings and spending of the former. The role of the village 
leaders during compulsory land conversion is very limited, if any.    
In general, the financial situations of many villages are not good. But some 
villages are doing much better, because they have a better geographical location, or 
set aside more reserve land during the 1994 Rural Land Reform, or are blessed with 
certain natural endowments.  
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CHAPTER 2 FARMERS 
 
1. Introduction 
 Farmers account for approximately 50% of Dragon’s total population. A rural 
family typically consists of two parents with 1-2 unmarried children. Married children 
usually live separately from their parents, although in some cases they share the same 
house. According to official statistics, the average net income of farmers was close to 
6,000 yuan (i.e. $800-900) in 2005. Their main sources of income include farming, 
animal husbandry, and working in towns or cities on a temporary basis. Farmers’ 
literacy rate is close to 100%, and most young farmers below the age of 40 have 
received at least 9 years of formal school education.    
 This chapter will first discuss the importance of farming to farmers; then explain 
the standard of compensation for compulsory land acquisition, and lastly discuss the 
role of farmers during compulsory land conversion.   
 
2. Importance of farming 
As mentioned earlier, each farmer in Dragon receives from the village 
approximately 1 mu (i.e. 1/15 of a hectare) of grain land. This means that the farmland 
of a village is divided into hundreds of small parcels, each farmed by a different 
farmer or household. The main crops in Dragon County include wheat, maize, beans, 
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potato, and peanuts, etc.      
 In addition to the grain land, each rural household typically also has a very small 
parcel of land, with a size of around 1/10 mu, for growing vegetables, such as cabbage, 
eggplant, tomato, and cucumber, etc. These vegetable lots usually occupy the lands 
immediately adjacent to the residential area of the village, because the villagers need 
to travel more frequently to these lots to take care of or harvest vegetables.  
Before 2001, farmers were required to pay “land contract fees” for the grain land 
contracted to them. The rate was generally 200-300 yuan/mu/year. In addition, they 
had to shoulder some of the public expenditures incurred by the village collective or 
even the township. For instance, they were sometimes required to make compulsory 
contribution to fund-raising for the construction of major infrastructure projects such 
as roads and water conservancy facilities, etc.  
In view of the relatively heavy burden on farmers, the national government 
implemented a reform in 2001 to cancel the land contract fees. Instead, farmers were 
asked to pay an “agricultural tax”, the rate of which was assessed based on farmers’ 
average income from agricultural production on the land during the previous three 
years. On average, the rate of the agricultural tax in Dragon was approximately 70 
yuan/mu/year.  
In 2003, the national government moved a step further, and exempted farmers 
from the agricultural tax. Now, farmers do not need to pay any fees or tax, and are 
entitled to subsidies for certain crops. In Dragon, there are two kinds of subsidies: For 
each mu of grain crops planted, a farmer receives from the government 16 yuan for 
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grain production plus 16 yuan for fertilizer. In other words, a farmer receives 32 yuan 
of agricultural subsidy for each mu of grain crops planted.  
Despite the tax/fees exemption and the agricultural subsidy, farming is far from 
an attractive source of income for most farmers. According to local farmers, the net 
income from farming is 600-700 yuan/mu/year at most, due to the low prices of 
agricultural produce and the high cost of fertilizer and insecticides. In other words, a 
household with three members, each having 1 mu of grain land, will have a total 
income of approximately 2,000 yuan (i.e. less than $300) from farming each year. Not 
surprisingly, most farmers, particularly those living in the villages close to Dragon 
City or township capitals, do not take farming seriously, because working in the city 
or towns pays far better. Most farmers still do farming, but few on a full-time basis 
unless there is absolutely no alternative way of making a living.  
This does not mean that farming is always unattractive for all farmers. 
Historically, some agricultural produces have been very profitable during certain 
periods. In the early 1990s, for example, many farmers in Township D made a fortune 
out of growing Fuji apple, which is a special type of apple introduced from Japan. 
Some households made as much as 10,000-30,000 yuan each year, which was a 
tremendous amount of money at that time - The average yearly net income was less 
than 1,400 yuan for urban residents and less than 900 yuan for farmers in Dragon 
County in 1990.110 One reason this type of apple sold so well was that its quality was 
far superior to that of other types of apples in terms of crispness, taste and looks. 
                                                        
110 Dragon’s Year Book 2003-2006. 
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Another reason was that the Chinese society has a long tradition of exchanging gifts 
on important holidays or for building up personal relations with others. Since the 
Chinese people were still quite poor in the early 1990s, a small box of Fuji apples was 
a relatively affordable, yet decent, “gift” for relatives or friends. Many companies or 
organizations typically also bought and gave high-quality fruits, such as Fuji apples, 
to their employees, many of whom would then give them to friends or relatives as 
gifts.     
Of course, scarcity is always a most important condition for any commodity to be 
sold well. After other farmers learned about the profitability of growing Fuji apple, 
they followed suit immediately. It was very fortunate for the farmers in Township D 
that their apples remained profitable for a few more years because it took a 
considerable amount of time for the new apple trees of other farmers to grow up and 
bear fruits. However, by the late 1990s, growing Fuji apples was no longer profitable 
at all, and some farmers cut down the trees to make room for other crops.  
The “Fuji apple case” is actually not an isolated phenomenon. A similar case 
involves building greenhouses to grow vegetables. Prior to the late 1990s, there were 
not many types of vegetables to buy in winter because it is too cold in Dragon for 
most vegetables to grow under natural conditions. Starting from the late 1990s, some 
farmers built greenhouses to grow such vegetables as tomatoes and cucumbers in 
winter. It was very profitable at the beginning, but, as more people engaged in it, the 
profit margin decreased over time. Now, these greenhouses are more popular in the 
remote areas where farming is still an important source of income. In the villages 
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close to Dragon City or township capitals, they are not very common because these 
greenhouses require intensive care whereas working in the city or the towns is often a 
better option for income.  
A third example is that shrimp farming used to be a profitable business in 
Townships D, E and F in the 1990s, but is much less popular now. The reason is that 
shrimp farming is a “high risk, high return” business. Significant investment is 
required for renting the beach, building up the ponds, and buying shrimp fry. Farmed 
shrimps are also very susceptible to certain viruses. Absent proper disease control 
measures, the shrimps in a pond and even an entire beach area may die all together. 
Nevertheless, some farmers made much money from it. In a prosperous year, it was 
typical for a farmer who owned several farming ponds to earn more than 100,000 
yuan. However, this business is much less profitable now due to increasing 
competition, particularly from specialized shrimp farming companies.     
The profitability of farming is sometimes also susceptible to external shocks. In 
2007, some farmers in Township D benefited from growing peanuts, whose price 
without shell was 8-9 yuan per kilogram. This was a result of high demand from both 
the international and the domestic market for oil products. However, in 2008, the 
price dropped to approximately 4 yuan per kilogram – partly due to increased supply 
but more importantly because of shrinking international demand as a result of the 
global financial crisis. Consequently, most farmers did not make much profit, and 
some could not even cover the costs (including fertilizer, pesticide, plastic film for 
agricultural use, and hiring of agricultural machines for sowing seeds, etc.).  
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In general, whenever a certain type of agricultural produce sells particularly well, 
the invisible hand of the market will increase its supply such that the profit margins 
for all produces tend to equalize, other things (such as the level of input and 
investment risks) being equal. There seem to be exceptions to this rule. For instance, a 
few farmers in Dragon County have recently been making large profits by planting 
some rare species of flowers, but not many farmers are following suit right now. Two 
factors are responsible for this: First, growing flowers requires much more technical 
know-how than other crops, such as temperature regulation, humidity control, and 
grafting techniques, etc. Second, one needs to have a land unit that is large enough to 
make flower growing economical – which is impossible for most farmers.   
One message this section tries to convey by citing these examples is that, for 
farmers, no single farming option will remain profitable for long, due to a large 
surplus of rural labor which stands ready to go in for anything that is financially 
promising. A more important point to note, however, is that the first farmers to try 
new options are usually those who are open-minded, active, shrewd and, more 
importantly, already wealthy. For the farmers who are poor, farming has been - and 
will continue to be - an unattractive source of income, although they tend to rely on it 
more than others.   
Due to the low profitability of farming, it makes economic sense to consolidate 
farmland into larger, more economical units. This is sometimes done by companies 
specializing in agricultural production. For example, Agricultural Company A from 
Phoenix City rents more than 500 mu of farmland from Village O, P, and Q in 
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Township D to grow blueberries. The company earns 600-800 yuan per mu in net 
income. Farmers who lease land to the company have priority in being hired by the 
company. The average salary level for these farmers is 500-700 yuan per month.  
However, such consolidation of farmland is, in general, not very common. In 
Dragon County, farmland leasing is not rare, but mostly applies to reserve land. The 
leasing prices can be up to 200-300 yuan per mu per year, but are usually much lower 
than that. Individual farmers sometimes also lease the farming rights to their grain 
land to others, but a typical deal usually does not involve more than several farmers, 
for two reasons: First, with modern agricultural machines, farming is not as laborious 
as it used to be. Most families in the villages covered by the case study have or have 
access to tractors or other agricultural machinery. There are also insecticides and other 
techniques to relieve farmers of the drudgery of removing weeds by hand or hoeing. A 
second reason is that each farmer has only 1 mu of grain land on average. This 
amount is easily manageable. In Dragon, it is typical that the husband of a household 
works in the city for most of the year while the wife stays at home taking care of their 
child (children) and farming. The husband usually comes back during busy planting 
and harvesting seasons to help.  
In October 2008, the Third Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CCP Central 
Committee passed a resolution to encourage the transfer of land contract rights among 
farmers.111 Since more detailed regulations are yet to be developed, the effect of the 
resolution remains to be seen. However, its likely impact on land conversion will be 
                                                        
111 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (2008) 
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discussed briefly in Chapter 12. 
In recent years, many people have seen the prospect of land value increase due to 
the county’s urbanization blueprint (See Map 3), and have tried to rent land from the 
affected villages in the hope of receiving compensation in the case of land conversion. 
For example, the brother-in-law of Party Secretary B, mentioned in Chapter 1, rented 
10 mu of reserve land from Village L, Township E in 2004. The duration of the 
contract is 2004-2014, and the rent is 15,300 yuan in lump sum. He is now growing 
poplar on the land. The advantage of growing trees instead of crops is that the former 
does not require intensive care since the farmer’s own village is about 10 kilometers 
away. His main purpose for acquiring the land, however, is not to make money by 
growing trees. The land is located just a few hundred meters from the downtown of 
the capital of Township L, so he hopes that the area will be developed soon and that 
he can claim a significant amount of compensation for the trees and the land. Even if 
the area is not developed before the contract expires, he would not lose anything, 
because the trees he grows, when sold, should be about enough to cover the rent.  
In a different case, Real Estate Developer A rented 300 mu of land in 2006 for 70 
years at a price of 4.5 million yuan from a village located close to a military base to 
the east of Township D, because he had obtained confidential information that the 
area was to be developed by the military base soon. He has planted trees on the land, 
and is waiting for land conversion to occur.   
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3. Compensation for compulsory land conversion 
The level and distribution of compensation for compulsory land conversion was a 
major source of social conflicts before 2005, but is attracting less attention now. This 
section explains why this is so.  
 
3.1 Chaos before 2005 
In general, the compensation system before 2005 was very confusing. A 
compensation package typically included two parts: compensation for land, and 
compensation for the existing crops on the land.  
The compensation for land was delivered - via the township government - to the 
village, which then distributed it to the farmers. Its level was determined by the 
county government one-sidedly, and was constantly changing. Moreover, the 
township government and the village typically each cut a slice before the 
compensation reached farmers, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Local Official A explains 
with an example,  
When the Coastal Road was under construction, the county government paid 
18,000 yuan/mu (as compensation for land) to the affected villages. It was a 
uniform standard set by the county government, but some townships took a share 
from it. For example, one township gave only 15,000 yuan/mu to its villages. 
Some townships delayed paying the villages and some even used up all the 
compensation by themselves, because they were in financial difficulty. Later, the 
compensation standard was increased to 20,000 yuan, and subsequently 30,000 
yuan.  
The compensation for existing crops was given to farmers directly. Its level also 
varied from case to case, and changed over time. Moreover, according to the local 
policy, the compensation for trees was higher than for crops, because trees are worth 
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more than crops on the market. This seemingly reasonable policy led to great chaos. 
In anticipation of compulsory conversion of their land, many farmers planted trees 
instead of crops, hoping to receive higher compensation. For example, Village H, 
located at the western fringe of Dragon City, had approximately 1,100 mu of farmland 
remaining in the early 2000s, but only 30 mu was used for growing crops and all the 
rest for growing trees. A former party secretary of the village comments that, 
It was a great waste of land! Farmers just wanted to receive more compensation. 
They did not grow crops, but poor-quality peach trees. They were not interested 
in producing fruits … At the time, they were not even sure about when land 
conversion would happen, but were simply waiting…  
Urban Resident A describes a typical scene during land conversion: 
In one case, the farmers were “planting” trees ahead, and the officials 
(responsible for land acquisition) were behind them counting the number of the 
trees… Officials had to leave “one side of the net open” (i.e. be ‘lenient’) - 
Otherwise farmers would not give up the land. 
Farmer H from Village H made the following observation regarding the confusion 
caused by this policy:  
Most villagers had no objections (i.e. thought it was “useless” to object) to the 
compulsory conversions (that had occurred to the lands of the village). However, 
about 20 percent were not happy, (which was not necessarily because they 
objected to the land conversions per se, but that) they did not think the 
compensation they received was fair. In one case, some farmers were offered a 
rate of 120 yuan only for each tree that had been planted several years before, 
while others were offered 200 yuan for each tree that had just been planted. The 
only reason why the latter received more compensation was that their trees were 
larger in size (whereas the type and quality of the trees were not considered).  
This “Tree vs. Crop” game does not apply to compulsory land conversion only, but 
other situations as well. Employee A from the county’s Water Company explains his 
experience as follows, 
In order to lay (or repair) water pipes, we often need to destroy farmers’ crops on 
the land along the routes. According to the local water supply regulation, water 
pipes are buried 9 meters to the west or north of roads. Since laying water pipes 
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destroys crops, the company needs to pay compensation. It pays compensation to 
the township, which passes it down to the villages, which in turn pass it down to 
villagers. But each of them will cut a slice. The water company cannot give the 
compensation to farmers directly because they are too many. Therefore, when the 
compensation finally gets to the farmers’ hands, only a small portion is left. In 
one case, the farmers became very angry and surrounded the workers of the 
company while the latter were working, and blocked them from laying the pipes 
for several days. The government had to intervene and “persuaded” them to 
leave… Whenever the water company plans to lay pipes, it does not dare to give 
prior notice to farmers. Otherwise, they may plant tree seedlings on the affected 
land overnight, knowing that much higher compensation has to be paid for trees 
than for crops according to local official regulations. 
  
3.2 The 2005 reform 
In order to ease the growing number of conflicts surrounding the level of 
compensation, the county government of Dragon started to implement a compensation 
reform in 2005. The new compensation system includes a standard cash compensation 
package and a pension system, as described below:  
Cash compensation package 
 Under the new system, a standard cash compensation package to villages 
includes two parts: The first part is the compensation for land and existing crops, 
which is 30,000 yuan per mu in lump sum. The second part is the compensation for 
crop production, which is 600 yuan per mu per year, paid in installments, for the 
remaining years before the expiration of the 30-year land contract signed in 1994. 
Paying the compensation for crop production in installments has several advantages: 
First, farmers have a stable source of income each year, avoiding the possibility that 
some farmers will use up the money rapidly in an un-planned way if they receive it in 
lump sum. Second, the government, which may be short of cash sometimes, does not 
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have to pay the compensation all at once.  
This level of compensation, if paid in full to individual farmers, is not 
insignificant - compared with a net income of 700 yuan at most per year from one mu 
of land if used for farming, as mentioned earlier. However, after land conversion, the 
cost of food for a farmer may rise significantly. In Dragon County, most rural 
households do not need to buy much grain or vegetables on the market, since they can 
produce them on their own land. They do buy some for diversity, but the spending is 
usually not much. If a household loses all its land and buys everything on the market, 
the extra cost could be around 100 yuan per month per person even if one lives a 
frugal life. With this being taken into account, the amount of lump sum cash 
compensation - though higher than before - does not seem to be very large. Moreover, 
it is typical for the village to keep a portion of the cash compensation, so what is 
received by individual farmers is usually less than amount stated above. Yet, what 
really makes the new compensation reform attractive is the pension system, as will be 
described below.       
Pension system 
Although farming is an unimportant source of income for most farmers and the 
level of cash compensation for land conversion is higher than their income from 
farming, many farmers still do not want to lose their land. This is largely because land 
provides a kind of “psychological” insurance for farmers. Like most other regions in 
China, Dragon County does not have a social safety net for the rural population, and 
land has served as a proxy for social safety. Recognizing this character of land, the 
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county government also set up a pension system for the farmers who lose land.  
Males over the age of 45 and females over 40 who have less than 0.3 mu of land 
are eligible to participate in the pension system on a voluntary basis. An eligible 
farmer contributes a small amount of money to his private pension account from the 
age of 45 (for male) or 40 (for female), to be matched by contributions from the 
village, township government and county government. The farmer will start receiving 
pension payment at the age of 60 (for male) or 55 (for female).  
The maximum contribution a farmer can make to his pension account each year is 
6% of the average net income of the county’s rural population in the previous year. 
(The maximum contribution in 2006 was about 340 yuan.) The village, the township 
government and the county government each contributes approximately the same 
amount. The level of the pension benefits a farmer receives after he reaches retirement 
age depends on the total amount of contribution in his/her private pension account.     
The formulas for the calculation of a farmer’s monthly contribution to his/her 
pension account and the pension benefits he/she is to receive are a bit complicated. In 
a simplified way, if a 45-year-old male farmer makes a fixed contribution of 340 yuan 
each year to his pension account, he would receive 240 yuan per month as pension 
benefits after he reaches the age of 60. (In reality, he would receive more because his 
contribution should generally increase each year rather than stay fixed.)  
Farmers who have already reached the age of 60 (for male) or 55 (for female) can 
pay a certain amount of contribution in lump sum and receive pension benefits 
immediately. For example, a 60-year-old male can make a contribution of 
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approximately 5,000 yuan in lump sum, and receive immediately pension benefits in 
the amount of approximately 240 yuan per month.  
  
3.3 An illustrative example of compulsory land conversion 
The new compensation system sounds a bit complicated. In practice, it is 
relatively easy to implement, and actual compensation packages may be different 
from the standard one described above. An illustrative example involved the 
acquisition of a large lot by the county government from Village H for the 
construction of a garbage disposal plant. Nominally, the total value of the 
compensation package offered by the county government was 60,000 yuan to the 
village for each mu of the land acquired, including 30,000 yuan for the land and 
existing crops and 30,000 for future crop production and pension. In practice, the 
compensation for the land and existing crops was all given to the affected farmers; 
whereas the compensation for future production and pension was not provided to the 
farmers right away, but kept by the local government in order to pay 600 
yuan/mu/year to the farmers and to pay for the farmers’ pension benefits. Incidentally, 
the farmers in this case realized afterwards that a garbage disposal site could cause 
pollution to the village’s groundwater, on which they depend for drinking water, 
because the village is on the downside. Fortunately, the garbage disposal site has not 
been put into use for some reason, and the farmers have come back to the land to plant 
crops again, although the village collective no loner owns the land.  
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4. Strategies of farmers during compulsory land acquisition 
The role of farmers during land conversion is very limited. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, as long as the government has made a decision to convert a particular land 
area, there is virtually no room for negotiation by villages and farmers. This, of course, 
is not a phenomenon unique for Dragon County. Other, existing studies have revealed 
that farmers are generally helpless during compulsory land conversion 112 . For 
example, Li Ping and Xu Xiaobai (2004) did a field survey in 17 villages in Anhui, 
Hainan and Guangxi provinces, and found that farmers were not consulted at all 
during the decision-making process, but were simply informed of which land parcels 
were to be acquired, what the purpose was, and how much compensation farmers 
were to receive, etc. Moreover, the notices to farmers were mostly oral: Among the 17 
villages surveyed, only two had the government’s official notices posted in the offices 
of the villagers’ committees.  
 This dissertation finds that farmers typically adopt the following strategies in 
dealing with local governments during compulsory land conversion:  
Complying 
Most farmers in Dragon County choose to defer to the government during the 
land conversion process. Two reasons are mainly accountable for such an attitude. 
First and foremost, the government is too powerful. Farmers know very well that the 
land they farm belongs to the state, that “collective” ownership is a nominal thing, and 
                                                        
112 Su Hong et al. (2005) 
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that it is impossible for them to change or even influence the decisions made by the 
government. Another reason is that, from a psychological perspective, many Chinese 
people are used to deferring to the government. In ancient times, the emperors taught 
the people to be loyal to the royal families. If an emperor wanted someone to die for 
“the good of the dynasty”, the latter should do so with a sense of glory. In modern 
times, the government has been trying to promote similar teachings, such as “the 
government will always serve the needs of the people”, “the government is 
trustworthy, even if it makes mistakes sometimes”, and “under no circumstances 
should the leadership of X be questioned”, etc. For many people, especially those who 
experienced Chinese politics in the pre-reform era, deference to the government is 
almost “customary”, so to speak. In modern Chinese history, for example, there are 
numerous examples of people making self-sacrifices due to an artificially cultivated 
inclination to defer to the government. Unconditional deference is clearly essential for 
achieving collective goals under certain circumstances. For instance, soldiers on the 
battlefield must follow the orders of their commanders, even if it means loss of their 
lives. The problem with unconditional deference in a non-war environment, however, 
is that the leaders may abuse their power for their own interests. This has come to the 
realization of more and more people as China becomes increasingly open to the 
outside world, but the effects of the old teachings are still evident in the minds of 
many people.     
A typical example involves the construction of the Coastal Road in Township D 
in 2006. In order to build the road, a cemetery on the route had to be relocated. The 
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cemetery included tombs for the ancestors of some villagers from villages I, R and S. 
The compensation was 300 yuan for a one-coffin tomb and 500 yuan for a two-coffin 
tomb. It is worth noting that, in the local society, the location of tombs is very 
important. Most people do not necessarily believe that a good location will bring good 
luck for the offspring or the relatives of the ones who have passed away; yet, many 
people care much about it out of respect for the dead – if not for other, superstitious 
reasons. However, despite the relative insignificance of the compensation, the affected 
farmers from these three villages gave no objections. Farmer E from Village I 
comments that,  
I heard that some people (i.e. the township government) had already cut a slice 
from it. The compensation should be 500 yuan for a one-coffin tomb, 800 yuan 
for a two-coffin tomb, and 1,100 yuan for a tomb with three or more coffins. We 
deferred to the government. Otherwise, what can you do about it?   
Making up information  
As described earlier, many farmers play the “tree vs. crop” game. This strategy is 
not just used by farmers in Dragon County, but also in other regions. In some cases, 
farmers and their village leaders even cooperate with local officials in order to receive 
more compensation. For example, a report by Liu Heng113 in The City Evening News 
(November 29, 2008) revealed that, in Fuyu Village, Nanguan District, Changchun 
Municipality, Jilin Province, the party secretary led some farmers to plant tree 
seedlings overnight on lands acquired by the government for a large road project. 
They also reported false information regarding the area of the lands. This case was 
discovered accidentally by the mayor of Changchun Municipality who was on a field 
                                                        
113 Liu Heng, et al. (2008) 
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trip to the project, because the seedlings had been planted in such a hurry that some 
did not even stand firm in the field. It was cold winter and the land was frozen, so the 
farmers had had to use stones to support the trees so as to prevent them from falling. 
The villagers and the local officials involved had received more than 1.6 million yuan 
of extra compensation. Eventually, more than ten people involved in the case were 
found guilty of criminal charges. The responsible district official was sentenced 15 
years in prison, and the village party secretary 3 years in prison.  
Cheating is not something that should be encouraged. However, it reflects serious 
problems created by an unfair compensation system for compulsory land acquisition. 
A fixed compensation standard leaves little – if any - room for negotiation by the 
village and farmers, so they often have no choice but to cheat. 
Being a nail 
“Nail” (Ding Zi) is a nickname given by local governments to a household which 
does not give in to the government unless their conditions are met - just like a nail, 
which is difficult to be pulled out once hammered into something. There have been 
nail farmers/households (Ding Zi Hu) in some large compulsory land conversion 
projects, and the local governments have had to devote great effort to “digging them 
out”. One example is Farmer F from Township C. His land was planned to make way 
for a big investment project in 2004. He, like all other farmers, was initially offered 
20,000 yuan for each mu of the land farmed by his family. He refused, even though all 
the other farmers had accepted. He was then offered 25,000 yuan/mu, 35,000 yuan/mu, 
and 45,000 yuan/mu in sequence, but he rejected them all. At last, the township 
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officials had to ask how much he really wanted. He said 75,000 yuan/mu. In response, 
the officials made a final offer of 65,000 and told him that it would be the final offer - 
whether he accepted it or not. In order to have him agree, the township government 
asked his brother-in-law, who was the director of the township agricultural machinery 
station, to “persuade” him. The township government told the brother-in-law that he 
would be fired if he could not “convince” Farmer E. Farmer E accepted the last offer. 
The other farmers, who had previously accepted 20,000 yuan per mu, were angry 
because Farmer E obtained a much better deal simply because he was tough. Some 
farmers sent appeal letters or made calls to higher-level governments, but these 
resulted in nothing because 20,000 yuan/mu was already higher than the official 
standard of the time. 
Being a nail is often not the dominant strategy for farmers. For example, during 
the construction of a large development project in the Economic Development Zone, 
Farmer G, whose house was supposed to make way for a road, had been such a hard 
nail in trying to negotiate for more compensation that the officials became very angry 
and decided to have the road take a detour to get around his house. The house now 
stands in complete isolation and in close proximity of a noisy road, and has lost most 
of its value.  
Another example is that, during the widening of the National Road in 2001, 
Farmer Z refused to give up a small facility he owned on the roadside. The 
government offered a compensation of 3,000 yuan, but he asked for 50,000 yuan. In 
the end, the government used the police to surround the land, and destroyed the 
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facility by force. The government eventually paid the farmer 5,000 yuan.  
Creating “trouble” or protesting in an organized way 
It is common for unhappy farmers to get together to protect physically their lands 
from being taken or block the roads leading to their lands. This typically escalates into 
confrontation between the farmers and local authorities. For example, when the 
Coastal Road was under construction, some farmers who were not satisfied with the 
compensation they had received went to a construction site to prevent the construction 
workers from taking down their fruit trees. The local government used force to take 
the farmers away from the site. It does not require a lot of brain power to imagine 
what a scene it was.  
There are of course other, similar cases in Dragon County. As a matter of fact, 
such cases are widespread across the country. Due to their high-level of political 
sensitivity, local governments typically make great efforts to keep such stories from 
appearing on the public media. Despite this, it is not rare to come across media reports 
about such confrontations. For example, during a short period between October 15, 
2008 and November 5, 2008, at least five different cases in various regions became 
known: The Jinghua Times (October 15, 2008)114 reports that more than 200 farmers 
from Taipingzhuang Village, Nankou Township, Changping District, Beijing 
Municipality blocked the roads leading to a construction site of the new 
Beijing-Baotou Highway. The cause of their action was that the government offered to 
pay them 60,000 yuan for each mu of land, but they insisted on receiving 70,000 yuan. 
                                                        
114 Zhou Yu (2008) 
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The New Legal News (October 27, 2008)115 describes a situation where farmers from 
Qinghu Village, Hekou Township, Qianshan County, Jiangxi Province were not happy 
with the level of compensation they received for their land and blocked a construction 
site. The confrontation developed into a serious physical fight, resulting in some 
farmers and construction workers seriously injured. The Chuncheng Evening News 
(October 27, 2008)116  tells a story that some farmers from Zhaotong, Yunnan 
Province suspected that the local government intercepted a large portion of the 
compensation for their lands. After the local government turned a deaf ear to their 
appeals, they organized a number of “trouble-making” activities including blocking 
local roads, leading to 15 farmers being detained by the local police. The Finance and 
Economics (November 3, 2008)117 reports that some farmers from Langfang, Hebei 
Province gathered at a construction site of the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Railway 
and staged a confrontation with the construction workers. The Jing Times (November 
5, 2008)118 reports that some farmers from Dangshan County, Anhui Province were 
not satisfied with the level of compensation paid to them, and had clashes with the 
local police, resulting some farmers being arrested.    
 Aside from blocking roads, farmers sometimes also try to attract attention 
through demonstrations. In Dragon City, it was not a rare scene in the early 2000s that 
some people gathered in front of the main county government building where the 
County Party Secretary and the County Mayor had their offices. Often, they asked to 
                                                        
115 Li Jing and Xu Xiaoming (2008) 
116 Su Zhong and Shen Xixun (2008) 
117 Lan Fang (2008) 
118 Jing News (November 5, 2008) 
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meet with the relevant county leaders in order to have their “problems” solved; but 
sometimes, they were there just to attract attention. These people were mainly 
composed of two groups. The first group included those laid down by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), or workers who could not receive salaries on time because their 
SOEs were not doing well. The second group were farmers whose land had been 
taken by the government. 
This was a big headache for the county government. Trouble-making activities or 
demonstrations without prior permission from the government are against the Chinese 
law – which is why such cases often escalate into confrontations between the farmers 
and the police. However, farmers were generally not very afraid of the government, 
because they had little to lose. The protests did result in some – though certainly not 
all - disputes being investigated or resolved. This usually applies to cases where the 
compensation promised to farmers had been intercepted on its way down the various 
levels of the government. It is fair to say that farmers’ protests served as the most 
important driver for the 2005 reform as described earlier.  
  These protests reflect the lack of an effective referee system during the land 
conversion process. Farmers have to resort to informal means to attract attention from 
the public and sometimes the media so as to exert pressure on the government. 
However, such protests are not always easy to organize because, as indicated earlier, 
the government is so powerful that most farmers would think that challenging the 
government is not worth the trouble. In order to organize a protest, a few determined 
nail farmers have to take the lead, so that others could follow them. In a similar way, 
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if the nail farmers withdraw, the others typically would follow suit. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, local governments are actually very good at dealing with nail 
farmers. 
The case study shows that the number of protests has decreased sharply after the 
2005 reform, indicating that Dragon’s local governments do a reasonably good job in 
this respect. 
Appealing to higher-level authorities 
Of course, unhappy farmers always have the option of appealing to the 




Farming is an unattractive way of making a living, and accounts for a small 
proportion of farmers’ total income. Some farming options have been profitable 
during certain periods for certain farmers, but the profit margin for most farmers has 
been - and will remain - small. Farmland leasing is not rare in Dragon, but seldom on 
a large scale.   
As the compensation policy for compulsory land conversion caused great chaos 
before 2005, the county government has established a new compensation standard and 
a pension system for the farmers who lose land, which are welcomed by farmers. 
However, farmers have virtually no say during compulsory land conversion. In some 
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cases, some individual farmers stand up to resist government decisions, but the 
psychological stress is usually very high and many do not succeed.  
 105 
CHAPTER 3 HIGHER-LEVEL GOVERNMENTS 
 
1. Introduction 
Higher-level governments refer to national, provincial and municipal government. 
This chapter will focus on the national government. The provincial and municipal 
governments will not be discussed at length because they are responsible for 
implementing the policies dictated by higher authorities and their concerns are similar, 
though at a different scale, to those of the local governments in Dragon - which will 
be described in Chapter 4.     
This chapter will first describe the national farmland protection policy, then 
explain and discuss four other policy objectives of the national government: 
promoting economic growth, centralizing political power, centralizing financial 
authority and delegating administrative responsibilities, and controlling housing 
prices. It argues that the so-called “most stringent farmland protection policy in the 
world” conflicts with the other policy objectives, and is impracticable.  
  
2. Protecting farmland 
 Since the early 2000s, China has been implementing what it calls “the most 
stringent farmland protection policy in the world”. The main reason is that, as 
mentioned in the Introduction of the dissertation, China’s farmland resource is very 
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scarce. Approximately 70 percent of China’s farmland is located in mountainous and 
hilly areas or on plateaus, whereas only 30% is on plains or in basins.119 Only 40 
percent of all farmland is free from water irrigation problems, with the other 60 
percent having low productivity. In addition, 90 percent of China’s farmland is 
located in humid and semi-humid areas, and mostly concentrated in the Pearl River 
Delta, the Yangtze River Delta, central-north provinces, and the northeastern 
provinces - where economic growth is most advanced and the demand for land 
conversion is huge.   
Most of China’s land resources are already being utilized fully. In 2003, the 
amount of land that could potentially be reclaimed into new farmland was 
approximately 13 million hectares. Assuming that 60 percent of these areas can 
actually be reclaimed into farmland, it will add 8 million hectares, or only 8.4 percent, 
to the existing stock of farmland. Much of this land is located in remote and 
economically disadvantaged regions in the northwest, northeast and Inner Mongolia, 
often without convenient access to water supply.    
In addition, a significant portion of the existing farmland stock has been 
reclaimed from forest or grassland on slopes. In 2003, there were 6 million hectares of 
farmland on slopes of greater than 25º, and 12.5 million hectares of farmland on 
slopes of 10º-25º. Vegetation destruction and soil erosion resulting from such land 
reclamation have been recognized as a primary cause of the flooding problems of 
China’s major rivers in recent years, particularly of the flood in the Yangtze River 
                                                        
119 All the figures in this and the next two paragraphs are drawn from Hao et al (2003), unless stated otherwise.  
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Basin that killed several thousand people in 1998.120 In view of this, the national 
government has been implementing a policy since the late 1990s to convert such 
farmland back to forest or grassland in order to protect ecological quality. This has 
constrained the existing farmland stock even further. 
Since the 1990s, China has been losing farmland to urbanization at a rapid pace. 
According to a national survey121 by the MLR on land use changes, China’s arable 
land decreased by 120 million mu (i.e. 8 million hectares), or 6 percent of China’s 
total arable land area, between 1996 and 2005. According to the same survey, China’s 
farmland was 1.83 billion mu122 at the end of 2005, a decrease of 5.42 million mu 
from 2004. Among the lost farmland in that year, 3.18 million mu was converted for 
development purposes, and the rest was either lost to land degradation or converted to 
forest or grassland for the purpose of ecological conservation. In recent years, an 
average of approximately 3 million mu of farmland has been converted to 
non-farming uses each year. (However, Lichtenberg and Ding (2008) note that a lack 
of consistent, reliable data makes it difficult to identify trends in farmland loss with 
much precision, and that official figures published by the National Statistical Bureau 
are known to have underreported farmland by a substantial margin, at least up until 
the mid-1990s.) 
Since ancient times, Chinese leaders have always attached a great deal of 
importance to food self-sufficiency.123 The Book of Rites, written in the fifth century 
                                                        
120 CCICED (2001) 
121 Xin Jing Bao (March 16, 2006)  
122 Mu is a Chinese measurement unit. 15 mu = 1 hectare. 
123 Li Chenggui and Wang Hongchun (2002) 
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BC, cautioned Chinese rulers that, “less than nine years of grain stocks were 
insufficient; less than six years of reserves created a tense situation; and less than 
three years of stocks pointed to a government in decline”. 124 The main unfavorable 
factors for China’s grain supply in recent years include reduction of arable land, water 
shortage, inadequate investment in agricultural research, unfavorable agricultural 
policies (such as pricing), and a conflict between the need to conserve the ecology and 
the pressure for intensive farming.125 
In 1995, Lester Brown, an American researcher, voiced the concern that China 
might not be able to feed itself in the future, and the rest of the world would not be 
able to feed China either, such that China would make the rest of the world hungry.126 
Brown's report put into grave doubt China's capacity to feed itself, particularly by the 
year 2030 when China's population is expected to reach its peak.127 He also predicted, 
in 1995, that China’s grain production would decrease by 20 percent by 2030 due to 
loss of arable land and other factors, and that, even if the existing Chinese diet did not 
change, China would need to import 200-369 million tons of grain in 2030, which was 
equivalent to the total amount of grain available for international trade in the world.128  
Lester Brown’s views attracted high attention from China’s top leadership, but the 
issue is highly controversial. For example, Frederick Crook, an agricultural economist 
at the US Department of Agriculture thinks that Brown, in his predictions, did not 
                                                        
124 Frederick Crook, “Grain Galore”, China Business Review, 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/9709/crook.html  
125 Li Chenggui and Wang Hongchun (2002) 
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127 U.S. Embassy Beijing (1996)  
128 Quoted in Wu Zhihua and Hu Xuejun (2003)  
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consider the self-correcting mechanism of the market economy, since it is obvious 
that the Chinese government, the producers and the consumers will respond to 
changing grain market conditions by increasing the efficiency of production. Other 
experts, such as Shirayishi Kaziyoshi, a Japanese scientist specializing in Chinese 
problems, and Lin Yifu, now Chief Economist of the World Bank, have similar views 
and think that China has the capacity to produce enough grain to feed itself. The 
World Bank also commissioned research on China’s food security, and concluded that, 
by 2020, China’s demand for grain would be more than 6 billion tons, over 90 percent 
of which can be produced by China itself through improving agricultural 
infrastructure, and increasing investment in agricultural research, land conservation 
and irrigation facilities.129 Despite opposing views about food demand and supply in 
China for the next 30 years,130 many researchers think that the rapid loss of arable 
land to development and degradation are reducing China’s grain production 
capacity,131 and food security considerations are the main basis for China’s farmland 
protection policy.         
According to the existing Chinese farmland protection policy, a minimum of 80 
percent of all farmland within a province shall be designated as “prime farmland” that 
shall be protected fully in principle. Prime farmland includes the following types: 
farmland within grain, cotton or oil crop production bases designated by county-level 
governments or higher; farmland with good water conservancy facilities; vegetable 
                                                        
129 This paragraph draws from Wu Zhihua and Hu Xuejun (2003)  
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production bases; farmland for agricultural research or teaching experiment activities; 
and, other farmland designated by the State Council.   
In principle, each province is required to make sure that there is no net loss of 
farmland within its jurisdiction. Provinces experiencing a net loss of farmland will be 
required by the State Council to reclaim an equivalent amount of new farmland of 
equivalent quality. Provinces unable to fulfill this requirement due to land resource 
constraints must apply to the State Council for special arrangements whereby they can 
be allowed to reclaim farmland in other jurisdictions. 
According to the Land Administration Law (2004), developers of new projects 
that involve farmland conversion should, in principle, reclaim an equivalent amount 
of the farmland converted. Those who are not able to do so are required to pay 
“farmland reclamation fees”, and the collected fees will be earmarked for reclaiming 
farmland.      
This farmland protection objective comprises the most important component of 
the National Guideline for Comprehensive Land Use Planning (NGCLUP), which is a 
basis for the provinces to develop their respective CLUPs. The components of the 
NGCLUP are similar to those of a local CLUP, such as the one presented in Figure 2. 
The existing NGCLUP, developed in the mid-1990s, designates the maximum amount 
of developable land allowed for each province between 1997 and 2010. A detailed 
assessment of its implementation will be made in Chapter 7.  
 The farmland protection policy has been questioned by some scholars. For 
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example, Lichtenberg and Ding (2008) think that a substantial share of China’s 
farmland loss does not represent a reduction in food production capacity, that 
increases in other factors of production can compensate for farmland losses, and that 
farmland protection is not the most efficient - or even a necessary - means of meeting 
China's food security goals. Mao Yushi, Director of the Beijing-based Tianze 
Economic Research Institute, argues that the Chinese farmland protection objective is 
too strict and will constrain China’s economic development.132 In December 2008, 
Mao and his institute released a 224-page research report entitled “Farmland 
Protection and Grain Security”, which concludes that food security is not a solid basis 
for the current farmland protection policy. This report incurred strong reactions from 
some policy makers and the public on the media. There was even a torrent of 
invectives – sometimes with name-calling – directed at Mao. Mao replied in his 
personal blog by saying that he did not care about those words because he had heard 
“far more and far worse words during the Cultural Revolution”. Back in 2007, Mao 
argues in an article133 that farmland protection is a presumption for many people: 
If you ask someone whether farmland should be protected, the reply will 
typically come instantaneously: “Yes, of course.” If you follow up by asking why, 
the reply is like to be: “Because it is a national policy that must be adhered to.” If 
you go on to ask him to explain the basis of this national policy, he is likely to 
say that farmland is lacking in China and therefore must be protected in order to 
produce enough food.   
  … The importance of farmland protection has been advocated (by the 
government) so repeatedly that it has become a presumption… (Many people 
hold on to this presumption) without even giving thought to it and thus have 
deviated from the correct logic.  
The findings of the case study in Dragon County supports this proposition. Almost all 
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the local officials interviewed regard farmland protection as a “principle”, the logic of 
which should not be questioned, although at the same time they are very keen on 
engaging in informal land conversions. Even the farmers interviewed say that they are 
strongly supportive of farmland protection, although they also acknowledge that 
farming is very unattractive and that they very much look forward to their areas being 
urbanized. 
This dissertation concurs with Mao in that the Chinese farmland protection 
objective is too strict, but concludes that such a seemingly inefficient policy is 
actually a wise way to achieve land use efficiency given the existing political 
institutions. This theme will be developed in the following chapters.   
 
3. Promoting growth 
Growth has been China’s single most important policy objective since the late 
1970s. For the CCP leaders, growth is not just an economic issue, but a political one 
as well. Deng Xiaoping, the late Chinese leader between the late 1970s and the early 
1990s, explained this point in 1990 as follows:134  
Why are people supporting us (i.e. the party)? The reason is that our economic 
growth has been rapid and visible in the past decade. What would happen if we 
experience no development, or slow development, for the next five years? What 
would be the consequences? This is not just an economic issue, but also a political 
one… Why did some countries experience problems? The fundamental reason was 
that their economy was not performing well, such that their people had had food 
problems, clothing problems, inflation and decreased living standards for a long 
time.        
                                                        
134 Deng Xiaoping (1993), Volume 3, P. 354 
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It should be noted immediately that, in the language of green economists, 
“development” and “growth” can have different connotations: the former may entail 
the concept of sustainable development and thus means more than the latter. However, 
it is apparent that, in the quotation above, “development” simply refers to “growth”. 
As will be seen from the other quotations below, these two terms are often used in an 
interchangeable way by the Chinese leaders.     
Deng thought that China faced many kinds of complex challenges along the 
“socialist path”. Some challenges were economic and technological, and others were 
about maintaining social and political stability, realizing national unification135 and 
strengthening national defense. Among all these challenges, growth was the single 
most important one, because it was the key to solving all other problems.136  
Deng’s thoughts were upheld by his successor Jiang Zemin. Jiang put forward a 
new concept called the “scientific development outlook”, the gist of which was that 
growth should be based on sound analysis so as to be sustainable. In 2002, he 
emphasized that seeking development is the first priority of the party.137 In his work 
report to the 16th Congress of the CCP in 2001, Jiang emphasized that the party must 
regard economic development as the most important task in order to “shoulder the 
historical responsibility of promoting social progress and revitalizing the country”, 
and reiterated that economic development would have a direct impact on the level of 
public support received by the party.138 The concept of scientific development has 
been developed further by Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor, with a new concept called 
                                                        
135 This mainly refers to the unification of mainland with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
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137 Jiang Zemin (2002a)  
138 Jiang Zemin (2002b); People’s Daily (February 19, 2003) 
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“social harmony”, which includes harmony among the people within a society, and 
between human beings and nature.  
Clearly, the recent party leaders have recognized the need to improve the quality 
of growth. However, an essential precondition for improving quality is that quantity 
shall not be sacrificed to any significant extent, for two reasons: First, as mentioned, 
growth is thought to be the most important basis for the party receiving public support. 
Second, and equally important, the Chinese have learned a hard lesson from its 
history that economic strength is essential for preventing them from being bullied by 
others, as explained by an editorial in The People’s Daily, the party’s most influential 
official newspaper, on Feb 19, 2003:139         
“Development is an un-compromisable principle” (Fa Zhan Shi Ying Dao Li) is a 
simple sentence, but reveals a hard lesson that China has learned from history. As 
known to all, China was once the most advanced country in the world… Since the 
end of the 18th century, however, the complacent feudal rulers of China adopted a 
closed-door policy, leading to slow progress in productivity. In the mean time, the 
capitalist countries in Europe and North America took advantage of the 
technologies resulting from the Industrial Revolution, and developed rapidly, 
leaving China far behind. As a consequence, China, a fallen feudal empire, 
became a target for invasion. In the face of strong warships and powerful canons 
of the western powers, the corrupt and incapable government of the Qing Dynasty 
was helpless, allowing a great country with thousands of years of splendid history 
to suffer for many years to come.140… “We were bullied because we were weak” – 
this is a miserable memory and a painful lesson that we have learned from the 
contemporary Chinese history.  
 The bloody lessons of the past made the Chinese aware of a simple truth: We 
must become strong in order to survive… The founding of the People’s Republic 
of China and the establishment of a socialist system created unprecedented 
opportunities for rapid economic and social progress… However, (during the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), China’s focus of attention 
deviated from economic growth, leading to a widened gap with developed 
countries in terms of economic strength.               
                                                        
139  People’s Daily (February 19, 2003)  
140 After the 1840s, China was invaded by western powers a number of times: By UK and France twice in 1840 
and 1860 respectively, by Japan and Russia respectively in the 1890s, by eight western powers in 1900, and by 
Japan during World War II. 
 115 
Since the Third Meeting of the 11th Congress of the Party141 in 1978, we have 
been holding on, tightly and unswervingly, to the central theme of economic 
development, and made great achievements…     
History and reality have proven, time and again, that, only if we stick tightly 
to the promotion of economic growth as the single most important task… can we 
fulfill the wishes of the Chinese people in a fundamental way… and retain 
independence in the world that is becoming increasingly competitive.     
Moreover, growth is also an “urgent” task, because China’s top leaders see the 
first 20 years of the new century as an “important and strategic” period for the 
country’s revitalization, as explained by Premier Wen Jiabao in an article published 
on February 26, 2007:142    
The first 20 years of the new century presents an important and strategic 
opportunity... It is of utmost importance that we make the best use of this period…  
In China’s contemporary history, there have not been many great 
opportunities for development. (Between the 18th century and the middle of the 
20th century), China lost valuable opportunities for development to closed-door 
policies and various invasions by western powers… (After the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China,) We made some big mistakes, particularly the 
10-year Cultural Revolution, leading to loss of another important opportunity 
period…  
Opportunities are rare and usually do not stay for long. In the past 28 years 
since we adopted open and reform policy, the Chinese economy has been growing 
in a sustained way, which is a miracle. Will we continue to have such an 
opportunity period, and for how long? I think the answer to the first question is 
yes, but the length of the period depends, to a great extent, on our ability to handle 
domestic and international policies.  
Currently, the international situation is undergoing deep and complex changes, 
and has exhibited many new characteristics. However, in general, the external 
environment is favorable for us, and the theme of the time is still peace and 
development. We do not foresee large-scale wars in the world for the time being. 
Therefore, it is possible for us to have a peaceful international environment and 
maintain good relations with neighboring countries for a relatively long time. 
History has taught us that we will be looked down upon and bullied unless we 
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history. 
142 Wen Jiabao (2007)  
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become strong. Therefore, we must take advantage of the current favorable 
international environment to speed up our development…    
These thoughts do not belong to the top leaders at the national government only, but 
are actually the most important tenets of the party that all party members are obliged 
to study and master.  
Since the 1990s, China has been allowing the market to play an increasing role in 
its economic growth. However, the old planning system is still at work to a significant 
extent. In particular, the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) continue to guide the workings of the 
economy at the macro level. There are two types of FYPs: the master FYP, and the 
sector-specific FYPs. 
The master FYP, developed by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) on behalf of the State Council, is an all-encompassing plan 
covering all the important aspects of economic and social development, such as macro 
economic objectives, generation of employment opportunities, technological 
development, regional coordination, and environmental protection, etc. For instance, 
the 10th FYP (2001-2005) set the following objectives for economic and social 
development indicators:  
- Annual economic growth rate: 7% 
- GDP by the end of 2005: 12.5 trillion yuan (based on 2000 prices) 
- Per capita GDP by the end of 2005: 9,400 yuan 
- Number of new employment opportunities in cities and towns: 40 million 
- Registered unemployment rate in cities and towns: below 5%  
- Price level: stable  
- International balance of accounts: balanced     
The sector-specific FYPs are developed by various ministries based on the 
guidelines set by the master FYP. For example, there are FYPs for transportation, 
forestry, environmental protection, and land administration, etc.   
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Although most of the macro control objectives set by the FYPs are not 
compulsory, they are important indicators for evaluating the performance of local 
governments. Therefore, local officials take these objectives – particularly the growth 
objectives - very seriously, and the competition for growth is so intense that many 
local governments resort to making up numbers in order to impress their bosses at 
higher-level governments. This is clearly the observation of some officials from 
Dragon County. Local Official A comments that, 
The official statistics are not credible. Whatever kind of data the higher-level 
governments will be pleased with, the local governments can make up. This is a 
national phenomenon… I doubt how much of the national statistics is reliable. 
The data about population and weather may be credible, but I am suspicious 
about the reliability of other data… One example is that, at the end of 2005, the 
National Bureau of Statistics “reduced” (artificially) the GDP of (Province X) by 
40 billion, and “increased” the GDP of (Province Y) by 70 billion. The NBS had 
to do this, because otherwise the GDP of (X) would be higher than that of (Y). (It 
is a well-known fact that Y is wealthier than X.) The most important reason for 
this kind of fraudulence is that local government leaders need to score politically. 
Along the same line, Village Party Secretary B from Township E comments that,  
(In Township E), the median annual income of farmers should be approximately 
3,000-4,000 yuan, but the official figure is 7,000 yuan. A township official once 
scolded me for telling the truth to a county official… The annual growth rate of 
per capita income has to be at least 5%... What we need to do is make up numbers 
for sheep, cows, and fruit trees, etc., and make sure that the numbers match each 
other.  
Developer E, who owns an export-oriented bio-chemical plant in Township D, 
comments, 
When my plant was doing well (i.e. before it was affected by the financial crisis 
that started in 2008), its annual gross sales value was approximately 12 million 
yuan. However, the township official wanted me to report more than 100 million 
yuan (so that the figure would be more impressive)… At the beginning, I dared 
not do this, because there might be tax issues involved: If my sales volume had 
been so large, I would have had to pay a lot more tax… Eventually, after they 
assured me that tax would not be a problem, I reported as they wished.       
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The worship of growth has created great demand for land conversion. Land is an 
essential input for economic growth, since all economic activities have to be based on 
land. Therefore, a land supply constraint, if binding at all, will essentially restrict 
economic growth. However, as will be explained in Chapter 11, it is impossible to 
know precisely how much farmland needs to be protected; so the farmland protection 
target has to be based on the political will of individual leaders, not on economic 
analysis of any kind. In other words, the national government does not – and cannot - 
know how to balance economic growth and farmland protection. To deal with this 
difficult issue, the national government chooses to tell the local governments that it 
wants both. The situation is illustrated in Figure 7, in which AB represents the total 
existing farmland stock, AD represents the annual farmland protection target, and BC 
represents the amount of farmland that needs to be converted annually in order to 
achieve the desired growth target.    
 
Figure 7 Conflicting Targets for Economic Growth and Farmland Protection 
 
This dissertation will show in the following chapters that Figure 7 does reflect 
reality. For now, it is useful to quote the following statement from a study by a special 
task force commissioned by the MLR in 2002 regarding the relationship between 
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economic growth and farmland protection:143  
Rapid economic development is making an increasingly greater demand for 
developable land. The national government has developed many strategies or 
programs to promote economic development, such as “Accelerating 
Urbanization”, “Developing Small Cities and Towns”, “Western Development144”, 
“Enabling Eastern Provinces with Good Conditions to Realize Modernization in 
Advance”, etc. All these programs require large-scale land conversion, which will 
aggravate the scarcity of land supply, particularly in the eastern regions where 
economic development is more advanced. In some regions, it has become 
increasingly difficult to start new development projects if the developable land 
quotas are to be fulfilled.  
 For example, Shannxi Province has proposed to build more than 3,400 km of 
highways in order to establish a highway network centering on Xi’an City (which 
is the provincial capital)… and most of the land to be converted will be 
high-quality farmland in Guanzhong Plain…   
 (A second example is that) Jiangsu Province has planned to increase the level 
of urbanization from 34.9% in 1999 to 50% in 2010, and has proposed an 
urbanization strategy called “Promoting the Development of Mega and Large 
Cities Actively, and of Small Cities145 Rationally”. According to the plan, the 
number of mega cities will be increased from 2 to 5, large cities from 3 to 6, and 
medium cities from 10 to 38 during this period. The province will also implement 
the national strategy of “Promoting the Development of Small Cities and 
Towns”… During the urbanization process, smaller towns will merge into larger 
ones… These plans will require converting a large amount of land… There is a 
large difference between the available land quota and the actual need.         
Needless to say, the local governments are very perplexed by the conflicting 
national policies. The choice, however, is not as difficult as it appears to be. The 
reason is that, in the minds of local officials, economic growth is definitely a higher 
priority than farmland protection. Imagine how a local government leader is to 
interpret the following words by Premier Wen Jiabao in an important editorial146: 
                                                        
143 Ministry of Land and Resources Special Task Force (2002) 
144 “Western Development” is a program to facilitate the development of the western regions, which have been 
lagging behind the eastern regions in economic growth. 
145 A mega city has a population of more than 1,000,000, large city 500,000 – 1,000,000, medium city 
200,000-500,000, and small city less than 200,000 (State Council, 1986, 1993). 
146 Wen Jiabao (2007)  
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There are big and small principles. The small principles should serve the big ones. 
Our central task is to achieve socialist modernization, which is our big principle, 
and which everyone must abide by…  
It is obviously not difficult to figure out which of the two, growth or farmland, is a 
more direct contributing factor to modernization.  
 Of course, the national government has different interpretations regarding the 
connotations of “socialist modernization”. In recent years, it has recognized the 
importance of ecological conservation and restoration to the sustainability of 
economic growth and people’s livelihood. For example, the Program of “Converting 
Slope Farmland Back to Forest or Grassland”, as mentioned earlier, aims to stop 
unsustainable farming practices on slope land, which are thought to be a major cause 
of soil erosion and ecological degradation. However, the afore-mentioned special 
MLR task force (2002) comments that, 
The western provinces are actively implementing the program of slope farmland 
conversion… The reason why they are so active is that the national government 
provides decent compensation for such land conversion… All farmland on slopes 
of greater than 25º is required to be converted, and selected farmland on slopes of 
15-25º will be converted too… In addition, some jurisdictions have planned to 
build greenbelts around their cities and along major roads, which will require 
converting more farmland… These planned farmland conversion programs have 
far exceeded the farmland conversion quota allowed for these regions…. 
Incidentally, a lack of coordination among different land-related agencies during the 
implementation of this program is also identified as a major issue:     
The forestry authorities, agricultural authorities, and land administration 
authorities all intervened… They lack coordination with each other… and there 
have been double-counting problems such that the statistics do not reflect true 
farmland changes.147    
                                                        
147 Ministry of Land and Resources (2002) 
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In addition, in order to improve the livelihood of the rural population, the national 
government has been encouraging structural adjustment to agricultural production by 
developing high value-added agricultural practices and diversifying the use of 
farmland. As a result, some farmland that was used for grain production is now used 
for growing fruits or as fish ponds, which has reduced farmland stock. In 1998 and 
1999, for instance, the conversion of farmland to orchids and fish ponds accounted for 
12.3% and 12.7%, respectively, of all farmland loss.148     
Therefore, it is fair to say that, as far as the national government is concerned, 
“socialist modernization” is an all-encompassing concept, including GDP growth, 
ecological conservation, and adjustment of the existing economic structure – and 
farmland protection may well be part of it. However, the various national policies 
mentioned above often conflict with one another and are clearly not achievable at the 
same time.    
Such a conflict will likely become more intense in the face of the economic crisis 
that started in 2008. On November 5, 2008, the State Council passed a resolution on 
an economic stimulus package with a planned investment of 4 trillion yuan by 2010. 
The package aims to stimulate domestic demand and increase the income of urban 
residents and farmers - which, of course, requires the generation of more jobs. An 
important component of the package is the construction of infrastructure, such as 
highways, railways, airports, affordable housing, and wastewater treatment plants, etc, 
which all require land conversion. The overall macro objective set by the State 
                                                        
148 Ministry of Land and Resources (2002) 
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Council is that the Chinese economy shall grow by at least 8% in 2009.149 
Conceivably, land supply constraints often have to give way to the need for growth. 
As will be described in Chapter 8, Dragon County already has a large iron and steel 
project approved as a part of the overall economic stimulus program, posing more 
demand on the local land supply.       
 
4. Centralizing political power  
 China has a highly centralized political system. At the national level, the highest 
bureaucratic authority is the State Council, which consists of the Premier, 3-5 Vice 
Premiers and 5 State Councilors. Vice Premiers have the same bureaucratic status as 
State Councilors, but with more responsibilities. The State Council delegates the 
responsibilities of the national government to about 30 specialized ministries or 
central agencies. The Premier is in charge of the overall performance of the national 
government, whereas each Vice Premier or State Councilor is responsible for 
directing and overseeing a few ministries and central agencies. The bureaucratic 
structures at provincial, municipal, county and township levels are similar. At the 
provincial level, for example, the Governor and Vice Governors delegate specific 
responsibilities to specialized bureaus, which are set up to match each and every 
ministry or central agency at the national level. Figure 8 is an illustration of the 
bureaucratic structures at national and provincial levels.  
As mentioned in the Introduction of the dissertation, there are “dual track” and 
                                                        
149 Quoting Wen Jiabao, Premier of China, by Zhang Yixuan (2009) 
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“single track” agencies. In Figure 8, Bureaus A-D are “dual track” agencies. The 
dotted lines connecting them with the matching ministries at the national level 
indicate that the latter do not have direct control over the former except on technical 
matters. Bureau E is a “single track” agency. At least nominally, the provincial 
governor has no direct authority to appoint officials or control the financial resources 
of Bureau E. The provincial BLR is a special case, because its director and deputy 
directors are appointed by the MLR directly but its financial resources and staff are 
controlled by the provincial governor. In Figure 8, the dotted line connecting the 
provincial governor and the BLR indicates some degree of direct control by the 




Figure 8 Illustration of the Bureaucratic Structure at National and Provincial Levels 
 
 Although a highly centralized power system makes it convenient for the CCP to 
control the ideology of the bureaucracy, such a system is inherently weak in both 
vertical supervision and horizontal coordination.    
In terms of vertical supervision, a first problem is that some national policies may 
not receive support from provincial governments. According to the Chinese 
bureaucratic rule, a minister at the national government does not have the authority to 
direct a provincial governor, since they have the same level of ranking. A minister can 
“advise” a provincial governor on national policies developed by his ministry, but 
does not have the authority to impose a penalty if the governor chooses to ignore 
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these policies, because only the State Council is eligible to order a governor to do 
things. What a ministry is eligible to do without resorting to the State Council is to ask 
its matching provincial bureau to implement its policies. This is where the 
implementation of many national policies goes astray, because national policies often 
do not coincide with local interests and therefore lack support from provincial 
governors. The implementation of the farmland protection policy at the provincial 
level is one such example. Clearly, absent true support from the provincial governor, it 
is impossible for a provincial BLR to carry out the farmland protection policy strictly 
- even if the BLR director and deputy directors are appointed by the MLR directly.       
A second problem is that it is very difficult for the national government to 
monitor the local implementation of national policies due to so many levels of the 
government and so many different agencies at each level within a hierarchical system 
that is very opaque. For example, as far as land conversion is concerned, it has been 
impossible for the national government to monitor the collection and use of revenues 
from land conversion,150 and there are many private deals between local governments 
and developers, causing significant loss of public revenue.151 Between 2003 and 2006, 
for instance, the National Auditing Bureau uncovered 60 cases of illegal land 
conveyance at prices that were abnormally low in 87 EDZs in Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Sichuan Provinces/Municipalities, resulting in 
approximately 5.6 billion yuan of loss in public revenue.152 It is fair to assume that 
many more such illegal cases actually went unnoticed.   
                                                        
150 Qian Wenrong (2004)  
151 Chen Fang, Zhang Huaping and Zhang Honghe (2004) 
152 Fan Lixiang (2006)  
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It should be noted that, despite being a source of corruption, the lack of vertical 
supervision is not necessarily always a bad thing. It is clearly impossible for a highly 
centralized system to respect local conditions that are very diverse and changing 
constantly. Therefore, weak vertical supervision may actually be a blessing for local 
governments, which are in a better position to respond to local needs, as will be 
discussed further in Part II of the dissertation. 
In terms of horizontal coordination, the agencies at the same level or ranking are 
traditionally competitors rather than partners. A first reason is that individual agencies 
are primarily - if not “only” - concerned with their own political achievements, and 
thus have a strong interest in evading the policies of other agencies. This is not 
difficult to understand. Suppose, for example, the MLR tries to coordinate with its 
line ministries regarding their compliance with the national farmland protection target. 
However, the Ministry of Transportation wants to build railways and roads, the 
Ministry of Construction wants to implement affordable housing programs and 
control rising housing prices, and the National Development and Reform Commission 
wants to achieve macro economic objectives, etc. As long as the farmland protection 
target is binding at all, the line ministries will try to evade it. Although the State 
Council is responsible for overall coordination, each ministry knows clearly that it 
cannot afford to sacrifice its own political achievements for the sake of complying 
with the policies of other ministries. Otherwise, it will be deemed “incapable” because, 
in the end, a minister’s performance is evaluated based on what he has achieved, not 
what he has not.      
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 A second problem with horizontal coordination is that the leaders of an agency 
typically face pressure from their staff to compete for more administrative authority 
with other agencies. The reason is that, in China, administrative power carries many 
types of personal benefits for the officials responsible for delivering the public 
services. These benefits may sometimes be simply psychological, providing a sense of 
“being important”; but are often more tangible, taking the form of gifts, cash, or 
personal favors, as will be discussed further in Chapter 9.  
 
5. Centralizing financial authorities and delegating administrative 
responsibilities 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, China copied the former Soviet system of public 
finance. The national government was in control of the national budget and the 
budgets of the provincial governments. Under this highly centralized financial system, 
provincial and lower-level governments served as agents of the national government, 
and provided public services according to the directions of the latter153. In the 1970s, 
the provincial governments started to have some degree of autonomy. For example, 
they were able to decide on their own budgets within certain limits and keep some 
surplus revenues.  
This soviet-style public finance system was reformed in the 1980s. The national 
government still maintained unified control of the budgets of local governments, but 
each level of local government is responsible for having balanced revenues and 
                                                        
153 Naughton &Yang (2004); Zhang Runlong (2006) 
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expenditures. This reform allowed local governments to participate actively in 
financial administration, and provided incentives for them to promote local economic 
growth so as to generate local revenue.154 
The current system is the result of another reform in 1994, which made the 
national and local governments responsible for covering expenditures on different 
matters. The national government is responsible for national security, diplomacy, 
operation of the national government, national economic structural adjustment, 
regional coordination, and the public utilities directly administered by the national 
government, etc.. Local governments are responsible for their own operations and 
local social and economic development. Accordingly, there are three types of taxes: 
state taxes, local taxes, and taxes shared by the national and local governments. State 
taxes are collected for national security and national-level macro control; shared taxes 
are collected for expenditure on matters directly related to economic development; 
and local taxes are administered by local authorities. Within each local government 
above the county level, there is a Bureau of State Taxation (BST) and a Bureau of 
Local Taxation (BLT). The BST is responsible for collecting state taxes and shared 
taxes, and the BLT for local taxes. The national government returns portions of the 
taxes collected by the BSTs to local governments, and also provides financial support 
to economically disadvantaged provinces or regions through transfer payments. 
Despite these reforms, financial conflicts have existed between the national and 
                                                        
154 Yang Zhigang (2004) 
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local governments and between various levels of the government since the 1980s.155 
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the national government adopted various kinds of 
measures to increase the share of the national government in the total budget. In some 
cases, local governments had to pay for expenses incurred by the national 
government.156 In the meantime, local governments also devised various strategies 
directed against the national government.157 Their respective behaviors increased 
their vigilance and alertness against each other, and there was increasing competition 
between various levels of the government for financial resources.158 
Under the existing financial system as a result of the 1994 reform, 75% of the 
VAT goes to the national government, and only 25% is returned to local governments. 
In recent years, some income taxes whose revenue is growing rapidly have been 
changed into shared taxes,159 making the financial situation of local governments 
more difficult. Between 1994 and 2005, the fiscal revenue of the national government 
accounted for 52% of the nation’s total, whereas provincial and lower-level 
governments accounted for 48% only; on the other hand, the national government 
shouldered only about 30% of the total fiscal outlays, whereas provincial and 
lower-level governments shouldered approximately 70%. 160  In 2004, the fiscal 
revenue of the national government accounted for 55% of the nation’s total, but the 
provincial and lower-level governments paid 14 times, 7 times and 10 times more 
than the national government in supporting public education, social insurance, and 
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agriculture respectively.161    
Moreover, the various levels of local governments follow the example set by the 
national government to centralize the power of revenue collection, such that the lower 
the level, the more authority in revenue collection it loses. On the other hand, there is 
no clear division of spending responsibilities, such that each level tries to delegate 
spending responsibilities to lower-level governments.162 In particular, county- and 
township-level governments face serious shortages of financial capacity to 
accomplish their spending responsibilities.163  
Thus, under the five-level hierarchical public administration system, the lower the 
level of government, the more exploitation it is potentially subject to.164 In particular, 
the municipality has been identified as a level of government that contributes to this 
problem. The original purpose of having a municipal-level government between the 
province and the county is that a municipality has a wider tax base than a county and 
is better positioned than a provincial government to provide support, when necessary, 
to financially disadvantaged counties, which have narrower tax bases. The actual 
situation, however, is that a municipality typically intercepts financial resources 
appropriated to its counties from the provincial government on the one hand, and 
“exploits” the own financial resources of the counties on the other hand.165  
The financial situation of most counties is not favorable.166 Although it is 
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common knowledge that the debts of local governments are very large, nobody can 
tell their size with confidence – because local governments are very opaque and 
typically conceal information from their higher-level governments.167 Some experts 
think that the risks posed by the debts of China’s local governments have become the 
most important influencing factor for China’s economic and social stability. The debts 
of local governments are of many types, and in amounts that are beyond control and 
growing at an increasing rate. Provincial, municipal, county and township 
governments all borrow in various forms; and the lower the level of government, the 
higher the pressure to borrow.     
Various local governments also compete against each other financially through 
adopting such strategies as local protectionism and implementing repetitive 
construction projects in order to increase tax revenue.168 Starting in 1994, land 
conveyance fees are no longer turned in to the national government, and have 
naturally become a main source of income for local governments. 
 
6. Controlling housing prices 
Prior to the recent financial crisis, the rapidly rising housing prices in many 
Chinese cities had been a great concern to the public, especially low-income groups. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the average sales prices of new 
housing in 70 cities surveyed increased by 12.9% between the first seven months of 
                                                        
167 The remainder of the paragraph draws on the research of the State Council’s Development Research Center, 
quoted in Li Peng (2004). 
168 Shen Kunrong (2005) 
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2003 and those of 2004; 12.5% between the first quarter of 2004 and that of 2005; 
5.5% between 2005 and 2006; 5.4%, 6.4%, 7.1%, 7.5% and 8.2% respectively 
between April, May, June, July and August of 2006 and the same periods of 2007; 
and 10.2% between May 2007 and May 2008.169  
It is worth noting that these figures are often the “average” of the sales prices of 
new housing, and must have underestimated the actual situation in most Chinese cities 
to a significant extent. The reason is that the average price of all housing ignores the 
effect of location, which is often the most important influencing factor for housing 
prices. Newer housing is usually located further from city centers or on less expensive 
sites, because more central and valuable sites are often occupied first. My personal 
estimate is that, in Beijing, Shanghai, Phoenix City, and Dragon City, the actual 
increase in housing prices was at least 100% between 2003 and 2007. In this regard, 
Shen Xiaojie (2007) discusses several indications that the government manipulates 
data on housing prices. First, the statistics provided by different agencies often 
conflict with one another. For instance, a report by the Bureau of Land, Resources and 
Housing Administration (BLRHA) 170  of Guangzhou Municipality, Guangdong 
Province on April 13, 2007 stated that the average prices of new housings in 
Guangzhou decreased from 7,729 yuan/m2 in February 2007 to 7,029 yuan/m2 in 
                                                        
169 China Land and Resources News (2004); Fang Ye et al. (2005); Chinanews (March 15, 2007); Xinhua News 
Agency (June 19, 2007); Qingdao Finance Daily (October 3, 2007); National Development and Reform 
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170 In China, different jurisdictions have different institutional arrangements regarding the housing administration 
authority. In most Chinese jurisdictions, the housing administration authority belongs to the Bureau of 
Construction. For example, at the national level, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) was responsible for housing 
administration before March 2008. (After March 2008, MOC has changed its name to Ministry of Housing and 
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Dragon County. However, in some Chinese regions, the housing administration authority belongs to the land 
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March 2007. The municipal government of Guangzhou used this as evidence to assert 
that “housing prices will definitely be put under control as long as the government is 
determined”. Four days later, a report by the NDRC showed that, in March 2007, new 
housing prices in Guangzhou increased by 1.2% over the previous month and 8.6% 
over the previous year. Second, the official figures are often a far cry from people’s 
intuitive observations. For example, a joint report by the NDRC and the NBS in 
March 2007 stated that housing prices increased by 5.9% over the previous year and 
0.6% over the previous month in the 70 cities surveyed. However, Shen notes that few 
people in these cities would believe that the housing prices in their cities had 
increased by single digit only. In many of these cities, the housing prices should have 
increased by 20%-30% over the previous year.             
The NBS and the MOC thought that the following factors contributed to the 
skyrocketing housing prices:171  First, the demand for housing had been strong 
because of rapid urbanization and people’s improved living standard. Second, the cost 
of housing construction had increased due to the higher cost of acquiring land and 
higher prices of construction materials. Third, the supply of housing was limited in 
some cities. Last but not the least, people generally anticipated that housing supply 
would continue to be restricted. Buying housing became a way of storing wealth. 
Many people chose to buy larger houses than they actually needed, or speculated on 
housing. Since housing prices rose so rapidly, many developers were deliberately 
holding land or slowing down construction for larger profits in the future - which 
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contributed further to rising housing prices.   
The rapidly rising housing prices made housing unaffordable to many people, and 
might have contributed to a widened income disparity because land and housing 
speculation generally benefits the wealthy, not the poor. The national government took 
it very seriously, and adopted a number of measures to increase housing supply or 
provide affordable housing for the poor. In particular, the national government 
required large cities to implement affordable housing programs for low-income 
groups.  
In general, there are mainly three types of affordable housing in China.172 The 
first type is “affordable rental housing”, which is owned by the government but rented 
to the lowest-income groups at a rate that is much lower than market rates. In some 
cases, the government provides a subsidy to the lowest-income groups so that they 
can afford to rent housing on the market directly. The second type is “affordable 
ownership housing”. In some cases, the government provides free land to developers 
to build housing to be sold to low-income groups at a rate much lower than the market 
prices. Typically, the government designates a maximum profit margin, say 3% in 
some cities, for the developers of such housing. In other cases, the government 
requires commercial real estate developers to devote a certain portion of the land they 
acquire from the government to developing affordable ownership housings. Such a 
requirement often serves as a precondition for a developer to acquire land from the 
                                                        
172 This information is based on a workshop on urban regeneration and affordable housing organized by the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Rural Development (HOHURD) in Beijing on June 23, 2008 – which I attended. 
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government. The third type is “limited-price housing”, which are sold to low- and 
medium-income groups at a price that is usually about 20% lower than market prices. 
Typically, the government provides the land to commercial housing developers at a 
favorable price so that the latter can devote a portion of their projects to developing 
limited-price apartments. 
Several problems have existed with the affordable housing programs in various 
cities. One problem is that there is a lack of an effective information management 
system for checking the eligibility of the buyers of affordable housing. Many buyers 
are actually well-off families, and there has even been an active informal market for 
the transfer of second-hand affordable housing.173 Another problem is that local 
governments are often not enthusiastic about such programs. On the one hand, their 
ability in stabilizing housing prices and solving housing problems for low-income 
groups is an important aspect of the evaluation of their performance by the 
higher-level governments. On the other hand, affordable housing programs tend to 
make land supply even scarcer and do no contribute much to local revenue or GDP.174 
For example, in August 2008, the State Council approved 28,817 hectares of 
developable land for 84 cities. Among all the land approved, almost 80 percent is for 
infrastructure and housing development; and among the land approved for housing 
development, 79.64 percent is for affordable rental housing, affordable ownership 
housing, or limited-price housing175 - indicating that the “official” supply of land for 
                                                        
173 Wu Haihua and Zhang Jiaqi (2005); Xie Wei and Rong Ancai (2005) 
174 Deng Yuwen (2005)  
175 Zhang Jing (2008)  
 136 
other development purposes is very limited. This will actually force local 
governments to resort to informal land conversion to meet their other needs, as will be 
described in Part II of the dissertation.    
The recent financial crisis has led to widespread speculation that housing prices 
may fall significantly. A dramatic fall in housing prices may lead to bad loans and thus 
contribute to further financial instability. Since China lacks a credible official 
statistical system for housing prices (as discussed earlier) and that it is now still too 
early for the effects of the crisis to manifest fully, the dissertation will not delve into 
this issue. However, the effects of the crisis on the prices of housing in Dragon 
County will be described briefly in Chapter 5.     
 
7. Summary  
Growth is the single most important objective of the national government. It is 
practically impossible to strike a proper balance between economic growth and 
farmland protection. Consequently, the local governments are receiving conflicting 
signals from the national government regarding the choice between growth and 
farmland. 
The existing bureaucratic structure is designed for the national government to 
control political power tightly, but has inherent weaknesses in vertical supervision and 
horizontal coordination, and provides a breeding ground for corruption due to a lack 
of transparency. On the other hand, the delegation of spending responsibilities and the 
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centralization of financial resources have led to financial difficulties for many local 
governments.     
The land supply constraint also leads to widespread land and housing speculation, 
contributing to rapidly rising housing prices, which may potentially increase public 
discontent and threaten the control of political power by the national government.  
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CHAPTER 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, local governments refer to the county and township governments 
unless stated otherwise. The county is the lowest level of government in China that 
has independent authority to appoint officials and appropriate financial resources. In 
Dragon County, the highest-ranking official is the County Party Secretary. The 
County Mayor, who is also a County Deputy Party Secretary, is the second-ranking 
official. The two key agencies with land use planning authorities are the Bureau of 
Land and Resources (BLR) and the Bureau of Planning (BOP). The BLR is 
responsible for developing and implementing the county’s land use plans, and the 
BOP for urban plans.  
The institutional arrangement at the township level is similar. The only difference 
is that township-level governments and their agencies do not have as much 
independent decision-making authority. Their main responsibility is to implement the 
decisions made by the county-level government and its agencies, not to make 
decisions by themselves. 
 This chapter will first describe the financial situation of Dragon’s local 
governments, then discuss the role of land conversion in the county’s public finance, 
and lastly explain the strategies of Dragon’s local governments in dealing with 
villages and farmers during compulsory land conversion.    
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2. Financial needs of local governments 
The financial administration structure of Dragon County consists mainly of two 
sets of financial relations: one is between the county and the township governments, 
and the other is between the county and the higher-level municipal government. Since 
these two sets of relations are similar, only the former will be described here.  
The existing financial relations between the county and township governments 
started in a reform in 1992. During the reform, the county government delegated 
spending responsibilities to the townships but maintained control over their financial 
resources. Specifically, the financial arrangements were made in the following way:  
The county government first assessed the financial situation of each township, 
including revenue and expenditure. Then, taking 1990 and 1991 as benchmark years, 
it figured out the difference between a township’s annual revenue and expenditure. If 
the difference was positive, a township would be asked to turn in the same amount to 
the county government in the following year; if negative, the county government 
would make transfer payment in the same amount. For example, a township whose 
average annual revenue was 5 million yuan and expenditure was 4 million yuan in the 
two previous years before the reform would be asked to turn in 1 million yuan to the 
county government in 1992. In a different case, a township whose average annual 
revenue was 7 million yuan and expenditure was 10 million yuan in the two previous 
years before the reform would receive transfer payment from the county government 
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in the amount of 3 million yuan in 1992. 
Moreover, if a township turned in surplus X1 to the county government in the first 
year after the reform, it would be asked to turn in X1*(1 + r1) in the following year, 
where r1 is a growth rate set by the county government. If a township received transfer 
payment X2 from the county government in the first year after the reform, it would 
receive X2*(1 - r2) in the following year, such that the township would not receive any 
transfer payment three years after. 
The revenues of the townships mainly come from taxes and fees. The fiscal 
revenues of a township are administered by the county government. A township has a 
financial office, but does not have a treasury. All the taxes and fees collected in the 
townships shall go to the county treasury first. The county’s Finance Bureau then 
appropriates financial resources to the townships’ Finance Offices based on the 
financial arrangements described above.  
Whether a township can generate sufficient revenue to cover its expenditure 
depends largely on the performance of its economy. Not surprisingly, various 
townships have had very different financial situations since the reform. Before 2005, 
some townships did not even have enough money to pay salaries to their employees. 
Consequently, many people, especially the public servants working in the townships 
whose financial situation was not good, complained about the system. A public 
servant working in a remote township was actually “making a sacrifice for the 
society”, but earned much less. In extreme cases, the difference in the average salaries 
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of public servants working in different townships could be 2 to 1. 
In order to address this problem, the county government carried out another 
reform in 2005. Under the new system, all public servants and public school teachers 
are paid at levels no lower than the “basic salary standards” set by the county 
government. The county government will make transfer payment if any townships do 
not have the financial capacity to pay the full amount according to the basic salary 
standards.  
 The 2005 reform was on the “basic salaries” of public servants and teachers only. 
A township government is still responsible for paying bonuses to these people by 
itself. In Dragon, it is typical for a public servant to receive bonus, which can account 
for up to 40% of his total salary in a rich township and 20% in a poor township. 
Teachers typically do not receive bonuses. 
Despite this reform, some township governments still have financial difficulties. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the financial relation between Dragon County and the 
municipal government of Phoenix is similar to that between the county and the 
townships. Therefore, the county government also faces similar financial pressures, as 
will be explained below.     
The county’s budgeted fiscal revenue has been increasing at a rapid pace in recent 
years, from 100 million yuan in 1992 to approximately 2 billion yuan in 2007. 
However, its financial situation is not promising. Industrial enterprises have been a 
major source of tax. However, most of them are labor or resource intensive companies 
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that produce such products as automobile tires, textile machineries, casting 
machineries, and home appliances, etc. These enterprises are at the “lower reaches” of 
the industrial chain and rely heavily on energy and raw materials. Due to rises in the 
prices of energy and raw materials in recent years, the cost of processing and 
manufacturing has increased, and these enterprises are generally not very profitable. 
Consequently, the contribution of these enterprises to local revenue is limited.176  
 In general, the service sectors in Dragon are lagging behind manufacturing. So 
far, the real estate sector has been a major stimulus for the development of service 
sectors. The wholesale and retail businesses in Dragon are doing reasonably well, but 
do not contribute much to the county’s fiscal revenue. Other service sectors, such as 
material flows and tourism, are not doing well. The material flow businesses are not 
good because Dragon is not a transportation center, with no railway station and being 
a bit too far from the airport. Tourism businesses are not successful in most seasons. 
Some tourists come to Dragon, but few stay for more than one day, so Dragon does 
not benefit much from related services such as recreation, shopping and hotels, etc.  
In addition, the county has been losing significant revenue after a tax reform in 
2002. Before 2002, income taxes from foreign enterprises counted as state taxes, 
whereas those from Chinese enterprises were local taxes. After 2002, income taxes 
from “new” Chinese enterprises count as state taxes - which has led to a significant 
loss of revenue for the county because only a small portion (25%) of state taxes are 
returned to the county government.  
                                                        
176 Internal policy paper by the county BST 
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 On the other side, the fiscal outlays of the county have always been larger than 
budgeted revenues in recent years. In 2007, for example, the budgeted expenditure  
(shown in Table 4) was 3 billion yuan, which was more than 1 billion yuan more than 
the budgeted revenue.   
Table 4 Budgeted Expenditures of Dragon’s County Government, 2007 
Categories Expenditure 
(million yuan) 
Basic expenditures (salaries, government operations, loan 
repayment) 
2,200 
Regular government programs (such as education, 
telecommunications and transportation programs) 
320 
Key government sponsored projects 500 
Total 3,020 
 Apart from basic expenditures (such as salaries, government operations, and loan 
repayment), an important part of the fiscal outlays by the county government have 
been incurred by what are called “image projects”, which are projects supported by 
the county leaders in order to impress people, especially their bosses at higher-level 
governments, with “visible” achievements. A typical example is a major beautification 
project for River A in the mid-1990s. The project included building stone banks, 
rebuilding several bridges, and planting trees and flowers on both sides of the river. 
As shown on Map 2, the river runs across Dragon City, and is just several hundred 
meters to the south of the old county government building. The cost of the project was 
tremendous. The county government did not have enough money to pay for it, and 
forced all the people receiving salaries from the county government to contribute 
approximately 1,000 yuan each on average. The contribution was deducted directly 
from their salaries. It was a considerable burden on many people, because the average 
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monthly salary for a government employee at the time was only several hundred yuan. 
These personal contributions have never been paid back.  
A second example is the construction of the Coastal Road. The road was designed 
to be wide, with two vehicle lanes and a bicycle lane in each direction for most 
sections. The project was started even before the land use application was approved 
by the provincial government. The county government did not have enough money to 
compensate the affected villages for the land occupied, and set the level of the 
compensation to be very low, giving rise to protests by some farmers, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. 
The reason why the county government is enthusiastic about such construction 
projects is that they are more visible compared with other types of projects. They are 
not necessarily bad projects. Some, such as the beautification of River A and the 
construction of the Coastal Road, have actually produced desirable social or economic 
effects. However, it is fair to say that the money spent on many such projects could 
probably have been spent in other and better ways.   
A smaller-scale, yet more telling, example of image projects is the pavement of 
some streets for some villages along the Township D section of Main Road G leading 
to Historical Site A, the county’s best-known resort area located in Township E. In 
2006, the government paid to pave for these villages all the streets within one block 
from Main Road G, but left all other streets unpaved. Farmer D from village I 
comments that,  
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We are not sure why they did it. Some say it was because some military vehicles 
(from Country X) were to pass though the villages (along Main Road G) during 
the joint marine maneuver by China and (Country X), and that the unpaved 
streets would not look good (thus leaving a bad impression on the foreign 
soldiers). Others say it was because the provincial governor was to come (to 
Historical Site A), and the county government wanted to leave him with a good 
impression. We are quite disappointed, because our village has only three blocks 
from west to east but they paved one block only… (Incidentally,) I should 
mention that the cement they used was very inferior in quality, and some sections 
of the pavement have already been damaged.          
There is also non-construction type of “image-building” efforts. For example, the 
county government organized a concert televised across the country by the China 
Central Television (CCTV) in 2006. Each year, CCTV would televise many such 
concerts, hosted by different cities and usually featuring some of the best-known 
singers and other celebrities in China. Local leaders are very keen on hosting these 
concerts, which they think can help make the names of their cities known to the entire 
country. However, the cost of hosting these concerts is usually very high. Local 
Official B comments that,  
I think the concert cost at least several million yuan, but the county government 
did not have the money to pay for it - The county treasury is empty. Some 
enterprises were asked to pick up the bill (as sponsors). Which enterprise would 
dare say no if asked by the county government (for a favor like that)?  
Incidentally, it is not rare for enterprises to pick up bills incurred by local 
governments. The enterprises, which see it as an opportunity to advertise themselves 
or simply to establish or strengthen relations with the government, may actually be 
happy to do it. Conceivably, such close relations between local governments and 
private enterprises often give rise to corruption, as will be discussed further in Chapter 
9.   
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3. Role of land conversion in local public revenue 
Land plays a vital role in the public finance of Dragon County, and contributes to 
revenue generation in two ways: First, the county government sells land use rights to 
real estate developers. Second, it promotes investment through land conversion, 
thereby generating revenue through tax collection. 
Land sale 
In general, selling the use right to state-owned land to commercial real estate 
developers is a lucrative business for the county government. During the land 
conversion process, a county government needs to pay compensation to farmers, the 
cost of preliminary land development before land sale, and the “user fee for newly 
converted developable land” to higher levels of government. In return, the county 
government collects land conveyance fees (tu di chu rang jin), land value increment 
fees, urban land use tax or land use fees, and farmland occupation taxes, etc. These 
fees and taxes are complicated to explain. In a simplified way, Table 5 lists the main 
outlays and revenues of a county government from land conversion. 
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Table 5 Main Outlays and Revenues of Dragon’s County Government during Land Conversion177 





Paid by county government to 
villages 
30,000 yuan/mu in lump sum, 
600 yuan/mu per year, plus 
contribution to the pension 
fund for farmers, as discussed 




County government typically 
provides road and utilities 
before land sale   
Total cost may be up to 
70,000 to 80,000 yuan/mu, 
including road, electricity and 
water, etc. in Dragon, but 
some sites already have 












Defined as the “average net 
benefit” of land that 
conversion brings about. Its 
rate is assessed by the 
provincial or national 
government, and paid by 
county government to 
provincial and national 
governments 
Before 2006: 3,335 – 46,690 
yuan/mu in lump sum 
Since 2007: 6,670 – 93,380 
yuan/mu in lump sum  
Determination of the exact 
rate is based on location, land 
price level, local farmland 
availability, and local social 




Paid by developers; almost all 
is kept by county government  
More than 1 million yuan/mu, 
in lump sum for most sites in 
Dragon City after 2005. 
Land use fees  National government receives 
30%, provincial and 
municipal governments 30%, 
and county 40%.  
Ranges from 10 to 140 
yuan/m2, based primarily on 
location. This revenue is 
earmarked for farmland 











Local tax collected from land 
users that use land converted 
from farming to non-farming 
uses.  
Less than 3,335 yuan per mu 
in lump sum, collected 
according to the amount of 
farmland converted and the 
applicable tax rate (which is 
set according to average per 
capita farmland availability of 
the county where the land is 
located). 
 
  Thus, land sale provides a convenient way for the county government to generate 
                                                        
177 The information contained in the table is based on the interviews in Dragon County. 
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revenue directly to meet financial needs. A typical example concerns the No. 1 Middle 
School, the best middle school in Dragon County. Before 2000, it was a public school, 
and the county government was responsible for paying the teachers and all school 
expenses. In order to relieve itself of a financial “burden”, the county government 
changed the school from an “ordinary public school (OPS)” to a “privately managed 
public school (PMPS)” in 2000. According to a provincial policy, an OPS cannot 
charge a student more than 1,600 yuan per year for tuition, whereas a PMPS can 
charge much higher tuition but is also responsible for paying the teachers and school 
expenses by itself. The school’s old campus was located in a central location, just 
opposite to the long-distance bus station, in the old downtown of Dragon City. Due to 
the rapid growth of the student body in the late 1990s, the old campus became too 
small. In 2004, the school moved to the current site in the northeastern part of the 
Dragon EDZ. The land of the new campus, covering 500 mu, was provided by the 
county government for free, and the school had borrowed almost 100 million yuan 
from a commercial bank in order to build the campus. However, the loan was so large 
that it was impossible for the school to pay back to the bank. Therefore, the county 
government had to change the school back to an OPS and took over all the loans. 
Being short of financial resources by itself, the county government decided to sell a 
portion of the campus land to repay the loans. 
A second example concerns Dragon’s Paper Making Company and a construction 
materials plant, located adjacent to each other in the Dragon EDZ. The construction 
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materials plant, which was an investment promotion project of township G178, was not 
earning profit in the early 2000s, and therefore unable to repay a loan in the amount of 
20 million yuan it had borrowed from a local bank. The county government decided 
to intervene, and asked the Paper Making Company, owned by the county government, 
to acquire the plant and take over the debts. In return, the company was allowed to 
sell the land of the construction materials plant for real estate development. The total 
revenue from the land sale was several hundred million yuan, which was kept by the 
Paper Making Plant. It is worth reminding that this kind of land sale would not have 
been possible without permission from the county government, because it involved a 
change in land use type from industrial to commercial. The county government has 
been very generous to the Paper Making Company for two reasons: First, the county 
government controls the majority of the company’s shares and is therefore the owner 
of the company. Second, the company contributes about 30 million yuan of tax 
revenue each year to the county government.  
The revenues generated from land conversion as such are usually not reflected in 
the county’s regular budget. As will be described later, this kind of land conversion is 
very un-transparent, and typically involves confidential agreements between the 
county government and developers. Although such revenues are supposed to be 
reflected in the county’s “extra budget”, it is difficult for outsiders to know how much 
contribution land sale actually makes to the county’s overall budget. However, it is 
believed by the local officials interviewed that land sale accounted for at least 50% of 
                                                        
178 Township G is not shown on Map 4. 
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the county’s extra revenue (i.e. revenue not reflected in the official regular budget) in 
most years between 2002 and 2007. In 2006, for example, the extra revenue was 
around 1 billion yuan,179 accounting for at least one third of the county’s total fiscal 
revenue.    
Within the BLR, there is a unit called State-Owned Land Reserve Center (SLRC), 
which has two nominal responsibilities: First, it is responsible for taking back and 
selling the use rights to state-owned land. Second, it is responsible for acquiring rural 
land. Theoretically, it is possible for the county government to manipulate the 
temporal allocation of scarce land resources in order to maximize revenue. In practice, 
this does not seem to be the case, as will be discussed further in Chapter 11. The 
SLRC is responsible for managing procedural matters only, and does not have real 
decision-making power regarding land acquisition or sale.  
Incidentally, some local governments in other regions even use state-owned land 
as collateral to obtain loans from commercial banks, in order to finance infrastructure 
development or other government-sponsored projects180. In such cases, the local 
governments may face additional pressure to sell more land in order to pay back the 
loans.  
Investment promotion 
Dragon’s local governments have devoted a tremendous amount of effort to 
                                                        
179 Report on the Finances of Dragon County, 2006 
180 One such example is Tianjin Municipality - based on a conversation with some local officials I met at a 
conference on affordable housing organized by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Rural Development on June 23, 
2008 in Beijing. 
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attracting investment since the 1980s. However, these efforts were not very successful 
until the late 1990s. Some companies were attracted to the area, but the total amount 
of investment was relatively small and the economic and social benefits they 
generated were not very large. This was attributable to several factors. First, Dragon 
was a small city with a small population at the time, and not known to investors from 
the outside. Second, transportation from Dragon City to other cities was not very 
convenient. It took several hours to go to Phoenix City, the capital of Phoenix 
Municipality and the economic center of the region, by road. It generally took less 
time to go to Phoenix City by ferry, but the waiting line and time could be long during 
peak hours on peak days. The nearest railway station was about 40 kilometers away. 
The nearest airport was almost 100 kilometers away, with no highway connecting it 
with Dragon.  
Nevertheless, the county government spent much effort, and assigned specific 
“investment promotion tasks” to each township. The ability of township officials to 
attract investment became - and remains - a most important indicator in the evaluation 
of their performance by the county government. Township governments were ranked 
according to the amount of investment they attracted, and township leaders whose 
performance was highly rated would receive bonuses awarded by the county 
government. Consequently, township governments were very enthusiastic about 
potential investment projects. They treated investors like kings, and usually took care 
of all the paper work regarding business and land use license applications.    
In turn, the township governments assigned tasks to individual officials, and 
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encouraged village leaders to help promote investment. Villages leaders unable to 
attract investment from the outside were encouraged to “tap their own villages’ 
potential”, such as encouraging wealthy villagers to establish factories or roadside 
stores. Farmer H from Village H describes this fervor as follows:   
In response to a call by the township, the party secretary of our village convened 
a meeting (on a day in the mid-1990s) attended by all the party members of the 
village. He conveyed the message from the government, and asked young party 
members to take the lead in attracting or making investment to the village …  
As a young party member, I was assigned a task of making “some kind” of 
investment. I was not prepared but had to take on the task by agreeing to register 
a construction company. To have such a company approved, I was required to 
show to a designated bank that I had 500,000 yuan, which I did not have. I 
borrowed money from the village to put into my bank account. After the bank 
verified that I “indeed” had enough money in my account and the company was 
approved, I returned the borrowed money to the village.  
I intended to use a land parcel with the size of 33*33 m2 for the “company”. 
However, the village leaders thought it was too small, and requested me to use 
60*60 m2. I was afraid that I could not accept so much land since the total land 
rent would be higher. According to the contract, land users should pay 500 yuan 
per mu per year of land use fees directly to the village plus 100 yuan per mu per 
year of agricultural tax. The total was 600 yuan per mu. (The agricultural tax had 
not been exempted at the time.)… So I had to invite the village leaders to my 
house for dinner to ask them for the favor of reducing the land use target for me. 
They finally agreed.   
Incidentally, Farmer H realized a few years later that his rejection of a larger land 
parcel was the biggest economic mistake he had made, because land prices started to 
skyrocket in the early 2000s.  
Despite such efforts, significant progress in investment promotion was not made 
until the late 1990s and the early 2000s when several things happened: First, the 
transportation facilities between Dragon City and Phoenix City were improved 
significantly. Highways were built to connect Dragon City with Phoenix City and 
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with the airport. It now takes about one hour to go from Dragon City to the airport and 
one and half hours to Phoenix City. A tunnel under the ocean will be built soon to 
connect Phoenix City and County A. Upon its completion, it will take less than 40 
minutes to go from Dragon City to Phoenix City via County A. Second, it has been 
planned that Dragon County will become a district, rather than a county, of the 
Phoenix metropolitan area in the near future. Surrounded by mountains on the north 
and the west and the ocean on the east, Phoenix City can only expand southwards to 
the direction of County A, (which is separated from Phoenix by a bay) and Dragon 
County. As mentioned, three urban clusters have already been planned within Dragon 
County. Third, Dragon became increasingly known to the outside world. It is a pretty 
city with moderate and pleasant weather, a nice beach, and a relatively well-educated 
labor force – all of which are attractive to investors.  
More importantly, the county government established the EDZ, Industrial Park A 
and Industrial Park B, which possess a few very important advantages for promoting 
industrial development from the perspective of Dragon’s local governments. First, the 
cost of providing infrastructure facilities and services (such as water, electricity, and 
wastewater treatment) for a concentration of enterprises is lower than for enterprises 
in diverse locations. Second, industries that are related through material flows have 
convenient access to one another. Third, it is conducive to preventing urban sprawl 
and controlling pollution. Fourth and most important, the county government provides 
each township with some land parcels in the EDZ and the industrial parks where any 
new investment attracted by the townships may be located. If not for this kind of 
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arrangement, the townships in the remote parts of the county would have had little 
hope of attracting external investors, for lack of convenient transportation, 
infrastructure and educated labor. Despite these advantages, some townships have not 
been very successful in attracting investment, or, the enterprises attracted by them are 
not doing well or even run into debt. In such cases, the land is often converted into 
real estate development, subject to agreements among the county government, the 
township governments and the enterprises using the land regarding how the benefits 
from such conversion shall be divided.  
The EDZ and the two industrial parks were all established prior to – or without - 
obtaining formal approval from the higher-level governments. The EDZ was 
established amidst the nation-wide Land Enclosure Movement, mentioned in 
Introduction, in the 1990s, but gained recognition from the provincial government 
later. Industrial Park A was established in 2002, and has never received formal 
recognition from the higher-level government – the reason being that the national 
government realized in the late 1990s that the Land Enclosure Movement caused great 
chaos in land use at the local level and tightened control over applications for new 
EDZs or industrial parks. The park was initially designed for industrial use. However, 
after much of the land had already been sold or leased to investors, the county 
government decided to change the planning focus of the park from industrial to 
residential and commercial use. There are two reasons for this change: First, the new 
party secretary of the county, unlike his predecessor, did not think that an area so 
close to the beach should have been used as an industrial site. Second, the county 
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established Industrial Park B in 2004, so that much of the industries could be located 
there.      
Industrial Park B was also established well before its approval by the provincial 
government in 2005. Now, its approved size is 4 km2 only, but it has already been 
planned to cover 30 km2, divided into four zones: an export-oriented industrial 
processing zone (18 km2), an electronics processing zone (8 km2), a storage and 
material flow area (2 km2), and a central service area (2 km2). The designed focus of 
Industrial Park B was to provide services and products for Phoenix Port, one of the 
largest ports in China. This sounds like an “acceptable” reason for establishing an 
industrial park. Nevertheless, it is a bit complicated to explain why Industrial Park B 
was approved whereas Industrial Park A rejected. It suffices to say that, in an opaque 
system, one cannot always figure out everything for sure.       
The county government provides very favorable tax and other policies for 
investors, particularly foreign investors - who are believed to possess more advanced 
technologies. For example, the investors in Industrial Park B are eligible for the 
following, among other, benefits: First, foreign manufacturing companies receive a 
24% exemption on income tax payments. Second, knowledge-intensive projects or 
foreign companies investing at least 30 million yuan receive a 15% exemption from 
income taxes. Third, companies planning to maintain operations in the park for more 
than 10 years are exempted from income taxes for the first two years, and half the 
income tax from the 3rd to the 5th year. Fourth, foreign enterprises adopting advanced 
technologies enjoy additional tax exemptions. Fifth, foreign enterprises in the park 
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receive a 40% exemption from business taxes, 12.5% from VAT, and 20% from 
income taxes between the time they move into the park and the end of 2008. Sixth, 
foreign manufacturing enterprises are exempted from all “fees” collected by the 
county government. Seventh, certain projects that are deemed by the county 
government to be able to make major contribution to local economic and social 
development, such as automobiles, shipping, electronics and new materials projects, 
are eligible for additional favorable treatment, the terms of which are negotiated 
between the county government and the enterprises on a case-by-case basis. 
Of course, such favorable policies are not unique to Dragon County. Similar 
policies are adopted by other jurisdictions as well because inter-jurisdictional 
competition for economic growth is very intense. An incidental example to show 
inter-jurisdictional competition involves the respective local fishing policies of 
Dragon County and County C (which is a neighboring county to the south of Dragon 
County). According to the national policy, fishing is banned in the seas during some 
seasons in order to protect the fish population. However, the local fishermen in 
Village V, a coastal village in Township E, have never stopped fishing. Of course, they 
run the risk of being caught by the authorities. Typically, the penalty is 10,000 yuan if 
caught by the authorities of Dragon County, 30,000-40,000 yuan by the authorities of 
Phoenix City, and 40,000-50,000 yuan by the authorities of County C. The County C 
authorities used to be very strict with enforcing the ban. After catching illegal fishing 
boats, they would pull the boats onto the beach, overturn them, and expose their 
bottom under the sun, which was very damaging to the boats, until the penalty was 
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paid. As a consequence, few fishermen dared venture into its jurisdiction. By contrast, 
the Dragon County authorities typically turn a blind eye to illegal fishing. They are 
sometimes pressed by the higher-level authorities to crack down on illegal fishing 
activities, but usually allow local fishermen to get away with a low penalty, for two 
reasons: First and foremost, illegal fishing contributes significantly to the local 
economy. Second, the fishermen who are caught would typically ask their friends or 
relatives who know the responsible officials to talk to the latter for the favor of not 
being strict. As a result of such deliberate “leniency” by Dragon County, County C 
has relaxed its control over illegal fishing by the fishermen from its own jurisdiction, 
too. 
To return from this digression, the EDZ and the industrial parks favor big 
investors. In Industrial Park B, for example, investors with the following 
qualifications are eligible for priority treatment by the county government: First, the 
amount of investment is large. To establish a business in the park, a Chinese investor 
needs to invest at least 50 million yuan, and a foreign investor needs to invest at least 
USD 5 million (approximately 35 million yuan). Second, high-tech investors have 
priority. Third, enterprises having the potential to stimulate the development of related 
sectors also have priority. Enterprises that meet all these qualifications are called 
“Dragon Head” enterprises, because they are supposedly able to lead the development 
of other enterprises. For very large projects, the county government even provides 
infrastructure and sometimes land for free. In general, the larger the amount of 
investment, the lower the land leasing price.  
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Much of the planned area for Industrial Park B is yet to be filled up, but the 
developed area has already far exceeded 4 km2, the size approved by the provincial 
government. The park authority, on behalf of the county government, is responsible 
for acquiring land from villages, and then selling or renting it to companies. The park 
authority also builds many workshops, which it then leases to investors. In order to 
manage the park affairs effectively, the county government has set up a 
government-owned entity, called Industrial Park B Property Management Company 
(PMC), to provide logistical support for the enterprises in the park and to manage the 
park properties, such as leasing workshops to investors. An advantage of having the 
PMC is that it makes it convenient for potential investors to obtain loans from banks. 
A new Chinese investor often needs to borrow from local banks, because few 
investors can afford to pay cash all by themselves to start new businesses in the park. 
The loan application procedure can be complicated for investors from other regions. 
In such cases, the PMC will rent workshops to them first and, using the workshops as 
collateral, help them acquire loans in the name of the PMC.  
It has not been easy to attract big investors due to intense inter-jurisdictional 
competition. Therefore, the county government and the PMC have to be very 
proactive. A typical example is that the county government successfully attracted 
Home Appliances Company A, one of the largest home appliances manufacturers in 
China, to locate a large plant in the park in 2005. The total investment of the project 
was 800 million yuan. The plant, which covers about 250 mu of land, has a designed 
annual manufacturing capacity of 1.6 million television sets, 1 million air conditioners, 
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1 million washing machines, and 1 million microwave ovens/water heaters, etc. A 
cooperation agreement was signed between the county government and the company 
in February 2005. The details of the agreement, such as the price of the land and the 
terms of preferential tax treatment, etc, were not available to the public, but it was 
apparent that the county government made a very attractive offer. At the time, the 
company did not have enough cash to build the plant. Therefore, the county 
government paid to have all the workshops built for the company. In order to do this, 
the county government used up all the financial resources it had at the time, such that 
it had to borrow, for two consecutive months, from a neighboring county in order to 
pay salaries to its public servants and teachers on time. Despite such difficulties, it 
took as little as four months to finish the construction of all the buildings and 
workshops, put in all the public utilities, and install all the manufacturing facilities. 
The plant formally started its manufacturing operations in June 2005.  
 
4. Strategies in dealing with nail farmers during compulsory land conversion 
The local governments play a dominant role during land conversion, and are very 
“effective” in dealing with “nail” farmers during compulsory land conversion. As 
Local Official K comments, “If you (i.e. farmers) agree (to compulsory land 
conversion), it is very fine; if you do not agree, you will still give consent in the end.” 
A most common strategy used by local governments is persuasion. During 
compulsory land conversion, each relevant township official is assigned to persuade 
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specific individual households, with assistance from village leaders. These township 
officials will visit potential nail households to explain the government’s decisions and 
the potential benefits of land conversion. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the township 
officials will sometimes ask the nail households’ relatives or close friends working for 
the government to help persuade. Such persuasion can be very powerful because, as 
will be elaborated in Chapter 9, personal relations often matter much more than 
money in the Chinese society. Most farmers would rather defer to the local 
governments than suffer the tremendous psychological stress from confronting 
officials or embarrassing their own relatives and friends.  
Dragon County is certainly not the only place where such a strategy is used. In 
Kaifeng City, Henan Province, for example, the local government has a policy that 
those receiving salaries from the government will lose their jobs if their family 
members or relatives refuse to defer to the government’s compulsory land acquisition 
decisions.181 Similar practices existed or still exist in some areas in Hunan Province 
and Jiangxi Province.182         
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the local governments may occasionally promise a 
higher level of compensation or other types of personal favors to some nail 
households in order to get them out of the way. However, such secrets are usually 
difficult to keep, and may cause other farmers to come back and ask for more. It 
would also set a precedent for other farmers to be “nails” too during future 
compulsory land conversions. Therefore, the local governments usually do not offer 
                                                        
181 Qiu Feng (2008)  
182 Qiu Feng (2008)  
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different levels of compensation to different farmers for the same type of land. Once a 
compulsory land conversion decision is made, the government would send a notice to 
the villages and farmers and start land development right away. Typically, most 
farmers would comply. In the end, the nail farmers will be isolated, making it easier 
for the government to adopt relevant measures to “dig” them out. 
If some nail farmers are too persistent to give consent, a last resort by the local 
government is to use force to take the land, as described in Chapter 2. Use of force 
per se is not necessarily illegitimate. Imagine a nail farmer who would decline any 
level of compensation offered by the government intending to develop a large project 
believed to benefit the local society tremendously. Ultimately, the only way to get the 
farmer out of the way is to take his land by force, as long as compensation is paid 
based on due process of law. However, the problem is that, in the Chinese society, 
nobody knows for sure what “due process of law” for settling land conversion 
disputes is. It is convenient for a local government to argue that it is certainly 
observing the law if it carries out land conversion based on official land use plans and 
compensates the affected farmers at a level equal to or higher than official standards. 
A fundamental weakness of this argument is that farmers, being excluded from the 
land use planning and legislation processes, do not necessarily think that the land use 
plans and the official compensation standards are fair or legitimate in the first place.      
Due to the sensitivity of this topic to the local community, it is not the intention of 
this dissertation to describe at length the confrontations between Dragon’s local 
governments and farmers during land conversion. However, as described in Chapter 2, 
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it is certainly not rare to come across, on newspapers or the internet, vivid stories 
from other Chinese regions in this regard. It is important to note that it is not fair to 
put all the blame on local officials for these confrontations. Rather, the blame should 
be placed on the “rules of the game” that are very unclear and ambiguous. The use of 
force shall be viewed as a “rational” choice made by local officials in pursuing their 
own interests, given the existing rules of the game. From a policy perspective, we 
have to presume that the players are “rational”, and must not expect that they will act 
in an “ethical” manner even if the rules do not explicitly require them to. This point 
will be discussed further in Chapter 6.                    
Despite the dominant role of the local governments, compulsory land acquisition 
is very time consuming. Whenever possible, they will try to avoid the land for which 
they have to pay higher compensation or where they expect to meet with strong 
resistance. Relatively speaking, it is much easier to acquire “reserve land” than “grain 
land” from villages, because the farmers renting the former on a temporary basis do 
not expect to have the same level of legal protection as those farming the latter.   
      
5. Summary 
Facing great financial pressure, Dragon’s local governments use land conversion 
as a means of generating revenue directly or through investment promotion. The local 
governments play a dominant role during land conversion, and typically use 
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persuasion or force to have farmers comply with compulsory land acquisition 
decisions.  
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CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPERS 
 
1. Introduction 
The developers in Dragon County fall into three broad categories: commercial real 
estate developers whose primary interest is to make a profit out of commercial land 
development; entrepreneurs who engage in manufacturing but require land as an input; 
and land speculators who acquire the use right to land at a low price and sell it at a 
high price. This chapter will first describe the housing market in Dragon since the 
1990s, and then discuss the respective interests and strategies of the three types of 
developers during the land conversion process.   
 
2. Housing supply and demand in Dragon 
Real estate development has been a booming business in Dragon County since 
the late 1990s, and served as a main driver for land conversion in Dragon. To help 
understand this, it is worth explaining briefly the history of the housing market in 
Dragon.  
Prior to the 1990s, there was no marketable housing in Dragon. Housing was 
provided to individuals for free by their Dan Wei (which is a Chinese term for one’s 
employing organization or company) as part of their employment benefits. At the time, 
most Dan Wei had an internal evaluation system to determine which employees were 
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eligible to receive housing, and what size of housing they were to receive. This 
evaluation system was based on a number of criteria such as one’s position and 
service years in the Dan Wei, number of children, and other factors. While the criteria 
were relatively objective, the leaders of Dan Wei had significant discretion and often 
used housing assignments as a way of seeking personal benefits for themselves or 
providing favors to their favorites. As a result, this old socialist system provoked 
many conflicts between Dan Wei and individuals and among individuals.  
The situation can be illustrated using Figure 9. Suppose the total amount of 
housing provided by Dragon County each year was Q1, in terms of m2 of floor area183. 
Nominally, the housing was offered to employees for free. However, an individual 
usually still needed to pay a price, denoted by P1, in order to win favor from the 
leaders of Dan Wei. The price might take the form of personal favors, gifts, or even 
cash to Dan Wei leaders. The level of P1 varied from case to case, but usually 
accounted for a very small proportion of the real price of the housing, denoted by P2, 
for two reasons: First, Dan Wei leaders usually had to provide favors to their favorites 
based on the general framework of the official evaluation system. They had some, but 
often not complete, discretion. Second, it was illegal to take bribes, and most Dan Wei 
leaders dared not take high level of bribes.  
Since P1 was much lower than P2, the housing provided by Dan Wei was always 
in short supply. Yet, another important reason for the housing supply scarcity was that 
                                                        
183 This ignores differences among various Danwei.  
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the Dan Wei had to pay for all the construction cost, denoted by C1, by itself.184 
Therefore, if the leaders of a Dan Wei were already living in large apartments, they 
would have much weaker incentives to build more housing, which would be for other 
employees only. Of course, building new housing always provided opportunities for 
Dan Wei leaders to receive gifts or personal favors during the distribution process. 
However, housing was such an important determinant of one’s quality of life that 
everybody stood ready and firm to defend his/her own legitimate interests - which 
forced Dan Wei leaders to be as seemingly fair as they could in the distribution of 
housing. To put it in a simple way, in some cases, Dan Wei leaders would rather not 
receive any gifts or personal favors from their favorites in order to relieve themselves 
of the pressures from others.          
 
Figure 9 Housing Demand and Supply185 
 
                                                        
184 Although the recipients of housing paid a price of P1, it went into the private pockets of Dan Wei leaders, not 
the public purse of Dan Wei. Therefore, P1 is not deducted from the construction cost.  
185 This is an over-simplified illustration - which ignores such important influencing factors of housing prices as 
location. 














Recognizing such problems associated with the old socialist housing system, the 
Chinese government started to implement a housing reform in the late 1990s. Now, 
employees no longer receive “free” housing from Dan Wei, but have to buy 
commercial housing on the market.186  
 For simplification, suppose the demand curve remains the same as before, and 
that the cost of housing development is now C2 - The reason why C2 is higher than C1 
is that developers now need to pay for the cost of land whereas the Dan Wei received 
land from the state for free during the planning era. Therefore, the profit that a 
developer makes is P2 – C2.  
Let us assume further that Q1 is the maximum amount of housing allowed by the 
developable land quota assigned to Dragon by the higher-level governments. As 
discussed earlier, prior to the reform, the leaders of Dan Wei often had weak 
incentives to build housing for their employees, let alone engage in “informal land 
conversions” by building more housing than Q1. The situation has changed 
dramatically after the housing reform. Now, developers are making good profits out of 
real estate development, and naturally want to acquire more land in order to build 
more housing as long as P2 is higher than C2.187 (Of course, P2 will also change if Q1 
changes.) 
In a competitive real estate market, if the amount of housing built is limited to Q1 
and the profit margin (P2 –C2) is large, the cost of land will increase. This is because 
                                                        
186 Actually, some Dan Wei still provide housing to their employees - at a price that is usually lower than the 
market price. 
187 Again, this is over-simplified. In reality, developers need to take into account the risks of real estate 
development, such as housing not being able to be sold on time. Therefore, a real estate developer may stop 
investing before P2 is equal to C2. 
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developers will bid up the price of land to the extent that P2 = C2.188 In reality, the 
price of land in Dragon has increased by a significant margin, denoted by C3-C2, but 
not up to a point such that the price of housing is equal to the total cost. The reason 
for this is incomplete competition on the land market, as will be explained later in this 
chapter.  
As the cost of land rises by C3-C2, the total cost of housing increases from C2 to 
C3. Since the profit margin (P2 – C3) is still large, developers have strong incentives to 
engage in informal land conversions.  
Suppose the quantity of housing built due to informal land conversions is Q2 – Q1. 
Then, the price of housing is expected to drop to P3. However, this is not what has 
happened in Dragon in practice. On the contrary, Dragon’s housing prices had 
skyrocketed between the early 2000s and 2008, as will be described in detail later. 
The main reason is that Figure 9 is an over-simplified illustration, assuming that the 
demand curve remains unchanged over time. In reality, the demand curve had shifted 
upward to a significant extent during this time due to several factors.  
First, urbanization has been accelerating in recent years in Dragon. The 
population of Dragon City increased from 280,000 to 340,000 within four years 
between 2003 and 2007 according to official statistics. In particular, the rapid 
expansion of Dragon City to the eastern coast and the establishment of Industrial Park 
A and B have attracted workers from the rural areas and business people from other 
regions to work and live in Dragon City. 
                                                        
188 Again, this is over-simplified, as explained above. 
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A second reason is that the residents of Dragon City generally expect that housing 
prices will continue to increase in the future due largely to land supply restrictions 
imposed by the national government. It is very common for a local middle-class urban 
household to have more than one apartment, and many households have made a 
fortune out of speculating on apartments. Urban Resident B explains why: 
In the late 1990s, I already had a nice apartment of 68 m2 in the old downtown. 
Then, I bought another apartment with a size of 70 m2 from the AAP1 in 1998 at 
a price of 800 yuan/m2 only. The total price was 56,000 yuan. We (i.e. my 
husband and I) did not have that much money, because our salaries were very low 
at the time (and it was difficult to obtain loans from a bank at that time.) We 
borrowed money from our relatives and friends. In 2003, the price of our second 
apartment increased to approximately 2,000 yuan/m2. We decided to sell it and 
buy two larger ones. We sold it for about 150,000 yuan, and used the money as 
down payment to buy two other apartments of 110 m2 and 130 m2 respectively. 
The total price of the two new apartments was 480,000 yuan. We had to borrow a 
large loan from the bank, but it was worth it. By now, they are worth more than 
800,000 yuan.                        
A direct result of widespread housing speculation is that many new apartments are 
un-occupied. According to rough estimates by local residents, the vacancy rate of all 
the new apartments built in the last 7-8 years can be as high as 40%. Specifically, the 
vacancy rate for AAP1 apartments189 is roughly 20%, AAP2 apartments190 60%, new 
apartments in the old downtown 20%, new apartments on the southern side of River A 
50%, and new apartments to the west of Main Road A 40%. A main reason why so 
many apartments are left vacant rather than rented is that the rental rate is generally 
not attractive. For an apartment of 70 m2, the rent is less than 500 yuan per month in a 
central location. On the other hand, the cost of renting out an apartment is significant: 
                                                        
189 These refer to the apartments built in Phase I of the Affordable Apartments Program in the 1ate 1990s, as 
mentioned in the Introduction of the dissertation. 
190 These refer to the apartments built in Phase II of the Affordable Apartments Program in the 1ate 1990s, as 
mentioned in the Introduction of the dissertation. 
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Most of the new apartments are unfurnished, so significant investments need to be 
made before they become livable. Some new apartments are immediately livable, but 
many owners think that the rent may not be worth the wear-down of the furnishings. 
In addition, the owner does not need to pay for centralized heating if an apartment is 
left vacant, but has to pay if it is rented. (The formal rule is that the owner of an 
apartment has to pay for centralized heating even if he does not live there. However, 
since the vacancy rate of new apartments is so high, it is impossible for the heating 
company to sue all those who do not pay. Therefore, it has become an informal rule 
that unused apartments are exempted.) The cost of centralized heating is more than 
1,000 yuan per year for an apartment of 100 m2. More importantly, most apartment 
speculators in Dragon are not poor, and many think that a rental rate of a few hundred 
yuan per month is not worth the trouble.  
A third reason why the demand for housing has increased dramatically is that 
people now have much higher living standard than before, and demand larger living 
space. In the late 1990s, the largest apartment that one could receive from Dan Wei 
was about 90 m2, for which only some Dan Wei leaders were eligible. Now, 80-100 
m2 is about the median size of all new apartments in all locations, and a significant 
portion of new apartments are larger than 120 m2. Moreover, for many people, living 
in a large apartment is an indication of one’s social status.  
A fourth reason is that, unlike in the past, people can now conveniently borrow 
loans from commercial banks to pay for new apartments. In Dragon, the down 
payment requirement is usually 30% of the housing price, and the term of mortgage is 
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typically 5-20 years. People are generally not too worried about repaying the loans 
because they are optimistic about the economy and assume that housing prices will 
continue to rise. Of course, they may be wrong, because the high vacancy rate of new 
apartments seems to suggest there is already a speculative housing bubble.  
The recent global financial crisis is having a strong effect on Dragon’s local 
economy, as will be described later. However, its impact on the housing market 
remains to be seen. The housing sales prices in Dragon City have been relatively 
stable since the beginning of 2008. Several reasons may help explain why they are not 
dropping in the face of such a serious external shock. One is that the local people are 
optimistic about a continued rapid growth of the city due to the county’s urbanization 
blueprint as described in the Introduction of the dissertation. Another reason may be 
that people generally believe that the restrictions placed by the national government 
on land supply will continue to be tight. Despite this, the rental housing market does 
seem to have been affected to some degree. According to the local interviewees, the 
rental rate of residential housing may have dropped by as much as 20% between the 
end of 2007 and the beginning of 2009. 
        
3. Commercial real estate companies 
Dragon County has more than 100 real estate companies, most of which have 
existed for less than 10 years. The people who created these companies mostly fall 
into the following two broad categories:  
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The first group of people used to be the leaders of construction companies. Prior 
to the late 1990s, there were many construction companies in Dragon County. The 
leaders of these companies were responsible for obtaining contracts and hiring 
workers to do the construction work. Almost all the construction workers were 
farmers specializing in construction or carpentry. These construction companies were 
typically owned by townships, but it was impossible for the township governments to 
control them. The reason was that the leaders of the companies were in direct contact 
with clients (who were mostly from other areas such as Dragon City and Phoenix City) 
and gradually developed their own business networks. By the late 1990s, most of 
these leaders disassociated with the township governments, and ran the businesses on 
their own.  
In general, these companies did well, for two reasons: First, the cost of labor was 
low. Before the late 1990s, there were not as many alternative sources of income for 
farmers as there are now. For many young farmers, the construction companies 
provided the only opportunity to earn extra income. They were paid low wages, and 
often not paid until long after the completion of construction projects. Second, the 
construction market was not as developed as it is now, but had been booming since 
the 1980s following the national open and reform policy. Most construction contracts 
came from the government or state-owned enterprises. The leaders of the construction 
companies were typically good at establishing personal relations with public officials 
responsible for offering construction contracts. Bribery was certainly something that 
could be heard of frequently.   
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In Dragon County, the leaders of the construction companies did not have a high 
reputation. They were often viewed as “people who became wealthy by exploiting 
construction workers”. Moreover, the local communities in Dragon are very 
traditional, and value highly such moral principles as frugality, modesty, and loyalty 
to one’s spouse, etc. Some construction company leaders were criticized for their 
extravagant living style or for being disloyal to their wives. Last but not least, they 
often delayed paying construction workers, because they sometimes could not receive 
payment from their clients in time in the first place. It is a bit complicated to explain 
the complex relations between construction companies and their clients, but it suffices 
to say that the Chinese credit market was - and still is - very under-developed, and it 
was common for one organization or company to owe money to others for services 
provided. To be fair, the construction company leaders should not take all the blame 
for owing to construction workers, because they were often victims themselves. The 
construction workers were often angry, but most of them had no choice but to work 
for the construction companies for lack of alternative employment.  
Over time, the profit margin of the construction companies decreased to some 
extent, because competition on the construction market became more intense and the 
cost of labor became higher as farmers started to have other alternative sources of 
income. It was fortunate for the construction companies that the housing market was 
liberalized in the late 1990s, such that the demand for construction increased 
dramatically. Naturally, some of the construction companies have turned into real 
estate companies by now, so that they are not just receiving construction contracts 
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from others but are acquiring land directly from the government for real estate 
development. 
The second group of real estate developers used to engage in industrial or other 
businesses, but shifted to the real estate business due to its high profit margins. 
Though not specializing in construction at the beginning, they typically have strong 
ties with the local governments, and therefore are very competitive on the real estate 
market.    
A real estate developer must have sufficient funds to manage cash flow. In a 
mature market, he would need to acquire land, buy construction materials, and hire 
construction workers; but his economic return could not be realized until the project is 
completed and sold. Most of the real estate developers in Dragon County did not 
possess such financial capacity at the beginning, but were able to prosper for two 
reasons: First, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the land market was not as formal 
as it is now. Developers obtained land through government ties at low prices, rather 
than through open auctions. Second, it was a common practice in Dragon before the 
early 2000s that the buyers of new housing were required to pay before the housing 
projects were finished or even started.191 The buyers did not have much choice, 
because the housing market had just been liberalized so that the demand for housing 
was far greater than the supply. The real estate companies benefited tremendously 
from the informality of the real estate market. Employee A from Real Estate Company 
A comments that, “At that time, the real estate companies made their fortune with 
                                                        
191 This phenomenon is still widespread in many other cities in China. 
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almost nothing. (The profit margin was so large that) most of them accumulated 
sufficient capital (for further development thereafter).”      
In Dragon County, there are only three to four very large real estate companies 
with comparable financial capacity. The small ones are gradually being driven out of 
the market, due to several developments: First, a developer is now required to deposit 
a large amount of money in the county’s Bureau of Construction prior to obtaining the 
“construction license’ that is necessary for starting a construction project, in order to 
ensure that the construction workers will be paid in time. Second, a developer can no 
longer sell housing that has not been finished. Housing buyers now usually have 
multiple housing projects to choose from, and always have the option of buying 
second-hand housing. Third, a real estate developer now has to acquire land through 
public auctions, leading to a sharp increase in the cost of land. Small developers are 
generally not capable of acquiring large land lots, which significantly constrains their 
capacity to grow or even survive. 
The cost of real estate development mainly includes the cost of land and the cost 
of construction. Depending on location, the cost of land ranged from 700-2,500 yuan 
per m2 of constructed floor area in 2006 and 2007. (The reason why land price is a 
matter of constructed floor area is that the former depends to a large extent on the 
Floor-Area Ratio (FAR) requirement set by the County’s Bureau of Planning, other 
things being equal.) For instance, the price of auctioned land was equivalent to 
approximately 2,300 yuan per m2 of constructed floor area in the AAP area, and 
1,200-1,300 yuan/m2 in Industrial Park A and the northern part of the Economic 
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Development Zone. The size of land is also an important determinant of price. Since 
only the largest developers have the financial capacity to bid for very large land 
parcels, the bidding prices of these plots tend to be lower.      
According to the local developers interviewed, in 2007, the cost of construction, 
including the cost of construction materials and labor, was 500-600 yuan per m2 of 
constructed floor area for 3-story buildings, 600-800 yuan/m2 for 6-story buildings, 
and 1,000-1,200 yuan for buildings with 12-18 stories. Most of the apartments built in 
Dragon have 6 stories. Therefore, the approximate total cost (i.e. the cost of land plus 
the cost of construction) of apartment buildings was 3,000 yuan/m2 in the AAP area, 
and 2,000 yuan/m2 in Industrial Park A and the northern part of the EDZ. Of course, 
the cost of construction is changing all the time due to the fluctuating prices of iron 
and steel, concrete, bricks, sand, and human labor, etc. According to the local 
developers interviewed, the cost of construction rose significantly in early 2008, but 
dropped again to the 2007 level by the end of 2008 due to the global financial crisis.    
Apart from the cost of land and construction, there can be other costs involved in 
real estate development. In Dragon, auctioned land usually already has access to roads, 
electricity and water, but a developer needs to pay for some taxes and fees before a 
construction project can start. However, these taxes and fees typically do not account 
for a significant portion of the housing cost.  
In 2007, the prices of new apartments in Dragon city ranged from 2,700-5000 
yuan/m2, depending on location. For example, it was more than 4000 yuan/m2 in the 
AAP area, and more than 3,000 yuan/m2 in Industrial Park A and the northern part of 
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the EDZ.  
Therefore, in general, the profit margin for a developer was at least 1,000 yuan 
for every m2 of floor area constructed. According to an estimate by Employee A from 
Real Estate Company A, one of the largest local real estate companies, the profit 
margin of a developer is about 30-50% of its total investment. 
One example of real estate development is Commercial Housing Project A, 
located to the south of the Bus Station of the Capital of Township E and covering 
several dozen mu of land. The land was acquired by Real Estate Company A in 2005 
at a price of approximately 200,000 yuan per mu through an auction process to 
develop two-story residential houses, each covering 150 m2 of land. The 
compensation paid to the village that had owned the land was 36,000 yuan per mu, all 
of which was kept by the village because it was “reserve land”. All the rest (200,000 – 
36,000 = 16,400 yuan/mu) was kept by the township government. The price of the 
houses built was 1,500 yuan per m2 of land covered by the houses and their courts. 
The total sales value for each mu was more than 900,000 yuan192. The net profit that 
Real Estate Company A received was more than 400,000 yuan per mu.  
This profit margin seems significant, but a developer also faces various risks 
related to the real estate market - such as rises in the prices of construction materials, 
uncertainty of housing prices, and whether the housing built can be sold in a timely 
manner so as to recover costs rapidly, etc. However, prior to 2007, a developer’s profit 
margin typically was much larger than it appeared to be, due to the increased value of 
                                                        
192 1,500 yuan/m2 × (667 m2/mu minus the area covered by public lanes in terms of mu) 
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the land between the time of land acquisition and the time of housing sale. In other 
words, the apartments made available for sale now are actually built on land obtained 
by developers at least 1-2 years ago, and the prices of the land were significantly 
lower back then. One such example is Commercial Housing Project B, located in 
Village R to the south of the College Town. Real Estate Developer A acquired 200 mu 
of land at 25,000 yuan per mu in 2000. The price of the land was so low because the 
area was completely undeveloped at the time, and the project was introduced as an 
“investment promotion project” by the county government. (If auctioned in 2006, the 
same land would cost 700,000-800,000 yuan/mu.) The developer planned to develop 
the land right away, but was not able to because the navy stationed in the area claimed 
that a portion of the land parcel acquired by the developer actually belonged to them. 
The dispute lasted for several years. Eventually, the developer won the dispute, and 
the project was completed in 2006. The prices of the apartments built by the 
developer were 2,800-3,200 yuan/m2. The developer received at least 2,000 yuan of 
profit for every m2 of the apartments sold. (If he had built and sold these apartments 
in 2000, the sales price would have been less than 1000 yuan/m2.) 
It has been a common practice in many regions across the country that developers 
hold land and wait for its value to increase.193 A study by the Financial Research 
Center of Beijing Normal University in 2007 predicted that the amount of land held 
up by developers was approximately 1 billion m2, which would be sufficient for them 
to use for 3-4 years.194 In Dragon, land speculation is a widespread phenomenon. 
                                                        
193 State Council (January 7, 2008); Ren Zhiqiang (2007); Zhong Wei (2007) 
194 Zhong Wei (2007) 
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However, most of the land for speculation has been acquired for industrial use, as will 
be described later. Commercial real estate developers have much less incentives for 
land speculation for several reasons. First, land for commercial real estate 
development has to be acquired through competitive auctions, so the cost of acquiring 
land is usually very high. Holding land for future development will incur great 
opportunity cost, since the cost of land cannot be recovered until a real estate project 
is completed and sold. Second, informal real estate development on industrial land is 
widespread, as will be discussed in the following section, making the profitability of 
the formal real estate development market unpredictable. Theoretically, a developer 
who acquires land through competitive auction process may not benefit too much 
from land speculation. The reason is that if land speculation is profitable, then its 
value will be reflected in the prices of the land.  
Auctioning processes are essential to ensuring competitiveness for the primary 
land market. However, auctioning did not start in Dragon County until around 2001. 
Between 2001 and 2006, land prices rose sharply. In the Dragon EDZ, for example, 
the prices of the land transferred through auctioning were generally 600,000-800,000 
yuan per mu in 2002, but increased to approximately 1.5 million yuan per mu by 2004, 
and were as high as 2 million yuan per mu by the end of 2006. Land prices were 
relatively stable in 2007. Since the end of 2007, the local land market has not been 
active. In 2008, only one land auction was arranged by the BLR, but not a single land 
parcel was sold because no developer was willing to offer a price higher than the 
reserve price. There were several reasons for this: First, housing prices had not 
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increased as much as land prices since the end of 2007; so the profit margin of 
commercial land development went down, and developers were more careful in 
offering high bids. The global financial crisis that started in the second half of 2008 
had further contributed to their caution in acquiring more land. Second, the big 
developers typically had already obtained a large amount of land that would be 
enough for them to develop in the next few years. Much of their land reserve was 
actually acquired in the early 2000s when land auctioning had not or had just started. 
Prior to the start of formal land auctions, land prices were only around 80,000 yuan 
per mu, and many developers acquired large land lots at that time. Most of the lands 
auctioned after 2002 were actually small parcels. Currently, almost all the large real 
estate development projects in Dragon City are on land acquired before the early 
2000s. 
Some problems have existed regarding the transparency and fairness of land 
auctions. A number of interviewees comment that developers typically engage in 
collusion among themselves during land auctions. For example, Local Official K 
states the following: 
There are certain taciturn rules among these companies regarding what they can 
or cannot do… The big real estate companies all know each other – It is a small 
city after all. They need to cooperate with each other because everyone has to 
plan for the long term (i.e. A developer who tries to win a bid by breaking the 
rules thereby making others angry will lose in the future in a society where 
personal relations are critically important). Often, those who really want to win a 
bid need to do a lot of “homework” (i.e. persuasion or private deals with other 
developers) in advance.  
This may well have been the case in the early 2000s when the land market was 
much less mature than it is now. It is conceivable that if all the developers 
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participating in a land auction are from the same city and know one another very well, 
it would be desirable for those who really want to win a bid to talk to others in 
advance. Otherwise, even if one is financially capable of winning the bid, he is likely 
to make others unhappy if he keeps pushing up the price. Therefore, if one wants to 
win a bid, he should at least make it known to others. Employee A from Real Estate 
Company A provides an example,  
In 2004, our company was determined to win a bid for several land parcels to the 
north of (Hotel A). We wanted to win because we had already had a project in the 
same area and hoped to develop a contiguous neighborhood there, which would 
save costs for us. We raised the price to 1.4 million (yuan per mu) on the first call 
to show our determination, and won the bid.  
By now, it has become more difficult to manipulate land auctions, because the 
number of real estate companies participating in the auctions is large, including some 
from other regions. Therefore, although it may be useful sometimes to do 
“homework” before land auctions, those wanting to acquire land badly have to 
prepare for real competition. Nevertheless, the local interviewees generally think that 
collusion of one kind of another still exists during the auctioning processes.   
 
4. Industrial developers  
Industrial developers play a critical role during the land conversion process, 
because investment promotion is a main driver for land conversion since the 1990s, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. In general, the existing industrial land users in Dragon fall 
into the following three groups:  
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The first group are private or state-owned enterprises coming from other regions 
or even foreign countries. In Chinese, there is a saying that “a monk from another 
temple can read the Buddhist teachings better”, which means that there is more to 
learn from someone coming from another region or country than from a local person. 
In a similar way, investors from other Chinese regions or countries are often venerated 
more than local investors, because the former are often believed to possess advanced 
technologies and management experiences. In particular, foreign investors are often 
provided with favorable conditions, as described in Chapter 4. However, prior to the 
late 1990s, most big foreign investors chose to go to the EDZ of Phoenix City, where 
transportation was much more convenient. Those who did come to Dragon County 
mostly set up small or polluting enterprises that did not have the potential for 
technology spillover effect at all. It was not until recently that some large companies 
with advanced technologies have been attracted to establish plants in Dragon.     
The second group used to be the managers of local state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), most of which were privatized in the 1990s during a nation-wide 
privatization move. The purpose of the move was to promote the efficiency of the 
SOEs, many (if not most) of which were not profitable at the time. In Dragon, the 
privatization process was often manipulated by the SOE managers in cooperation with 
the local governments. For example, Local Official F talks about the privatization 
process of a local chemical plant:   
The enterprise was sold to the current Chairman of its Board of Directors at 50 
million yuan. The plant was actually worth much more than that (but the 
government offered a much lower price because the Chairman had personal ties 
with the local government.) According to the rule, the Chairman had to use his 
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own money to buy the enterprise. But he did not have that much money. He 
borrowed 50 million yuan from a local paper making plant (which was another 
SOE), promising that he would return the money once he had bought the 
chemical plant. He was able to do this because he knew the general manager of 
the paper-making plant very well. As soon as he acquired the chemical enterprise, 
he was able to repay the paper making plant by obtaining a loan in the name of 
the enterprise he had just bought.  
This was not an isolated case. During the privatization move, most SOEs in 
Dragon were changed into share-holding companies. The prices of the shares were 
very low, and the enterprise leaders, who had been appointed by the government, 
received most of the shares, and often did not have to use their own money to buy 
these shares. Ordinary enterprise workers received a minor portion of the shares. 
Local Official A comments that,   
A number of my former colleagues are now wealthy “entrepreneurs”. They used 
to be civil servants, just as I am. They became the owners of their enterprises 
during the privatization process, and are now very rich.  
It is a consensus among Dragon’s local residents that privatization has helped 
these enterprises become more efficient, create more job opportunities, and stimulate 
the local economy. However, it is also true that the privatization created an elite group 
of entrepreneurs who not only took over the assets of the SOEs at a low cost, but also 
have been able to see the value of their enterprises rise sharply due to skyrocketing 
land prices since the late 1990s.  
The third group of industrial land users are villagers’ committees or individuals 
running small enterprises. In the 1980s and the 1990s, villages and townships were 
encouraged to establish industrial enterprises, called township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), on the collectively owned lands of villages in order to create alternative 
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sources of income for farmers, as mentioned in Chapter 4. By the late 1990s, most of 
these TVEs had been privatized or contracted to individuals; but they typically still 
maintain some kind of relationship with the villages because their lands are still 
owned by the village collectives.  
All these three groups of industrial land users have prospered in Dragon. 
However, their prosperity is not necessarily due to their success with manufacturing 
or service businesses, but often because of the land they occupy. Local Official C 
explains, 
What do you think has made the industrial enterprises prosper? Many are actually 
not doing well with their industrial businesses. The reason for their prosperity is 
that the value of the land they use has increased by many times.     
Along the same lines, Local Official D comments that, 
Nowadays, the profit margin of manufacturing is actually very small (due to a 
very competitive market). However, what matters more for many industrial 
enterprises in Dragon is that the land they use has become their most important 
asset.    
Most of the industrial enterprises established in Dragon before 2004 are located 
in the Dragon EDZ and Industrial Park A. By now, these sites have become central 
locations, so there is a strong demand for the conversion of these sites into housing 
and commercial development. Such conversion is carried out in two ways. The first 
way is for the county government to acquire the sites from the existing industrial land 
users, and then auction them for real estate development. Since the existing land users 
typically have close personal relations with the local governments, the conversion is 
often based on confidential agreements regarding how the benefits shall be divided 
between the current land users and the county government, as mentioned in Chapter 4.   
The second way is for the existing land users to convert their sites into higher 
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uses directly. According to the law, land can only be used for the purposes designated 
by the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and the urban plans. However, violation of this 
rule is not rare in Dragon County. A common strategy by the violators is to develop 
commercial housing in the name of building workshops or “dormitories” for the staff 
or workers of their enterprises. Nominally, the land is still used for an “industrial” 
purpose. In reality, these so-called dormitory buildings are for sale to all people. This 
strategy is nicknamed “edge ball” by the local people. An edge ball is a ball that hits 
the edge of the table during a table tennis game. It is considered a good ball, but on 
the verge of being a bad ball. When applied to a social phenomenon, it refers to an act 
or behavior that is not strictly, but appears to be legal.  
One edge ball project is located close to Main Road D on the northern side of 
River A. The apartments built on this industrial site were available for sale in 2006 at 
a price of approximately 1,500 yuan/m2, which was only about half the normal market 
price for this location. There were three reasons why the price was so much lower. 
First, the cost of the project was much lower than that of normal real estate projects, 
because the prices of industrial land are much lower than those of the land for 
commercial real estate development. Second, the duration of the use right to industrial 
land is typically 50 years, whereas it is 70 years for land zoned for real estate 
development. Third, since the land was not zoned for real estate development, each 
individual buyer of the apartments could not have a separate property rights certificate. 
Instead, all apartment owners had to share one certificate with the developer - which 
was a significant limitation on property rights. Nevertheless, these apartments were 
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very attractive to low-income people and those who had come to Dragon from other 
regions to do business, because many of them could not afford to buy “legal” 
apartments.    
Another example is Neighborhood A, located on the west of AAP1 and consisting 
of six apartment buildings built in 2001. The land was zoned for industrial use and 
belonged to a casting machinery factory owned by Village A. Urban Resident C, who 
bought a second-hand apartment of approximately 130 m2 in this neighborhood, tells 
about her experience regarding the property rights of her apartment: 
I bought this apartment in 2003 at a price of 330,000 yuan. It was a good bargain 
because the price also included a storage room of about 4 m2 and a garage of 
more than 10 m2 on the first floor.195 We received property rights certificate for 
the apartment at the time. However, soon after that, the government forbade all 
the apartments in the neighborhood from going onto the secondary market.  
The reason was that these apartments had been built (on industrial land) in 
the name of workshops, and were not (strictly) legal. I do not know exactly why 
they (i.e. the government) issued property rights certificates to apartment owners 
at first but changed their minds later. Apparently, the villagers’ committee (of 
Village A, which was the developer of these apartment buildings) did a good job 
in dealing with the government at the beginning (and had it agree to grant 
“legal” status to these apartments), but screwed up the relationship later. Some 
people say that the government had asked the villagers’ committee to pay a large 
amount of fee, but the villagers’ committee refused.  
This has had a significant impact on the apartment owners. Some people who 
had bought their apartments in this neighborhood (for speculation purpose) are 
dismayed, because these apartments can only be sold at a low price to people who 
are willing to buy an apartment with no legal property rights certificate. We are 
not sure whether and when the problem will be resolved.         
It is worth noting, in passing, that edge ball players have to devote much effort to 
building up good relations with the government in order to obtain its explicit or 
implicit approval, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9. 
                                                        
195 In Dragon, the first floor of apartment buildings is often used as garage or storage rooms, and not counted as a 
“floor”. Therefore, what is called a “six-story” apartment building actually consists of seven floors.       
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5. Land speculators 
As mentioned earlier, land speculation has been lucrative in Dragon. This 
provides opportunities for many people who have strong personal ties with the local 
governments to make a fortune out of land speculation. Typically, these people would 
acquire land from the local governments at low prices, and then set up plants or 
factories that exist in name only and do not produce anything. Unlike the “edge ball” 
players mentioned earlier, land speculators do not engage in real estate development 
by themselves. Instead, their primary intention was to wait for the land value to 
increase before selling it.  
One such example involves a “vehicle assembling plant” occupying a land parcel 
of approximately 200m×60m located about 500 meters to the west of the new main 
government building. The land has been idle since 1999. Although a few workshops 
have been built within the enclosed premises, the plant has never been used for any 
industrial activities. The land was acquired at a price lower than 100,000 yuan per mu, 
but was worth at least 1.5 million per mu in 2007. Local Official C comments that, 
The county government has tried to do something to that piece of land (because 
the national government did not allow land to be left idle for more than two 
years196) but is not successful, because the guys behind the scene are from 
Phoenix City and have a very powerful background. 
A second example involves a large land parcel in Industrial Park A, covering 
more than 1,000 mu. Local Official C comments that,  
It was acquired by a relative of a high-level official from Beijing for a big oil 
                                                        
196 This policy will be explained and discussed later in this section. 
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company from the United Arab Emirates intending to invest in this area. But 
nothing has happened (regarding the expected investment by the oil company), 
and the land has been left idle for quite a few years.  
Land speculation is actually very common in Industrial Park A. According to local 
officials, much of the land has already been sold to “investors”, but only some of 
them have established businesses there, and much of the park looks empty.  
In Industrial Park B, some enterprises, such as Home Appliances Company A, 
Electronic Equipment Company A, Pharmaceutical Company A and Garment 
Company A, have established manufacturing businesses, and are contributing to local 
revenue and have provided employment opportunities for local residents. However, 
some factories have built workshops, but have never gone into operation. Developer C 
comments that  
Many people assume that real estate companies are most profitable because of the 
booming housing market. However, what they do not know is that the 
construction, in itself, does not bring that much income for a developer nowadays. 
Rather, what makes the real estate business lucrative is the difference between the 
current market value of land and the price at which one acquires the land.        
To some extent, the land market in Dragon is similar to the booming Chinese stock 
market in 2006-2007. For land speculators, holding a piece of land is just like holding 
a stock whose value keeps skyrocketing. The only difference is that the holders of 
land seem to be much less concerned about risks than stockholders because of the 
scarcity of land supply. (Of course, these people may be wrong, since there already 
seem to be indications of a housing bubble in Dragon, as mentioned earlier.)     
Recognizing that land speculation is a widespread phenomenon across the 
country, the national government has required that any developable land acquired by 
private parties cannot be held idle for more than two years - Otherwise, the land will 
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be taken back by the government.197 The intention of this policy is to increase land 
supply. However, compliance has been poor. Local Official E comments that, 
It is difficult to comply with this policy. Once land is sold (to private parties), it is 
difficult to take it back (because most of those private parties have ties with the 
government in one way or another). Other counties and regions are not 
complying with this policy either. As far as I know, the only city that has 
implemented the policy strictly is Xi’an.198  
A former party secretary of Village H comments that,    
Much land is simply enclosed, and then not used… In the suburbs, land that is 
enclosed but not used for two years can sometimes be re-used by farmers for 
farming. In the urban setting, however, if a land parcel is enclosed, then nobody 
else can touch it. It makes our hearts ache to see such waste of land.” 
Some land dealers do not simply leave the land empty. Though having no intention to 
carry out business operations, they have built workshops on the land in order to assert 
that the land is actually not held idle, or at least does not look so. For instance, a small 
“factory” in Industrial Park B started to build its workshops in 2002, but had not 
finished by 2007. Normally, it takes a few months at most to build workshops for a 
factory of that scale.  
It is worth noting that the descriptions above are not meant to say that land 
speculation is bad. On the contrary, it can be good and socially beneficial, as will be 
discussed in detail in Part II of the dissertation.    
 
6. Summary 
There has been a booming real estate market in Dragon ever since the 
                                                        
197 This requirement was reiterated in a circular by the State Council issued in January 2008, which stipulates that 
developers who leave land idle for more than a year but less than two years shall pay a fee at a level equivalent to 
20% of the land conveyance fees, and that any land that is left idle for more than 2 years shall be taken back by the 
government.  
198 Xi’an is the capital of Shannxi Province in northwestern China. 
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liberalization of the housing market in the late 1990s, due to rapid urbanization, 
improved living standard of the urban population, and people’s anticipation that land 
supply will continue to be restricted.    
The profit margin for real estate developers is typically large, and there was 
incomplete real estate market competition before the early 2000s. A more lucrative 
business, however, has been to acquire land in the name of establishing industrial 
enterprises, and then use it for real estate development through various means.   
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 CHAPTER 6 THE REFEREES  
 
1. Introduction 
The referee institutions of the Chinese land conversion process mainly include the 
courts, the Letters and Calls system, and the Supervision and Inspection system. This 
chapter will describe their respective roles, followed by a brief discussion of the role 
of the media and the public in supervising the workings of the government.  
 
2. The courts 
In China, the courts are part of the government. Each level of government at 
township level or higher has a court. Nominally, the president of a court is elected by 
the same-level People’s Congress; actually, he (or she) is appointed by the 
government. All other officials and judges of a court are appointed or hired by the 
government. In general, the courts are very ineffective in dealing with disputes related 
to land conversion, for the following reasons:199  
First, going to court is very time consuming. After a plaintiff submits a case, the 
court will collect evidence, establish the case, transfer it to the tribunal, notify the 
defendant, and set up a date for a trial. Usually, for a civil case, the court will try to 
mediate first. If mediation is not successful, the court will proceed to try the case and 
                                                        
199 The following discussions are based on the consultation with Local Judge A and his colleagues 
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make a ruling. If the defendant or the plaintiff is not satisfied with the ruling, he may 
appeal to a higher-level court, and much of the same process will be repeated. 
Sometimes, this may take 1-2 years.  
 Second, the types of land conversion cases that can be brought to a court are very 
limited. The main reason is that court rulings have to be “evidence-based”. Many land 
conversion dispute cases cannot be accepted by the court, for lack of “evidence”. For 
example, a court usually does not accept cases related to the level of compensation 
farmers receive for land conversion, because there are usually no written contracts 
among farmers, villages and the government. As long as the compensation paid to 
farmers is higher than the prescribed official standard, a court will not be responsible 
for determining whether a farmer is eligible to receive more, unless there is a contract 
between the relevant parties specifying clearly a higher level of compensation. In 
Dragon County, the official grain land contracts signed between farmers and villages 
are very vague, containing only the location and size of the land and the contract 
duration. There is no written agreement whatsoever regarding how farmers shall be 
compensated if the land is taken for “public interest”. During land conversion, a local 
government usually just issues a written or even oral notice to tell the villages the 
level of compensation. This means that, basically, farmers are under no judicial 
protection for land conversion.     
In addition, a court does not have the authority to determine whether the original 
distribution of land property rights is just. The reason is that the distribution of land 
property rights has to respect historically given conditions, of which the court is not 
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capable of collecting evidence. Therefore, for any disputes related to land property 
rights, villages or farmers have to resort to the county- or higher-level governments 
for resolution. However, the court does accept cases related to the transfer of land use 
rights from one individual to another.    
Moreover, a court cannot accept cases in which a farmer sues a local government 
directly for land disputes. The reason is that farmers’ land use contracts are signed 
with their villagers’ committees. Therefore, a farmer is only eligible to sue the 
villagers’ committee. He cannot sue the government because there is no contract 
between them.   
The third reason why the court system is ineffective is that it is generally 
incapable of dealing with ultra vires by local governments. Ultra vires are almost 
never brought to the courts for trial. Instead, officials who support informal land 
conversions without authorization from higher-level governments usually receive the 
party’s disciplinary penalties or administrative penalties, as will be discussed later. 
The role of the courts is limited to trials of officials found to have benefited 
personally from land conversion by, say, taking bribes.  
  Due to the ineffectiveness of the courts, people often feel helpless when they 
have disputes with local governments or entities supported by local governments. One 
example is the case of Chemical Plant A in County A. This Korean-owned company 
was established in 2003 as an investment promotion project supported by a former 
Party Secretary of Phoenix Municipality. Its main products are p-xylene, benzene and 
toluene. It was built on land reclaimed from the sea, and located adjacent to two large 
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residential neighborhoods with thousands of households. The local residents living 
close by have been complaining about the air pollution problem caused by the plant. 
However, according to the monitoring by the local environmental protection bureau, 
the local air quality meets the required standards. But the residents do not believe that 
it is safe, because they can smell the odor from the plant during nighttime. Moreover, 
they are afraid that there may be leakages from the plant in the future. 
Since the establishment of the plant, the housing prices of the apartments in the 
two neighborhoods have dropped significantly, and are now about 1,000 yuan/m2 
lower than apartments of equivalent quality in comparable locations. The residents 
affected have been blaming the plant for this. Urban resident D comments that, 
I have an apartment, about 120 m2 in floor area, in one of the two residential 
neighborhoods. The total value of the apartment has dropped by at least 100,000 
yuan. I am a doctor and am familiar with the potential effects of the chemicals 
that may be leaked from a chemical plant like that.     
Urban Resident E, who lives close by, comments that,  
The local residents seem to have a psychological problem. The chemical plant 
may not be as harmful as people think, but the people are very afraid. Many 
people in the two neighborhoods have moved out.  
The value of the apartments has dropped to a significant extent, but the real 
problem is that nobody wants to buy these apartments. So, although the market 
price of the apartments is now “estimated” to be more than 2,000 yuan/m2, the 
demand for these apartments is almost zero at that price. I guess some people 
could sell their apartments at lower prices, but they don’t want to sell it too 
cheaply. 
Before the plant was established, the local residents were very resistant. 
However, it was an investment promotion project by the municipal government of 
(Phoenix). They couldn’t do anything about it. Some residents voluntarily 
organized to appeal to Beijing and some media, but it resulted in nothing. Some 
people tried to ask their friends who had personal relations with the national 
government, but they were not helpful either. It is so difficult for individuals to 
appeal against the government. 
Actually, many employees of Power Plant A (which is the main local power 
supplier) also live in the two neighborhoods. The Power Plant organized efforts to 
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appeal to the government, but it was not useful either. Many of them have now 
moved out of that area. 
Of course, a natural question to ask is why the local residents do not resort to the 
court to solve a dispute like that. Local Judge A explains that,  
I am sure that the court will not accept a case like that. The court serves the local 
government… It belongs to the party… (Chemical Plant A) is supported by the 
municipal government and is such a big taxpayer. I don’t know their contribution 
to local tax revenue, but I heard that the profit of the plant was as high as 20 
million yuan in the very first quarter in its very first year, and 40 million in the 
second quarter…  
 
3. The Letters and Calls system    
The Letters and Calls (LC) system is an important channel through which the 
public can report their complaints against the government, individual public officials, 
or even private entities. At each level of government above county level, there is a 
Bureau of Letters and Calls (BLC).200 Moreover, within each individual government 
agency, there is an Office of Letter of Calls (OLC). For example, in Dragon County, 
the BLC is an agency having the same political status as the Bureau of Land and 
Resources (BLR) and the Bureau of Construction (BOC). Moreover, there is an OLC 
within the BLR, the BOC and each other county bureau respectively. 
Relatively speaking, the LC system is able to facilitate dispute resolution rapidly 
without the kinds of complicated procedures required for a court. Local Judge A 
explains that, 
Some disputes can even be resolved right away. For example, it is a common 
phenomenon in this region that some construction companies do not pay their 
workers on time – which has been a major source of disputes. If the construction 
                                                        
200 State Council (2005) 
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workers choose to go to the court, it could take as long as 1-2 years to have a final 
decision. Besides, the construction workers often do not have any paper 
documents (such as a contract) showing that they are owed money, which makes 
it hard for the court even to accept the cases. If, instead, the construction workers 
go to the BLC, the BLC will transfer the cases to the Bureau of Construction 
(BOC). An official from BOC can simply call the managers of the construction 
companies to come to pay. The latter may make the payment to the construction 
workers right away (because these construction companies cannot afford to 
displease the BOC, which is responsible for overseeing the quality of their 
construction projects). It is as simple as that. In this case, no hard evidence will 
be required from the construction workers.       
Actually, the failure - or inability - of private entities or individuals to honor 
commercial agreements is an issue that the OLC has to deal with repeatedly.201 In this 
regard, one specific example concerns Professional School A located in Industrial 
Park B. It is a private school established by Developer E in 2007. Developer E signed 
a one-year contract with the Industrial Park B Property Management Company, which 
rented the campus to the school. The school did a very good advertising job, and had 
more than 1,000 enrolled students by 2008. However, the school had been started 
prior to obtaining permission from the Provincial Education Commission, which is the 
competent authority for approving new professional schools. Developer E had 
obviously received strong support from the county government, but underestimated 
the chance of not being able to obtain provincial approval. In 2008, his application for 
the school was rejected firmly. Consequently, the school had to be disbanded one year 
after it was established. Developer E encountered a serious financial problem, and 
was unable to pay salaries to the teachers he had hired. Since Developer E refused to 
pay (or perhaps was not able to at the time), the teachers decided to go to the OLC of 
                                                        
201 Incidentally, as mentioned in the Introduction of the dissertation, the inability of some countries to honor 
commercial agreement was thought by Mancur Olson - in his posthumously-published book Power and Prosperity 
- to be a major constraint of these countries to achieving greater economic prosperity. 
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the county government to exert pressure on Developer E. One of the teachers 
describes his experience at the OLC as follows:   
It was quite a scene! There were so many people in front of the building (where 
the OLC office is located). It was the end of the (Chinese lunar) year, which is 
typically the best time for people to ask for their money long due. We (i.e. 
teachers) were a large group. (We had to go together in order to make our voice 
louder.) But we were not the only ones. Some workers from the paper-making 
company were also there. We really had a very impressive presence there. 
The relevant officials treated us with patience. They promised that they 
would take our problem very seriously, but also explained to us that they were 
actually in a very difficult situation. It was not a prosperous year, because a 
number of companies became bankrupt due to the global financial crisis and 
therefore were not able to pay their employees. (It was extremely difficult for the 
OLC to deal with so many cases at the same time.) 
Of course, we did not just go to the OLC. We managed to get the telephone 
numbers of the County Mayor, the Municipal Mayor, and the Director of the 
Municipal Education Bureau; and called their offices. We also contacted some 
media. (We made such a noise that,) later, a journalist from a provincial-level 
newspaper came to the school to investigate the case. Regrettably, all the teachers 
were already gone because the school had been closed for a while… Nevertheless, 
we got paid eventually (due to the pressure placed on Developer E by the local 
government).     
Incidentally, the disbanding of this school actually turned out to be a good thing for 
other professional schools in the county, because they were able to receive most of the 
students abandoned by Professional School A - and hence more tuition payments.  
In general, the Letters and Calls system, which is less formal than the court 
system, is very effective in handling certain disputes between individuals and private 
entities. However, it also has serious limitations, especially in dealing with disputes 
between individuals and local governments, for the following reasons:   
First, The BLC/OLC does not have the authority, like a court, to resolve a dispute 
by itself, and therefore has to transfer the case to the relevant authorities for 
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consideration. Its responsibility is simply to record the appeals, convey them to the 
relevant agencies, and track the dispute resolution process. For example, if the 
Phoenix Municipal BLC receives a letter or call of complaint against Dragon 
County’s BOP, the former will then transfer it to the municipal BOP, which will then 
require the Dragon county BOP to examine the case and report back regarding its 
settlement decision. This can be an effective mechanism sometimes, because local 
governments have to take the requests from higher-level authorities very seriously. 
However, it does not always work, because dispute settlement decisions are often 
subject to the influence of complex personal relations networks (called “Guan Xi” 
networks in Chinese as will be explained in Chapter 9). Dragon’s Local Official M 
comments, 
Most of the cases are transferred back to the local governments. The internal 
workings (i.e. interactions of personal relations) within the government are so 
complicated that it is impossible for all cases to be handled in a fair manner. 
Of course, Guan Xi networks do not always work. In general, the higher the level 
of government to which an appeal is made, the more pressure there is on a local 
government to take the appeal seriously. A main reason is that the influence of Guan 
Xi networks becomes weaker as it goes up the level of government.  
A second limitation of the LC system is that it is not helpful at all in ensuring that 
farmers receive a fair share of the benefits from land conversion. As mentioned, the 
national compensation standard is lower than Dragon’s local standard. Therefore, 
even if villages or farmers feel strongly that they deserve more, they are unlikely to be 
supported by higher-level governments.   
A third limitation of the LC system is that it plays a reactive, not an active, role in 
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supervising the workings of local governments. For example, as far as the land 
conversion process in Dragon is concerned, the system exerts some pressure on local 
governments to reduce the number of disputes with farmers and villages, but is 
ineffective in preventing collusion between officials and developers.  
Due to these limitations, farmers in Dragon County typically resort to two means 
of making their voices heard and exerting pressure on the government. A first means 
is to protest. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some township governments and villages 
used to take a share from the compensation to farmers. This led to a number of 
protests. According to local residents, before 2005, there used to be protestors in front 
of the county government building frequently. They were mainly composed of two 
groups of people: workers laid off from state-owned enterprises, and farmers who had 
disputes with local governments or village leaders regarding the compensation for 
land conversion. According to the law, open protests or demonstrations on the streets 
require application to the government in advance; otherwise, the police are in a 
position to take the protestors away or even arrest them. In reality, however, it was 
often difficult for the county government to use force, because doing so could lead to 
unnecessary escalation of the conflicts. Besides, the farmers had nothing to lose 
anyway. These protests contributed directly to the reform on land conversion 
compensation in 2005, as described in Chapter 2.     
A second means for a farmer to make his voice heard is to go to higher-level 
governments, sometimes even the national government in Beijing, directly to hand in 
their letters of complaint in person. However, this is usually not a dominant strategy 
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for farmers. Suppose, for example, a farmer wants to go to the MLR in Beijing to 
make an appeal. He has to take into account a number of factors. First, he has to pay 
for travel and hotel. (Many farmers in Dragon have never traveled beyond the 
boundary of Phoenix Municipality during their lifetime.) Second, he is not sure 
whether his appeal will be accepted or, even if accepted, how it will be handled. Third, 
even if his complaint is taken seriously, he is unlikely to receive a level of 
compensation that is higher than what the local standard because, as mentioned before, 
the national compensation standard is actually lower. Moreover, even if the appeal 
leads to local officials involved being scolded or removed from office (which is 
usually very unlikely), the farmer will not benefit directly except to fulfill a sense of 
justice.   
Therefore, most farmers will think that making appeals in this way is not worth 
the trouble. The farmers who did make such attempts were either those who had been 
treated too badly by the local governments or the ones who had an exceptionally 
strong sense of justice. Local governments are usually nervous about these farmers 
because they cannot control the results of such appeals. Therefore, they make great 
effort to forestall such appeals. In doing so, they often need to anticipate which nail 
households are likely to make appeals, and then adopt relevant measures, such as 
persuasion and threat (as described in Chapter 4), to prevent them from doing so. 
Another common strategy adopted by local governments in dealing with these farmers 
is to “bribe” them not to do so. As Local Official J from County A comments, 
Sometimes, when county officials learn about a farmer going to Beijing to make 
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an appeal, they would prevent them by paying them or promising other favors. 
Most farmers would accept. Otherwise, they may receive less even if they win the 
case. In addition, what is the use of embarrassing local officials? They are still 
going to live in this area for the rest of their life, and who knows that they are not 
going to require help from local officials in one way or another in the future?      
In addition, each county government has a permanent office in the provincial 
capital and in Beijing respectively. The main function of this office is to provide 
logistic support for county officials coming to the provincial or national capital for 
public, or private, affairs. This office is often involved in “handling” people coming 
from its own jurisdiction to make appeals to the provincial or national government.  
However, it is not an easy job because it requires, in the first place, information about 
which farmer plans to make appeals and when. It has been a “big headache” for local 
governments, in the words of some local officials. It is also conceivable that some 
farmers who do not intend to make appeals to higher-level governments may 
intentionally threaten to do so in the hope of receiving additional favors from the local 
governments.  
The last few years has seen a sharp decrease in the number of protests and 
appeals. The introduction of the new compensation standard and the pension system, 
as described in Chapter 2, has played a major role in it, but there are other reasons as 
well. Local Official S explains the reasons as follows: 
Farmers (can be quite a headache if they are not happy, because they) go 
anywhere to report their complaints… They often do not follow the rule that 
appeals shall be made level by level. They may even go directly to Beijing… 
Most of the township governments and villages (located within or on the outskirts 
of Dragon City) no longer intercept the compensation paid by the county to 
farmers (because they are afraid of protests or appeal by farmers). These 
townships and villages do not lack money. They collect rents from the companies 
renting their land. Township governments usually share the rents with villages. 
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Some of them also rent the beach to farmers for fish farming… Other township 
governments (which are located in remote areas and are poor) may still take a 
share out of the compensation to farmers; but, overall, the situation is much better 
now than before. 
 
4. The Supervision and Inspection System 
The Supervision and Inspection (SI) system includes the Ministry of Supervision 
and Inspection (MSI) at the national level and the Bureaus of Supervision and 
Inspection (BSI) at local levels. In parallel, each level of the party’s branch has a 
Discipline Inspection Committee (DIC), which actually shares much of the same staff 
as the BSI but has a different name. Typically, a BSI works under the leadership of the 
same-level DIC, because the DIC Chairman is typically a higher-ranking party leader 
than the BSI Director.          
The DIC and BSI are responsible for supervising and inspecting public officials. 
They are eligible to give disciplinary penalties to those who do not observe disciplines, 
and transfer those that constitute criminal offenses to procurators. They have a very 
high profile, and are relatively free from the penetration of local Guan Xi networks 
due to tighter control by the party. In recent years, they have played an important role 
in combating corruption. For example, between June 2006 and April 2007, a number 
of officials were removed from office or put into jail due to land related or other 
charges, including: Liu Zhihua, Vice Mayor of Beijing Municipality; Li Baojin, Chief 
Procurator of Tianjin Municipality; He Minxu, Vice Governor of Anhui Province; 
Wang Bingyi, Director of the BLR of Fuzhou Municipality; Lizhong, Director of the 
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BLR of Cangshan District of Fuzhou Municipality; Zhang Senxing, Party Secretary of 
Cangshan District of Fuzhou Municipality; Zhu Junyi, Director of the Department of 
Labor and Social Security, Shanghai Municipality; Qinyu, Administrator of Baoshan 
District, Shanghai Municipality; Chen Liangyu, Party Secretary of Shanghai 
Municipality; Sun Luyi, Deputy Secretary General of the CCP Committee of 
Shanghai Municipality; Qiu Xiaohua, Former Administrator of the National Bureau of 
Statistics; Ling Baoheng, Director of the State Assets Administration Committee, 
Shanghai Municipality; Wu Hongmei, Deputy Director of the State Assets 
Administration Committee, Shanghai Municipality; Zhu Wenjin, Director of the Land 
Use Division of the Housing and Land Administration Bureau of Shanghai 
Municipality; Du Shicheng, Vice Governor of Shandong Province; Yin Guoyuan, Vice 
Director of the Housing and Land Administration Bureau of Shanghai Municipality; 
Zhou Liangluo, Administrator of Haidian District, Beijing Municipality; and Chen 
Shijie, President of the Real Estate Association of Shanghai Municipality; etc.202  
Imagine a public official having opportunities to engage in misconduct by 
seeking personal benefits using his power. Assuming “rationality” in his behavior, the 
official’s decision regarding whether to engage in misconduct or not depends on three 
factors: a) the level of potential benefits from misconduct, b) the perceived probability 
of getting away with misconduct, and c) the penalty to be received if caught (which 
does not just include an economic penalty, but also psychological stress from losing 
freedom or even life in the case of imprisonment or capital punishment). In other 
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 Market News (Aug. 25, 2006); Li Le and Wang Qiming (2007)  
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words, even if the potential benefits from misconduct are large, an official will refrain 
from it if he perceives that the chance of getting away is very small and the penalty 
will be severe.   
The biggest shortcoming of the Chinese anti-corruption laws and policies is that 
they react and penalize only, but do not aim to establish an effective check and 
balance system so as to increase public officials’ “perceived” probability of getting 
caught for corruption. To illustrate the consequences of this shortcoming, it is useful 
to draw an analogy to the recent legal case of Xu Ting vs. Guangzhou Commercial 
Bank. Xu Ting was a 24 year-old man coming from Shanxi Province to work as a 
guard for an organization in Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province. On April 21, 
2006, he went to an ATM of the Guangzhou Commercial Bank to withdraw some 
money from his bank account, which had a total balance of 176 yuan. He intended to 
withdraw 100 yuan, but received 1,000 yuan from the ATM. He was puzzled, checked 
his bank account, and discovered that only 1 yuan had been deducted from his bank 
account. He tried again, and received another 1,000 yuan, with only 1 additional yuan 
deducted from his bank account. Therefore, he tried again and again until he had 
withdrawn 175,000 yuan from the ATM, and ran away. He was caught a year later, 
and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Intermediate Court of Guangzhou in 
November 2007.          
This case invoked much discussion on the media. Xu Ting was a naive young 
man from a remote area, had just been in a large city for several months, and was still 
very unfamiliar with the complexities of urban life. Apparently, he did not know that 
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the bank could easily identify him by examining the ATM transaction records or the 
video recording. It was very unfortunate for him that the bank neglected – or perhaps 
did not think it was necessary – to put up a sign beside the ATM to caution its 
customers about a high probability of getting caught if they take advantage of 
potential technical problems of the ATM. If Xu Ting had seen such a reminder, he 
would probably not have done what he did.  
The Xu Ting vs. Guangzhou Commercial Bank case was re-examined by the High 
Court of Guangdong Province, which changed Xu’s sentence to five years in prison in 
March 2008. Even so, there is a good reason to be sympathetic towards Xu Ting, 
because he would probably be still enjoying freedom had the bank taken all the 
measures necessary to “prevent” him from committing the misconduct. Of course, a 
major difference between Xu Ting and a public official arrested for corruption is that 
the former mistakenly thought that the probability of getting caught was low, whereas 
the latter typically knows for sure that it is indeed very low in most circumstances.203 
However, they are both very “unfortunate” in the sense that, if the society had taken 
all the “precautionary” measures to try to prevent their misconduct, they both would 
probably have avoided ending up in prison.   
By not having in place an effective check and balance system, many public 
officials are “encouraged”, so to speak, to behave in a corrupt manner. Indeed, they 
                                                        
203 Actually, the number of corruption cases investigated has been increasing slightly in recent years (Ma Huaide, 
2008). For example, in 2003, the Supreme Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reported 12,830 criminal 
cases involving county- or higher-level officials; in 2008, the number increased to 13,929 (Ma Huaide, 2008). The 
fact that so many people engage in corruption deeds but do not get away reflects two things: First, the probability 
of getting caught for corruption must be low – otherwise, it would be irrational for so many people to do it if they 
knew they could not get away easily. Second, the potential benefits from corruption could be very large in some 
cases where the risk of getting caught is relatively high.          
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would appear “irrational” if they did not. Of course, some are more risk averse – or 
morally committed - than others, and therefore less corrupt. However, the 
anti-corruption policies of a society must not be based on the assumption that all 
people should be morally committed. Otherwise, most public officials will get away 
with corrupt activities, with only a few falling “victim” to these inappropriately 
designed policies by being caught due to mere “bad luck”.  
 
5 The media, NGOs and the public  
The media, NGOs and the public are potentially important supervisors of the land 
conversion process. But, in reality, their roles are very limited. In Dragon, there are 
virtually no NGOs of any kind, and the public is generally excluded from the land 
conversion process, as described earlier.   
Relatively speaking, the media are more important, because public officials are 
always nervous about their misconduct being exposed to the public through 
newspapers or the TV. In China, all media are subject to close surveillance by the 
government - so they need to be careful in reporting on important but sensitive issues. 
In addition, local media cannot be free from the influence of local Guan Xi networks, 
which, as will be discussed in Chapter 9, are very powerful.      
A few national newspapers are known to have been “bold” in reporting 
misbehavior or corruption by public officials, for several reasons: First, they are 
relatively free from the influence of local governments. Second, reporting against 
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individual public officials helps keep up the popularity of the media, other things 
being equal. Last but not the least, the national government actually needs a few 
newspapers like these for anti-corruption purpose.  
Nevertheless, the influence of these national newspapers is, in general, minimal, 
for three reasons: First, their number is very limited. Second, they are relatively free 
to report against low-level officials, but have to be very careful when dealing with 
cases involving high-level ones. Third, the media need to have sufficient evidence in 
order to report something – but collecting evidence by journalists can be difficult.    
Potentially, the internet is a convenient channel through which people can acquire 
information and make their voices heard. According to a survey by the China Internet 
Network Information Center (CNNIC), the number of people in China having access 
to the internet increased from 103 million in June 2005 to 253 million in June 2007.204 
The internet has already become one of the most influential forms of media in 
China.205 Another survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2004 shows 
that the Chinese people having access to the internet have a strong expectation 
regarding the role that the internet can play in political supervision.206  
The internet has one advantage over other, conventional forms of media: It is 
much more difficult for the government to control the flow of information or exercise 
censorship. However, the case study in Dragon County shows that, although internet 
use is popular among the younger generation in Dragon City and the towns, very few 
farmers choose to use the internet in order to acquire information or even as a form of 
                                                        
204 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) (2008)  
205 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) (2008)  
206 Chinanews (January 15, 2004)  
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entertainment. Nationwide, only 19 percent of the Chinese population had access to 
the internet by June 2008.207 In addition, the internet has a serious limitation in 
exercising public supervision, since it is a general perception in China that much of 
the information on the internet lacks credibility.208 For example, a CNNIC survey 
shows that approximately half of all the people surveyed think that the internet is an 
unreliable source of information.209  
  
6. Summary 
 The formal referee institutions, such as the courts, the Letters and Calls system 
and the Supervision and Inspection system, all belong to the government, and 
therefore cannot ensure impartiality in supervising the land conversion game, of 
which the government is the dominant player. They also tend to be reactive, not active, 
towards settling disputes or combating corruption. Informal referees, such as NGOs 
and the media, are either non-existent or controlled by the government.  
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
As described in Part I, the Chinese land conversion process is governed, officially, 
by a hierarchical top-down structure. In practice, there exist various sets of bottom-up 
relations, through which individuals can influence the government. In Figure 10, the 
bottom-up relations are represented by dotted lines, because they work in informal 
manners through personal relations networks. In the meantime, there also exist 
informal horizontal relations between villages and developers and between farmers 
and developers. These relations give rise to a local informal land market.       
 
Figure 10 Workings of the Land Conversion Process 
(Dotted arrows represent informal channels to influence other players) 
Part II of the dissertation will explain, in detail, how these informal relationships 
make the system work, and assess their efficiency and equity consequences. Chapter 7 
will discuss the impracticability and inconsistency of the planning system. Chapter 8 












Local Informal Market 
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will discuss the central importance of personal relations in allocating land resources. 
Chapters 10 will describe the contribution of the informal market to local social and 
economic development, and two crackdowns by the higher-level governments. 












As mentioned before, the National Guideline for Comprehensive Land Use 
Planning (NGCLUP) serves as a basis for local jurisdictions to develop their 
Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLUPs) and Urban Plans (UPs) to guide land 
conversion. This chapter will discuss the impracticability of the NGCLUP and the 
inconsistency between the CLUP and UPs of Dragon County.     
 
2. Impracticability of the NGCLUP 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the most important feature of the NGCLUP is that it 
sets farmland protection objectives and developable land quotas for various 
jurisdictions. However, the quotas are always exceeded in reality. Many jurisdictions 
used up their 10-year land quota within five years. For instance, by the end of 2003, 
Beijing had used up more than 100% of its quota for all years before 2010, Shandong 
Province had used up 80%, and Zhejiang Province 99%.210 An official from the MLR 
makes the following comments regarding the implementation of the system:211  
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211 Wang Libin (2004) 
 213 
According to the Land Administration Law, the CLUPs are legally binding. In 
reality, they (i.e. the zoning maps) are no more than something that we draw on 
paper and then hang on the wall. The CLUPs are usually adjusted to meet the 
land use requirements of specific projects (rather than the other way round).  
Yan Jinming, a member of the Expert Team for National Comprehensive Land Use 
Planning and a professor at Renmin University, observes that, “the implementation of 
the existing CLUPs is, in general, a failure”.212 
In many regions, the CLUPs are ignored by local governments in developing 
urban plans. Shu Kexin, Deputy Director General of the Land Use Department of the 
MLR, describes the national situation as follows: 
According to our planning principle, we should first draw a big “circle” – which 
is the comprehensive land use plan. Within the boundary of the big circle, urban 
planners can draw smaller circles – which are urban plans. Lastly, developers or 
public utilities agencies can draw even smaller circles – which are their business 
plans or land use plans for public utilities. The real situation, however, is that the 
sequence is reversed.213       
One reason for such disrespect for the existing CLUPs is that they cover the period of 
1997-2010 only, whereas many jurisdictions have developed urban plans for 2020 or 
beyond.214 More importantly, as will be discussed later, the developable land quotas 
received by local governments are not practical.    
Now that non-compliance with the existing CLUPs is so widespread, a natural 
question to ask is whether the national government intends to have the existing 
NGCLUP revised in order to make it more practical. The answer is clearly 
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negative.215 The State Council has recently directed the MLR to develop a new 
NGCLUP (2006-2020),216 in which the amount of the developable land quota will 
become even more restrictive, despite projected higher demand for land conversion in 
the future.            
This new NGCLUP has not come about easily. Its first draft was submitted to the 
State Council by the MLR before October 2006.217 In it, the MLR proposed to the 
State Council that a maximum of 2.8 million mu (i.e. approximately 190,000 hectares) 
of farmland be allowed for conversion each year. This objective was set based on the 
target that the national farmland stock should not be lower than 1.8 billion mu (i.e. 
120 million hectares) by 2010, which had been set by the National Guidelines for the 
11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). The reason for such a target is that, if China’s 
farmland stock stays at more than 1.8 billion mu, its annual grain production will be at 
least 500 million tons, which is approximately the level of its annual grain 
consumption. In other words, a farmland stock of 1.8 billion mu is about enough to 
ensure grain self-sufficiency.218 In 2005, China’s farmland stock was 1.83 billion mu. 
Therefore, to meet the target of 1.8 billion mu, a maximum of approximately 6 million 
mu could be developed each year on average. However, in order to take into account 
overuse through non-compliance, the MLR proposed that the objective be set at 2.8 
million mu per year. (Incidentally, this implies that non-compliance with the national 
target is unavoidable, and is actually allowed, albeit implicitly, by the national 
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216 The new NGCLUP has 5 overlapping years with the old one.   
217 The following description of the process is based on Li Le (2006) – unless noted otherwise.   
218 Yan Wenyu and Li Pingping (2008)  
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government.) 
During the development of the draft, the aggregate request for developable land 
quotas by various jurisdictions was more than 135 million mu, far exceeding the 
maximum quota (i.e. 2.8 million mu/year for 15 years) intended by the MLR.219 
Therefore, the MLR had to go through intense negotiations with the provincial 
governments regarding how the quotas should be distributed.220 In one case, the MLR 
intended to assign different quotas to two provinces with comparable situations. The 
province that was to receive less insisted that it be given the same amount as the other 
province. Eventually, MLR had to increase the quota for this province while reducing 
the quota for the other. It was also common during the negotiations for local 
governments to report fraudulent information about their farmland stock. The MLR 
discovered that many local governments had reported prime farmland as ordinary 
farmland or even wasteland, so that they could have more flexibility. Zou Yuchuan, 
Chairman of the Chinese Land Academy and former administrator of the National 
Land Administration Agency (which was one of the predecessors of the MLR), makes 
the following comments regarding the difficulties faced by the MLR in distributing 
the developable land quota among various agencies and jurisdictions for the draft 
NGCLUP: 221 
Ideally, (in land use planning,) the various agencies that are responsible for urban 
construction, industrial development, water conservancy, power plants, and 
transportation respectively should sit together and figure out the amount of land 
                                                        
219 Ye Jianguo (2006)  
220 Developable land quotas are not only assigned to local jurisdictions, but also to some national-level agencies, 
such as the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Construction, which are responsible for the construction 
of infrastructure, such as roads and railways.  
221 Wang Libin (2004) 
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they really need.222 The real situation is different. Every agency or jurisdiction is 
inclined to exaggerate its demand… Some regions in the western provinces will 
actually have more than enough land quota to use, but they would not 
acknowledge it. Why so? Because they are afraid that the national government 
will reduce their quota, and they are afraid of being ridiculed for being incapable 
of promoting local development.    
Therefore, the MLR felt that the target of 2.8 million mu/year was already 
over-restrictive. However, the State Council still rejected the proposal in October 
2006 for “not being strict enough”, and clarified that the 1.8 billion mu target for 
protection should be for 2020, not 2010.  
The NGCLUP was subsequently revised based on the new requirement, and 
received approval from the State Council in August 2008. According to the new 
NGCLUP (2006-2020), China’s farmland stock shall be at least 1.818 billion mu by 
2010 and 1.805 billion mu by 2020. According to the MLR, the reason for setting the 
target for 2020 to be 5 million mu more than 1.8 billion mu is to leave some room for 
“changing situations”. 223  The new NGCLUP maintains a strict restriction on 
inter-provincial trading of developable land quotas. A high-level MLR official 
predicts that this restriction is unlikely to be lifted in the next few years or even after 
2020.224    
It is an interesting question why China’s top leaders intend to continue with a 
farmland protection policy that has proven to be clearly impracticable, and even want 
to make it more stringent in the future. One plausible explanation is that they know 
clearly local evasion will be unavoidable under the existing institutional arrangements 
                                                        
222 Actually, this is impossible to do in practice. 
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even if the farmland protection target is set at a much lower level, and that an 
over-strict target will actually help protect more farmland than a seemingly 
“reasonable” one. Also, an over-strict quota system makes local officials subject to the 
arbitrary power of higher-level officials, because the former must always break the 
rules.  
 
3. Impracticability of the CLUP of Dragon County 
The existing CLUP225 of Dragon County, developed in 1995 and covering the 
period between 1997 and 2010, has two key components: First, it defines the 
characteristics of the county’s future land use by dividing, in broad terms, the county 
into various zones, such as agriculture, industry, forestry, etc. Most important of all, it 
designates 67,048 hectares, or 88% of all the farmland in the county, as prime 
farmland to be protected fully. Incidentally, the municipal prime farmland ratio is 85%. 
The reason why Dragon’s target is 3% higher is that Dragon was a major 
grain-producing area during the last national land use survey conducted in the late 
1970s - so most of the farmland in the county was already regarded as prime farmland 
back then. Second, the total amount of farmland that may be converted to 
development is set to be approximately 28,000 mu (i.e. 1,867 hectares) during the 
planned period (1997-2010). Of course, the loss of farmland needs to be made up for 
by reclaiming at least an equal amount of farmland elsewhere. 
                                                        
225 It is expected that Dragon County will soon start developing a new CLUP covering 2006-2020. However, this 
will take some time since the NGCLUP was just approved in August 2008.  
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Dragon’s CLUP has two problems: First, the zoning requirements do not provide 
much restriction on actual land use. Land conversion is based more on actual demand 
than on the zoning requirements prescribed by the planners. In order to reflect the 
difference between actual land use and the zoning requirements, the county BLR 
conducts an assessment each year, and makes changes to the CLUP according to 
actual land use. Local Official B comments that,  
The developable land quota is a requirement that we are supposed to meet in a 
strict manner, but the zoning requirements are more flexible… Each year, we 
assess the changes to the CLUP based on actual land use. It means that we will 
make 15 changes to the CLUP during the 15 years’ duration of the CLUP. By the 
end of the 15th year, the actual land use may be completely different from the 
original design.  
This phenomenon is, of course, not unique to Dragon. The situation is similar in 
most other regions in China. A high-level MLR official comments that,226   
China’s current land policies have “loopholes”. According to the Land 
Administration Law and the Regulations on Prime Farmland Protection, any 
conversion of prime farmland shall be approved by the national government, 
whereas municipal and lower-level CLUPs can be approved by provincial 
governments. Therefore, when local governments want to convert prime farmland, 
they usually do it by making changes to the CLUP, such that they can avoid 
seeking approval from the national government. It may be said that the prime 
farmland protection policy is largely a nominal thing… and the implementation 
of the CLUPs developed by local governments has been ineffective.       
The second problem with the CLUP is that the developable land quota, 
determined in a strictly top-down manner, is practically impossible to fulfill. As 
mentioned earlier, the developable land quota for Dragon during 1997-2010 was 
initially set to be approximately 28,000 mu by the CLUP, which means that the 
average annual quota for farmland conversion was only about 2,000 mu. In practice, 
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the total developable land quota received by Dragon County has been approximately 
3,600 mu – including farmland and other types of land - each year in the past few 
years. However, the demand for land is much greater.   
In order to deal with this problem, the provincial government used to allow its 
jurisdictions to trade developable land quotas in the early 2000s. Municipalities and 
counties that wished to have more developable land could buy quotas from less 
developed regions within the same province where the demand for land conversion 
was lower. Dragon County, for example, used to buy quota from Municipality B at a 
price of 4,500 yuan per mu. This provided a flexible mechanism that served to 
alleviate, to some extent, local demand for land. However, this trading mechanism 
was abolished a few years ago, because it was thought that the economically advanced 
regions might take advantage of their economic power to abuse the use of quota and 
that their farmland would not be protected. This has made land supply in Dragon even 
scarcer.  
It is difficult to have a good estimate of how much land is actually converted in 
Dragon each year, because non-compliance with national policies is usually 
accompanied by deliberate concealing of information. However, according to some 
local interviewees, Dragon converted at least 6,000-7,000 mu each year in recent 
years. In addition to buying land quotas from other regions, the county has managed 
to make up, partially, for the land shortage through land reclamation and 
under-reporting of land use data to higher-level governments, as will be explained 
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below.     
Dragon County is a relatively densely populated area, and does not have much 
un-utilized land. However, a portion of the over-used land has been reclaimed from 
the sea during the expansion of Dragon City to the eastern coast. In the past, when the 
tide rose, sea water would come up to reach parts of the land of Village A and Village 
B. The beach land was once thought to have little or no economic value. However, in 
the early 1990s, people started to use these beach areas to farm shrimps, crabs or fish. 
Since there were no clearly defined property rights for the beach areas, whoever 
occupied the land first became the de facto owners of the use right. Following the 
Affordable Apartments Program in the late 1990s, many of these beach areas were 
acquired by the county government from local farmers, and reclaimed for 
development. A more recent land reclamation project from the sea is the Water City, 
which is located to the east of the new county government building and designed to be 
a large commercial and recreation center for attracting businesses or tourists from 
other regions. Land conversions that occur on such reclaimed land do not require 
approval from higher-level authorities. The county government needs only to pay 
compensation to the farmers for their fish farming ponds and other facilities or 
buildings.   
Some land located close to rocky hills that are not suitable for farming has also 
been converted to urban uses. Such land used to be regarded as useless, and is often 
not recorded in the official land use statistics kept by the higher-level governments. 
Therefore, local governments are relatively free to convert such land, and some 
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individuals take advantage of their personal relations with local officials to acquire 
such land at low cost for development or speculation purpose. For instance, Education 
Service Company A is located at the foot of a rocky hill at the urban fringe of Dragon 
City. According to official records, it occupies less than 150 mu of land only. In reality, 
it covers close to 300 mu, more than half of which is rocky land that is not counted as 
“land” in official land use statistics.   
The county sometimes under-reports land use data to higher-level governments.  
As a result, a small portion of Dragon’s farmland is not known to higher-level 
governments, such that Dragon’s county government has complete discretion over 
such land. 
Despite these strategies to increase land supply, it has been impossible for Dragon 
County to meet the increasing demand for land except to engage in informal land 
conversion, as will be described in detail in Chapter 8. 
 
4. Inconsistencies between Dragon’s CLUP and Urban Plans 
Compared with the CLUP, the urban plans of Dragon City have played a more 
important role as far as the physical growth of the city is concerned. The reason is that, 
as mentioned before, the CLUP outlines land uses in a very general way, and does not 
prescribe details regarding land use on specific sties. In contrast, the urban plans not 
only specify the types of use for specific land parcels, but also dictate the kinds of 
buildings that may be constructed in terms of density and height.  
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There are four levels of urban plans for Dragon City: the comprehensive plan, 
specialized plans, detailed controlling plans, and construction & repair plans. Each 
lower level contains more detailed information, and is approved by a lower-level 
authority.  
The first level is the comprehensive urban plan (CUP), approved by the 
provincial government. According to the current CUP of Dragon City developed in 
2005, the city’s population is projected to reach 400,000 by 2010 and 600,000 by 
2020, and the planed area shall be 48 km2 and 71.8 km2 respectively. The CUP also 
prescribes the growth pattern of the city in the near future. Specifically, it defines the 
city’s “backbones”, which include “Two Axes” (Main Road D and Main Road F), 
“One Belt” (coastal landscape belt, which is the area between Main Road F and the 
ocean), and “Four Zones” (Industrial Park A, Industrial Park B, the downtown, and 
the college town). The CUP also includes a long-term blueprint with three major 
urban clusters covering a total area of 384 km2, as shown on Map 3.    
The second level includes specialized plans for the Industrial Parks, the 
Economic Development Zone, and major roads, developed on an ad hoc basis. The 
plans for Industrial Park A227, Industrial Park B and the Economic Development Zone 
require approval from the provincial government; whereas those for major roads can 
be approved by Phoenix Municipality.  
The third level is “detailed controlling plans (DCPs)”, which specify the density 
                                                        
227 Actually, Industrial A was established without approval from the provincial government. – but this will be 
explained later. 
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and height of buildings, and infrastructure requirements such as hospitals, schools, 
streets, water and electricity, etc. The county government has the authority to approve 
the DCPs. Two important parameters used in the DCPs are “building density” and 
“floor-area ratio (FAR)”. Building density refers to the ratio between the area of the 
land occupied by buildings and the total area of a land parcel. FAR is the ratio 
between the total floor area of the buildings and the total land area. The purpose of 
having these two parameters is to regulate the distance between and the height of 
buildings. In most parts of Dragon City, buildings can have six stories at a maximum. 
Recently, 12-18 stories have been encouraged in the newly developed coastal areas. 
According to the technical staff of the BOP, the most important consideration in 
determining building height is whether it makes the city look good, but sometimes 
land value considerations are also taken into account.228 For example, buildings with 
12 to 18 stories are encouraged in some areas close to the beach for two reasons: First, 
tall buildings make the city look more like a “modern” city. Second, tall buildings 
make better use of the land that is expensive. A disadvantage of tall buildings near the 
ocean is that they block views of others – but this is not an explicit consideration in 
Dragon. After building height is determined, planners would build sand tables to find 
out what is an appropriate distance between buildings such that they do not block each 
other’s sunlight, thereby calculate FAR.  
The fourth and lowest level of urban plans are those for the construction or repair 
of specific buildings. These plans can be approved by the county BOP. As will be 
                                                        
228 It is worth noting that “looking good” is a legitimate consideration, because it also has economic value. 
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discussed in Chapter 9, this approving authority makes the BOP a powerful local 
agency, because building designs can affect the profits of developers to a significant 
extent.  
The urban plans are legally binding documents. They can be adjusted based on 
actual needs, but such changes need to be approved by qualified authorities. For 
example, changes to the CUP must be approved by the provincial government, 
whereas changes to the DCPs can be approved by the county government. This 
implies that the zoning functions of land are relatively “inflexible” requirements,229 
because they are defined by the CUP and changes to them require provincial approval 
whose procedure is complicated; whereas building density and FAR are relatively 
“flexible” requirements, since the county has the authority to change them by itself. 
A most outstanding issue with the UPs is that they are not consistent with the 
CLUP. Local Official B comments that,  
The CLUP is supposed to be the “master plan” that guides urban plans. The 
CLUP should be ‘hard’, meaning that its principles and targets are not to be 
compromised. The urban plans should be ‘soft’ and subordinate to the CLUP… In 
reality, the opposite is true.  
This phenomenon is not difficult to understand. As mentioned earlier, the CLUP is 
developed in a strictly top-down manner. In particular, the farmland protection target 
and developable land quota are rigid and impractical. In contrast, the urban plans, 
developed by local governments, are relatively more responsive to local needs and 
based on superior local knowledge.  
                                                        
229 They are inflexible in a relative sense. In reality, they are also subject to constant changes, as will be described 
in the following chapters. 
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 Another important reason for the inconsistency is that the urban planners are 
apparently very confused about the land supply control requirement of higher-level 
governments and, in order to promote local growth, have chosen to ignore the 
availability of developable land as a major constraining factor. Local Official G 
describes the planning process of the CUP as follows,       
The CUP of Dragon City was designed by the Provincial Urban and Rural 
Planning and Design Institute (PURPDI – which is a technical body that belongs 
to the provincial BOP and has the technical authority to approve Dragon’s CUP 
on behalf of the provincial government.). The reason why the County government 
asked an external institute to design the CUP for its capital was that Dragon did 
no have the technical qualifications by itself… During the design process, the 
PURPDI used such methods as focus group meetings, field visits, document 
review, questionnaires, and statistical surveys of transportation volumes, etc. to 
obtain information about land use and other local concerns… PURPDI first used 
statistical models to predict population growth, then determined the amount of 
land required to accommodate population growth according to an official 
planning guide from the national government prescribing the amount of land a 
city needs for each person added to the city (referred to as “coefficient” below). 
Dragon City was predicted to have 400,000 people by 2010, and the coefficient 
given by the official planning guide that applies to Dragon is 120 m2 of 
developable land for each person. Therefore, the planned urban area for Dragon 
City in 2010 is 48 km2. Incidentally, this has already been exceeded, because the 
city already covered more than 50 km2 in 2006… In a similar way, the population 
is predicted to reach 600,000 by 2020, and the coefficient for the added 
population is 119 m2 of developable land for each person230. Therefore, the 
planned urban area for 2020 is 71.8 km2. 
During the planning process, the county BOP chaired a committee, composed of 
major county government agencies, to provide guidance. Even though the BLR was a 
member of the committee and therefore had opportunities to “inform” the PURPRI 
and the BOP of the restrictions imposed by higher-level governments on developable 
land, it was apparent that the BLR played an unimportant role in it. A calculation 
                                                        
230 The coefficient becomes smaller as a city become larger. 
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shows that Dragon city is planned to expand by 23.8 km2 (71.8 km2- 48 km2) between 
2010 and 2020. This is equivalent to 3,568 mu per year on average. However, as 
mentioned earlier, Dragon County now receives a quota of about 3,600 mu annually, 
and may receive even less in the future according to local officials. This means that 
the quota for the entire county is barely enough to accommodate the growth of 
Dragon City alone. This is impossible because the various townships also need to 
grow and the county needs to build roads and develop tourism, which all require land.   
Moreover, according to the CUP, the planned area of Urban Cluster A centered 
around Dragon City shall cover up to 384 km2 in the long term (i.e. beyond 2020). 
However, the total existing urbanized area, including Dragon City and the capitals of 
the townships covered by the cluster, is less than 80 km2. Assuming that Dragon 
receives approximately 2.4 km2 (i.e. 3,600 mu) of developable land quota each year as 
it does now, it would take 120-130 years (i.e. 384 km2 minus 80 km2, then divided by 
2.4 km2/year) to develop the cluster fully, even if all other townships do not develop 
at all. Local Official C comments that, “It is “ridiculous”! How can it be as large as 
384 km2 (if the current land policy remains as it is now)? We cannot have so much 
developable land quota in the first place!”   
Despite of its inconsistency with the CLUP, the CUP was approved by the 
provincial government. The planning and approval process of the CUP indicates at 
least two things: First, the county government did not believe that the developable 
land restrictions were practical, and the county BLR had a limited - or perhaps 
indifferent - role in influencing the urban planning process. Second, the fact that the 
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CUP was approved shows that the provincial urban planning authorities were also 
confused about the land supply restrictions. Moreover, it is fair to say that even the 
national planning authorities were confused – otherwise they would have revised the 
afore-mentioned official planning guide in the first place.  
This is not to say, however, that Dragon’s urban plans reflect local needs well. 
They may reflect the needs of the county government, but not necessarily those of the 
public. Urban planning is an internal process of the local governments, and public 
participation remains nominal. Before an urban plan becomes “official”, it is usually 
made available to the public for 15 days for comments by being posted on three 
bulletin boards in three different locations of the city and on the website of the county 
BOP, which few people - among a relatively small proportion of the local population 
having access to the internet - know of. A public hearing, attended by local officials 
and experts from the relevant government agencies or institutions, is usually also held, 
but with almost zero public participation.      
 
5. Summary 
 The national farmland protection objective, set by the NGCLUP, is intended to be 
“over stringent” in order to allow room for local non-compliance. This is a smart 
strategy by the national government given the existing top-down system, because a 
seemingly “reasonable” objective would not serve to stop non-compliance anyway.   
 The developable land quota received by Dragon County falls far short of demand, 
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and Dragon has tried to make up, partially, for the shortage through land reclamation 
and under-reporting of land use data. 
 The local planning system in Dragon is inconsistent. The urban plans are more 
responsive to local demand than the CLUP, but neither is able to take into account the 
demand by non-government players.  
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CHAPTER 8 INFORMAL MARKET AS A NATURAL RESPONSE TO A 
HIGHLY CENTRALIZED SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
As discussed before, the land supply in Dragon falls far short of demand. 
Moreover, the official approval procedure for land conversion is very rigid. According 
to the Land Administration Law, Dragon County must apply to the provincial 
government for development permissions although in some cases the provincial 
government delegates the approval authority to the municipal government. In addition, 
approval by the State Council is required for the conversion of prime farmland, of 
non-prime farmland covering more than 35 hectares, or of other types of land 
covering more than 70 hectares. 
There are two types of applications by a county government for the conversion of 
farmland to urban uses. The first type is called “group applications”, through which 
the county government seeks approval for converting land intended for multiple 
projects. Group application can only be made at designated times once or twice a year. 
Each year, before submitting group applications to higher-level governments, the 
county BLR will ask all the relevant county agencies, including the Public Roads 
Bureau, the Investment Promotion Bureau, the Tourism Bureau, and the Construction 
Bureau, etc., to predict the amount of land that will be required in their respective 
sectors and make requests to the county government. Individual developers are not 
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involved in this consultation process in a formal way, although those having ties with 
the relevant agencies may influence the decisions of the latter. The county government 
shall make sure that the aggregate amount of the land requested by these respective 
agencies does not exceed the developable land quota allowed by the higher-level 
governments. However, Local Official E comments that,      
The aggregate amount of the land requested by these agencies always exceeds the 
developable land quota allowed by the province. To resolve this issue, the BLR 
chairs a committee, consisting of the representatives of these agencies, to 
examine the requests and reach a compromise.   
This process is, therefore, one for distributing the developable land quota within the 
county through political bargaining, without formal involvement of developers, 
villages and farmers.  
The second type of application is for individual projects. These applications are 
usually limited to large projects only, and the process is very complicated. Local 
Official S comments that, 
It is very complicated. According to the regulation, a land conversion application 
(for an individual project) cannot be made unless a contract has been signed 
between the developer and the village(s) affected. The application will be 
examined by many levels of authorities, including township, county, municipal, 
and provincial governments. Since the approval process is lengthy, many projects 
are simply put into operation before approval is granted or even sought for. 
A special report by the MLR concurs and points out that,231  
The applications need to go though many steps at each of the multiple levels of 
the government, so the procedure is very complicated… The supporting 
documents required for an application usually becomes thicker and thicker as it 
goes down the levels. 
Therefore, in response to an overly strict developable land quota policy and very 
complicated land use approval procedures, an informal land market has existed in 
                                                        
231 Ministry of Land and Resources Special Task Force (2002) 
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Dragon County to help make the system work. This chapter will describe various 
forms of informal land conversion carried out by various players. 
 
2. Informal land conversions by local governments  
Local governments can provide services more efficiently than do higher-level 
governments because the former have superior local knowledge and a stronger 
pressure to meet local needs.232 Given the rigidity and impracticability of centralized 
planning, it is natural that local governments have tried various ways to engage in 
informal land conversion. Their strategies in this respect have much to do with their 
interpretation of the policies of the higher-level governments. It is fair to say that 
Dragon’s local governments are very confused about the conflicting national policies. 
On the one hand, they know very well that controlling land supply tightly will not 
only impose a direct negative impact on the local financial situation and economic 
growth, but also affect their own career in a negative way because, as mentioned 
before, GDP growth is the most important criterion for the evaluation of their 
performance by the higher-level governments. On the other hand, ignoring the 
farmland protection requirements may embarrass their bosses at higher-level 
governments and consequently themselves.    
If left to itself to choose between farmland and growth, a local government would 
definitely select the latter, since the economic and social benefits of its farmland 
                                                        
232 Tiebout (1956) and Fischel (2001) argue that this is also the case in the US.  
 232 
protection efforts will be shared by other jurisdictions as well. In other words, 
whenever possible, a local government would want to evade the national farmland 
protection policy. In fact, they would look foolish if they do not. As described before, 
informal land conversion is widespread across the country. If most others are doing it 
and not receiving due punishment, those who are not will be ridiculed.  
The key question for a local government leader is to guess how far he can go with 
informal land conversions such that his bosses at the higher-level governments do not 
get embarrassed. This is illustrated in Figure 11. The law defines a boundary (i.e. the 
smaller circle), going beyond which is illegal in a strict sense. In the context of land 
conversion, this boundary refers to the developable land quota assigned by the 
national government level by level down and the corresponding zoning requirements 
defined by the CLUPs. In practice, however, few local governments stay strictly 
within this legal boundary because the economic incentive to go beyond is high. The 
national government, which either is unsure by itself about whether the legal 
boundary it has set is practicable or thinks that it is impossible to crack down on so 
many trespassers, chooses to allow, albeit implicitly, some “leeway”, denoted by the 
shaded area in Figure 11, for local governments.  
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Figure 11 “Leeway” of national policies 
It is important to note that the outer boundary of the shaded area is neither clear- 
cut nor fixed, but depends on the wavering political will of the national government. 
Therefore, local governments, in seeking maximum benefits, should make, on a 
continual basis, the best guess it can about the size and boundary of the shaded area. A 
risk-taking local government will venture as far as it can from the legal boundary in 
order to maximize its own benefits, but in doing so runs the risk of being picked out 
by higher-level governments for a crackdown. This is because the national 
government needs, from time to time, to crack down on certain risk-takers in order to 
warn everybody else not to go too far, as will be elaborated with specific examples in 
Chapter 10. A risk-averse county mayor, on the other hand, will stay close to the legal 
boundary in order to be safe, but may be considered “incapable” by the local residents 
within his jurisdiction and, more importantly, by his own bosses as he is not able to 
promote local economic growth as much as his counterparts in other counties.       
In general, Dragon’s county leaders have dealt with this dilemma in an adroit way. 








determine whether to refrain from or continue with them based on the reactions of the 
higher-level governments. As mentioned before, the Dragon EDZ, Industrial Park A 
and Industrial Park B were all established without approval from the higher-level 
authorities at the beginning. Of course, whenever the higher-level governments do 
become serious and intend to crack down on some trespassers, it is important that a 
local government show a good spirit of cooperation. For example, when Dragon’s 
application for establishing Industrial Park A was rejected by the provincial 
government, the county government “deferred”, and cancelled the park. However, the 
reality was that, by the time of the official rejection, much of the land had already 
been filled up. Now, the area is no longer called an “industrial park”, but has become 
part of the EDZ. (For the sake of convenience, it is still called Industrial Park A in this 
dissertation.) During such a process, the county leaders run no significant risk of 
being punished by the higher-level governments in any serious manner, as long as 
they are “cooperative” and not found to have benefited personally in a direct way 
from such informal land conversion.  
This kind of strategy is called “Execute First and Report Later (EFRL)”.233 The 
term originated in China’s feudal times, and referred to special circumstances where 
an official decided to execute a criminal before asking the emperor for approval 
because prior reporting might result in the criminal being let loose. The term did not 
necessarily refer to the execution of criminals, but to carrying out tasks in general 
without reporting to the emperor according to normal official procedures. There were 
                                                        
233 It is called Xian Zhan Hou Zou in Chinese 
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mainly two reasons for EFRL: First, the official, without modern communication 
methods, was too far from the capital to report to the emperor, and the matter was 
extremely urgent. Second, the official wanted badly to do something but presumed 
that the emperor would not agree to his decision if prior reporting were to be given 
but that, if he just did it, the emperor would give him a minor penalty only, if any. 
When applied to land conversion, EFRL simply means carrying out land conversion 
first and seeking approval from higher-level governments later.  
A variation of EFRL is “Execute and Do Not Report (EDNR)”,234 which means 
that local governments or individuals carry out land conversion without even 
attempting to seek approval from higher-level governments afterwards. The 
phenomenon of EFRL or EDNR in Dragon reflects a deep local distrust towards 
national policies. Dragon’s officials and developers blame higher-level policy makers 
for not understanding the local “subtleties” very well. Developer C comments that,  
The policies (from higher-level governments) are simply not practicable. If we are 
to follow their policies strictly, then we cannot do anything (i.e. there would not 
be much business opportunities since they require land as an input).  
Along the same lines, Local Official A comments that,  
How can they know the real situation at the local level? When they (i.e. policy 
makers from the national government) come down to do research for 
policy-making, they are always accompanied by officials from various levels (i.e. 
provincial, municipal, etc.), and treated like kings. The local officials would tell 
them the good things only… Policies made in such a way are often misleading.   
Such a perception of the national policy makers may not be fair because, as discussed 
before, the reason for the system to be impracticable is not that the national policy 
makers do not understand the local situation well, but that they have intentionally 
                                                        
234 It is called Zhan Er Bu Zou in Chinese 
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made it to be over-strict. 
Most land conversions in Dragon have been either EFRL or EDNR cases. This 
section will describe a few. A first example is the construction of an iron and steel 
production plant in Township F and I. Starting from the early 2000s, the state-owned 
Phoenix Iron and Steel Company had been planning to move its main manufacturing 
facilities from the current site, which is close to downtown Phoenix City, to a 
suburban county due to environmental considerations. The county government of 
Dragon was very enthusiastic about attracting the company to locate its new plant in 
Dragon. The company was interested, and selected a coastal site covering a number of 
villages in Township F and Township I235. Following the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2003, the county government started to carry out compulsory land 
conversion right away. In the meantime, the company and the county each sent 
representatives to Beijing to lobby the relevant national government agencies for 
approval of the project. These central agencies included the MLR, which is 
responsible for approving unplanned land conversions; the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), which is responsible for approving large investment 
projects by state-owned enterprises; and the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA)236, which is responsible for environmental impact assessment 
for large projects.  
The land intended for use by the company was acquired successfully from the 
villages by the county and township governments. During the land acquisition process, 
                                                        
235 Township I, which is not shown in Map 4, is located on the southwest of Township F.  
236 SEPA has recently been elevated to be the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 
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the local governments met with some resistance but the local farmers were generally 
pleased with the opportunity of receiving a decent amount of compensation and 
looked forward to having such a big project that would provide them with jobs. In 
total, 2,000 to 3,000 mu of land was acquired and made ready for use.   
 Unfortunately, the project was rejected in 2007 by NDRC, although both MLR 
and SEPA approved. The reason for the rejection was that a relocation of the company 
would require a tremendous amount of investment, which NDRC was not willing to 
support. As a result, the land conversion process had to be stopped.  
 In order to attract the company, Dragon’s county government had paid for all the 
costs related to land acquisition, including the compensation to local farmers and the 
cost of the preliminary land development. Local Official L from Township F 
comments in 2007 that,  
I do not think that the construction of the project will be resumed. It was 
supported by (a former party secretary of Phoenix Municipality). Since he left 
office, this project has lost key support from the municipal government. Of 
course, the land that has already been acquired from the villages will not be 
wasted, because it is in a very good location along the coast and is ideal for 
manufacturing companies as it is convenient to discharge wastewater into the 
ocean.  
Before the project was rejected, some companies specializing in harbor 
management and materials flow came to Township F to evaluate the prospect of 
investing in the area. However, because the project has been rejected, these and 
other potential investors have also been lost… In order to attract investment, you 
must have “dragon head” enterprises first. If the iron and steel project had been 
approved, it would have been a great stimulus for the local economy.   
This dissertation has no intention to evaluate whether the rejection of the project 
is a good decision or not – doing so would require a very complicated assessment of 
the expected costs and benefits by consulting various stakeholders, which is clearly 
beyond the scope of a dissertation. The purpose of citing this case is to illustrate two 
 238 
points: First, local governments are very eager to attract investment by offering 
favorable conditions including land use. Second, given intense inter-jurisdictional 
competition, local governments often do not have much choice but to engage in EFRL 
in order to promote local economic growth. As Local Official J puts it, 
If a local government wants to abide by the formal land use approval procedures 
strictly, it will be left behind in investment promotion. (To put it in a different 
way,) a local government that does well in investment promotion must have 
violated the formal rules. 
Local Official H comments that,  
Many projects are like that - start off the project first, and seek approval later… 
As long as a local government thinks that a project is good (i.e. able to contribute 
to local growth), it is usually very happy to provide land for it, and will help the 
project go through the complicated application procedures for official land use 
approval.  
Yet, the story of the iron and steel project did not stop there. At the end of 2008, 
the project received unexpected approval as part of the government’s economic 
stimulus package in response to the financial crisis that started in the second half of 
the year. Along with the iron and steel plant, a seaport will be built in order to 
transport raw materials such as iron ores and coal to the plant. A railway line for 
freight transport has also been planned for the area. Construction activities 
commenced immediately. This will be a big boost for the local economy, and there 
will be a large amount of new jobs for the farmers in the surrounding areas. 
A second example is a golf course, covering about a few hundred mu, on the 
western side of the Coastal Road in Industrial Park A. According to the CUP of 
Phoenix Municipality, no development shall be allowed within 500 meters of the 
Dragon City section of the Coastal Road. This is a one-size-fits-all policy, whose main 
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purpose is to protect the coastal scenery because the road runs along the coast. It was 
a good decision by the county government to build the golf course because the land 
had not been used for farming or any other purpose anyway. If the county government 
had followed the municipal policy, the best that could have been done was to plant 
trees or grass on it. A golf course not only contributes to coastal scenery, but also 
provides a unique attraction for local people - particularly entrepreneurs who regard 
playing golf as a way of socializing with others in addition to a form of entertainment. 
Therefore, a golf course may help the city improve the “business environment” for 
potential investors. 
The county government built the golf course without seeking approval from 
higher-level governments, because it knew that approval would not have been 
possible. Apart from the no-development requirement by the municipal government 
mentioned above, the national government had a policy that restricted new golf 
courses across the nation – because golf courses occupy large areas of land and many 
local governments had built golf courses as “image projects”.        
Unfortunately, this project was made known to the higher-level governments 
through a journalist. An inspection team was sent by the provincial government to 
investigate the case. The result was that the county government was “criticized”, but 
the golf course was allowed to remain.  
A third example is that, while the Coastal Road was under construction without 
official approval, the provincial government learned about it, and demanded that a 
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county leader be held responsible. Eventually, a vice mayor received “party’s 
disciplinary penalty”, a dishonor within the party carrying no legal consequences. 
Construction of the coastal Road was suspended, but resumed some time later.            
Apparently, if anyone were to be held accountable for this project, it had to be the 
mayor or the party secretary, because nobody else within the county government had 
the authority to make a final decision on a large construction project like that. The fact 
that the mayor and the party secretary were excused indicated that a nominal penalty 
on a vice mayor was largely a political token to show that the matter had been taken 
“seriously”. The vice-mayor should not be viewed as a loser, because he took a blame 
that should have been placed on the party secretary or the mayor, who would naturally 
feel obliged to compensate him in other ways in the future. Actually, other local 
beneficiaries from the project should also be grateful to him, too.     
Typically, when “caught” by higher-level governments for informal land 
conversions, a local government would be asked to pay a fine. However, the level of 
the fine is often negotiable. Local Official J from County A comments that,  
I heard that, in one case, the provincial government asked County A to pay a fine 
of 50 million yuan. In the end, only 2 million was paid. It was negotiable - 
County A did a good job in public relations. I think (Dragon) was fined (for 
illegal land conversions and had to negotiate) too… What else could a local 
government do? If they follow the formal procedures (for land conversion) 
strictly, they would definitely be left behind by other jurisdictions in investment 
promotion. 
Informal land conversion projects are relatively safe as long as nobody makes a 
fuss by reporting them formally to higher-level governments or the media. Even if 
they do attract attention from higher authorities, projects with strong backing by the 
 241 
county government usually face much lower risks than projects supported by 
township governments only. Not surprisingly, the informal projects by the townships 
in Dragon are usually of much smaller size and limited to industrial uses only.  
 
3. Informal transfer of land use rights between villages and developers  
It is common for industrial developers to rent or buy the use right to land from 
villages or farmers directly, instead of acquiring it through the government as required 
by the law. Such informal transfer of land use rights usually takes one of the following 
two major forms: (For simplification, all the examples provided in this section are 
from Village H, unless specified otherwise.) 
The first form is called, in Chinese, Yi Zu Dai Zheng, which means “renting 
farmland to industrial developers directly for non-farming uses without transferring 
the ownership of the land from the village collective to the state”. Typically, the 
annual rental rate for one mu of land was approximately 300 yuan in 2000, 500 yuan 
in 2003, and 800-1,000 yuan in 2007. The rent is usually divided between the village 
and the affected farmers. Normally, the village receives one fourth, and the affected 
farmers receive three fourths. (This is the situation in Village H. The distribution 
pattern is different from village to village.) The township government collects a land 
use tax from the industrial developers at a rate of 9 yuan per square meter per year. 70 
percent of the tax revenue is kept by the government, and 30 percent is returned to the 
village to contribute to farmers’ pension. It is thus clear that local governments are a 
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part of such informal land conversions - they must be involved because their implied 
permission or silence is essential.  
For instance, a brick kiln was established on the land of Village H a few years ago. 
It now covers almost 200 mu, the “formal” use right to which belongs to many 
farmers. The owner of the kiln now pays 1,200 yuan per mu per year to the village 
and the farmers. The deal was reached through consensus among the kiln owner, the 
village and the farmers. It is a good deal for the brick owner, because brick making is 
a profitable business in Dragon due to a booming construction sector. Farmers are also 
happy because they retain the formal use right to the land, but receive more from 
renting the land than doing farming by themselves.    
The rent paid by enterprises to villages can be significantly lower in areas far 
from Dragon City. For instance, in Village L, one of the four villages that comprise 
the capital of Township E, some reserve land is rented to several small enterprises at 
80 yuan/mu/year. Of course, the rent is not the only form of benefits for the village, 
because the enterprises also provide jobs and pay taxes. 
 Another form of informal transfer of land is called Fan Bao Wei Zu, which means, 
literally, “(a developer) buying out a farmer’s formal land use contract and then 
renting the land from the village”. For example, Farmer K contracted 700 mu of 
wasteland from Village H in the early 2000s at a total rental rate of 1,700 yuan per 
year. The rate was so low because it was rocky land considered to be “useless” at the 
time. He received the contract through a bidding process within the village. In 2006, 
Developer D intended to acquire the land, and made the following offer to Farmer K 
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and the village: He would pay 1,700 yuan per year to Farmer K and 12,000 yuan per 
year to the village; in return, the use right to the land should be transferred from 
Farmer K to him. A deal was reached for a contract of 70 years. It was a win-win-win 
deal: Farmer K would receive 1,700 yuan per year for 70 years; the village would 
receive a much higher rent from Developer D than from Farmer K; and Developer D 
intended to develop the land on a gradual basis. The land has not been zoned for 
non-agricultural use. However, the developer is not too worried because, as indicated 
before, the zoning requirement is largely a nominal thing as long as he maintains good 
relations with local governments.  
A second example involves a land parcel covering 5.8 mu. It had been contracted 
by Farmer L at a rate of 300 yuan per mu per year. Developer D took over the land in 
2006 by offering to pay 80,000 yuan in lump sum to Farmer L and 300 yuan per mu 
per year to the village. This price was for the land only. Developer D also paid 
compensation to Farmer L for his crops and buildings on the land by drawing 
reference to, but at a level slightly higher than, the official compensation standard for 
compulsory land conversion. The compensation usually has to be higher than the 
official standard - otherwise it would be difficult for a developer to have farmers 
agree. The duration of the contract was 70 years. Again, the land was not zoned for 
non-farming use, but developer D is holding it for future development opportunities. 
A third example involves a land parcel located on the east of Professional School 
B, which is privately owned. The land covers approximately 30 mu and was farmed 
by more than 10 households who had previously contracted the land from the village 
 244 
at a rate of 200 yuan/mu/year. The school took over the land by offering to pay 200 
yuan/mu/year to the village and 600 yuan/mu/year to the farmers. In addition, it paid 
30,000 yuan in lump sum to compensate the farmers for the existing crops. The 
duration of the school’s new contract with the village is 50 years.    
Negotiations between developers and village/farmers are not always easy, 
especially when many farmers are involved. The utility of land is different for 
different farmers, so it is natural for some farmers to expect more compensation than 
others. Developers have adopted smart strategies to deal with this issue. A developer 
would usually negotiate with each individual farmer separately. As soon as one farmer 
agrees, the developer would sign a contract with him, so that the former cannot come 
back and ask for more even if others have received more. On the other hand, a 
developer usually does not offer different prices to different farmers in order to avoid 
potential conflicts. Occasionally, however, a developer also needs to strike secret 
deals with individual farmers so that they could make way for his project. During the 
process, a developer typically maintains good personal relations with village leaders, 
whose support is crucial. Village leaders have a personal interest in attracting 
investment for the village, as discussed before, and often serve to facilitate such 
negotiations or even as go-betweens for developers and farmers. 
Of course, negotiations are not always successful. For instance, Professional 
School B intended to acquire approximately 3 mu of land from Farmer M, because the 
former planned to build a small water supply facility, but the land stood in the way 
between the school and the facility site. The school offered 30,000 yuan per mu in 
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lump sum to Farmer M, but the latter asked for 500,000 yuan per mu. The expectation 
of Farmer M was so high that the school had to give up and acquire a neighboring 
land parcel to allow a detour to the reservoir. This was a lose-lose situation for the 
school and the farmer. The school had to pay a higher cost for the detour. The farmer 
is growing some trees on the land, which is not profitable in any significant sense. 
Moreover, it is now more difficult for the farmer to access his land, because the water 
supply facility blocks the way. Apparently, the farmer miscalculated the situation and 
mistakenly thought that he had a dominant strategy. Of course, the market value of the 
land in this location, if auctioned by the government for real estate development, 
should be much higher than 500,000 yuan per mu. However, a farmer can use the land 
for no other purpose than farming, and will be eligible to receiving only a small 
portion of the benefits from land conversion if the land is taken by the government. 
Incidentally, soon after Farmer M and the school broke up their negotiations, the 
former encountered a robbery and had his leg injured. He suspected without any 
evidence that it had been committed by someone hired by the school, causing a big 
fuss in the area.   
 Basically, three things could happen to a farmer’s land: First, the land continues 
to be used for farming. Second, the government acquires the land in a formal manner, 
and compensates the farmer according to the official standard. Third, a developer 
rents or acquires the land in an informal way, and compensates the farmer at a level 
that is higher than the official standard. Apparently, the third option is the best for the 
farmer, because he receives the greatest economic benefits. In addition, his village 
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will retain the ownership of the land. On the other hand, developers typically are 
capable of obtaining “implied” permission from local governments to carry out 
informal conversion. Even if such informal land conversion entails significant risks 
(i.e. from crackdowns by the higher-level governments) in some cases, developers 
have much greater financial capacity to withstand potential economic loss than 
farmers. Thus, the informal transfers of land use rights between farmers and 
developers are mutually beneficial, though not to the same degree.   
 
4. Informal real estate development by villages 
Many villages have developed informal real estate projects on their land in two 
forms: The first form is to build workshops or office buildings, and then rent or sell 
them to private enterprises or companies. Some villages have benefited immensely 
from this kind of practice. For example, Village D, which is located in the old 
downtown area and became fully urbanized in the early 1990s, built many workshops 
in the 1990s, and is now receiving approximately 2 million yuan per year by renting 
them. A retired party secretary from Village H comments that,  
(Such practices were illegal, but) they just did it. The government could not do 
much about it. What can the government do to you if you (as a party secretary) 
are doing something for the collective? … By doing so, they (i.e. the villages) 
have (become wealthy and) been able to provide pension benefits for all the 
villagers. Our village should do the same; otherwise, it would be difficult for us 
to solve pension problems for our villagers. 
 A second form is to develop commercial real estate projects directly. For example, 
as mentioned in Chapter 5, it is a common practice for developers or village-owned 
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enterprises to develop edge-ball real estate projects in the name of “dormitory 
buildings” on land zoned for industrial use. This not only exists in the fully urbanized 
villages that have become parts of Dragon City, but also in the villages that constitute 
the capitals of townships - since the demand for land there is also high. For instance, 
the party secretary of Village M that constitutes part of the capital of Township E talks 
about why and how his village engaged in informal land conversion: 
Among the 59 villages in our township, about three fourths have financial 
difficulties, and fewer than 10 villages have enough money to pay salaries to the 
members of their villagers’ committees. In many villages, money has to be 
borrowed from elsewhere in order to pay villagers’ committee members 500 yuan 
as their monthly salary… Many things require money. Road lamps need 
maintenance, village offices need repairing... Our village does not have a stable 
source of income. We (i.e. the village) have some trees, but they need about 10 
years to become mature… We had a lot of debts. Last year (i.e. in 2006), we 
made about 200,000 yuan by selling some land parcels to those who wanted to 
build larger houses. We did not apply to the government for permission. If the use 
of land is to be changed (from farming to housing), the application procedure is 
too complicated. We simply decided to do it. We figured that if we did not make a 
lot of noise, and the villagers simply built two-story houses, nobody would care. 
The township government (turned a “blind” eye to it, but) came right away to 
collect fees. The rate was 8 yuan per square meter. They collected 1,000 yuan 
from each housing site. Everything was informal, but we were able to pay back 
the debts. 
Another example is that Village L, which is also a part of the capital of Township 
E, sold approximately 30 housing sites, each covering 120 m2, at a price of 120,000 
yuan each in 2005. Most of the buyers were “speculators” who had no intention to 
live in the area but expected the value of the land to increase dramatically in the future 
because, as mentioned before, the township is at a central location in the planned 
Urban Cluster B. The township government gave “consent” to the project by 
remaining silent. Pretty two-story houses were built on these sites, with uniform 
design by the village. After this case was “discovered” by the county government, the 
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party secretary of the township received “party’s disciplinary penalty” in 2006 due to 
this and several other charges, and the village was required to pay a fine.    
Dragon’s county government has chosen to allow, or turn a blind eye to, these 
land conversions. The primary reason is that they make a tremendous contribution to 
local development, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10. In addition, Many 
township governments benefit from these land conversions by sharing land rents with 
villages. The land rents are usually not reflected in the regular budget, and can 
therefore be spent with considerable discretion by the local government leaders. Some 
well-off township governments do not collect land rents, but still benefit from the tax 
revenue generated through land conversion. 
Such informal land conversions by villages are certainly not unique to Dragon 
County, but a widespread phenomenon across China.237 In Dragon County, some 
party secretaries were found to have benefited personally from these land conversions. 
For example, a former party secretary of Village A was removed from his position 
because some villagers reported to the government about his illegal gains from land 
conversion. Local Official A comments that, “Quite a few party secretaries in the 
urbanized villages or villages at the urban fringe did not stay very long on their posts 
due to their ‘bold deeds’”. The reason why many people engage in corruption deeds is 
that the probability of getting caught is relatively low while the benefits from 
corruption are large – which is a key point made in Chapter 6.   
   
                                                        
237 Ministry of Land and Resources (2005); Xinhua News Agency (June 16, 2006); Xinhua News Agency 
(September 14, 2006); Wang Yijuan (2006);  
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5. Summary 
An informal market exists in Dragon County to alleviate local demand for land, 
because the national land policy is unreasonably strict and very rigid. Dragon’s local 
governments have been smart and active in carrying out informal land conversion 
projects. Two common strategies used are “Execute First and Report Later” and 
“Execute and Do Not Report”. Informal transfer of land use rights between 
developers and farmers is common and beneficial to all the parties involved. Some 
villages even engage in informal real estate development themselves.  
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A most important reason why the informal market exists at all is that the national 
government cannot monitor everything that a county does, and the provincial and 
municipal governments are often sympathetic because they share much of the same 
interests as local governments. However, two important questions demand attention: 
The first one is how land resources are allocated on the informal market. The second 
one is how the people engaging in informal land conversions avoid - or minimize - 
penalties, since it is clearly impossible for all informal conversions to escape the 
attention of the relevant authorities. To understand these questions, it is critical to 
have an understanding of the central importance of Guan Xi for the informal market. 
Guan Xi is a Chinese term for “relations”. When used alone, it usually refers to 
one’s personal relations with other people. The case study in Dragon shows that Guan 
Xi plays a central role in the operations of the local governments, in the 
implementation of policies, and in the daily life of the local people. This chapter will 
explain why this is so. Some of the examples cited in the chapter may not relate 
directly to land conversion per se, but help explain a social phenomenon that is 
central to the general context under which all informal markets, including the 
informal land market, operate.  
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2. Importance of Guan Xi to the Chinese society 
Guan Xi is important for any society, particularly non-democratic societies. In 
China, political power generally prevailed over the law and economic power in 
ancient times, and provided a better guarantee for property rights (such as land 
ownership) than the law,238 as mentioned in Chapter 1. Therefore, building up Guan 
Xi with those having political power was a most important means of protecting one’s 
interests or seeking benefits which otherwise would have been impossible to receive.    
The importance of Guan Xi did not vanish after the CCP came into power in 1949. 
In particular, the planned economic system before the 1990s provided a fertile 
breeding ground for Guan Xi. When supply fell short of demand and the price was 
fixed (which was a common phenomenon of a planned economy), Guan Xi played a 
central role in distributing scarce goods or services. This can be illustrated with the 
example of long-distance train tickets. Before the late 1990s, trains were the only 
affordable means of traveling long distance for most Chinese, but the demand for train 
tickets was almost always far greater than the supply. In particular, train tickets were 
most scarce before and after the Chinese New Year, which is the most important 
Chinese holiday and a time for family reunion. There were many types of train tickets 
in China. For simplification, they could be divided into two broad categories: One 
was for cars that allowed both “sitting tickets” and “standing tickets” holders and 
were usually fully packed and very uncomfortable. The other type was for cars with 
                                                        
238 Wei Tian’an (2003)  
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comfortable seats or sleeping beds that did not allow “standing tickets” holders. Not 
surprisingly, the Type II tickets were almost always in short supply. In Figure 12, the 
price of the Type II train tickets was fixed at P1. At this price, the demand for train 
tickets was Q1. However, the capacity of the trains was limited, and only Q2 tickets 
were available. Therefore, (Q1 – Q2) people were unable to obtain train tickets. 
Nominally, tickets were sold on a “first come, first serve” basis. In reality, of course, 
those having Guan Xi with railway officials did not have to queue in long lines while 
worrying whether there would be any tickets left when their turn came.   
 
Figure 12 Demand and Supply of Train Tickets 
 
Of course, the importance of Guan Xi was not limited to acquiring train tickets, 
but applied to the provision of almost all goods and services during the planned era. 
In essence, Guan Xi was important because there was not an equitable and transparent 
system to distribute scarce goods or services that were undervalued, and that the 










meet the needs of those with whom they had Guan Xi.   
Since the 1990s, China has been allowing the market to play an increasing role in 
its economy. Now, it is largely the market, not Guan Xi, that is responsible for the 
distribution of many goods and services. However, Guan Xi continues to be of central 
importance to the Chinese society for the following reasons:  
A large public sector 
The state continues to influence the way the Chinese economy grows by its 
Five-Year Plans (FYPs), which set targets for economic and social development. It 
still owns many large-scale industrial enterprises (such as petroleum, natural gas, and 
iron & steel companies), almost all banks, most insurance companies, most 
telecommunications services, the railway, public utilities, most schools, and almost all 
hospitals, etc. In order to correct market failures, the state is also responsible for 
regulating the use of natural resources including land.   
 In any society, the state is in a better position to provide certain services (such as 
public utilities) because the private sector is either not capable of providing them or 
cannot provide them in an efficient way. However, in a highly centralized and 
un-transparent political system, such as the Chinese one, the power of public officials 
can be abused easily, and there are many opportunities for corruption, of which Guan 
Xi is a critical part.   
Leeway of laws and policies  
It has been discussed in Chapter 8 that local officials have considerable leeway in 
implementing national land policies. This is unavoidable, because China is such a 
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large country that national policy-makers cannot predict all local situations and 
therefore have to allow some local discretion. In terms of the degree of leeway 
allowed, China’s national policies and laws may be classified into the following three 
broad types:      
First, some policies and laws are meant to be implemented strictly and do not 
allow any leeway. One such example was the Family Planning Policy (FPP) in the 
1980s and the 1990s. The specific rules of this policy are complicated and will not be 
explained here, but its purpose is to limit the number of children each married couple 
is allowed to have in order to control the country’s total population. The 
implementation of this policy met with strong resistance from the public in the 1980s, 
but the national government was extremely determined, and put the population growth 
rate under control successfully. Apparently, apart from a firm determination of the 
national top leaders, another important reason for the effectiveness of the FPP was 
that population growth was relatively easy to monitor.  
Second, some policies and laws do not allow leeway explicitly, but 
non-compliance will not be punished as severely as for the first type of policies and 
laws described above, or may even be allowed implicitly in some cases. The most 
important characteristic of these policies is that their objective is usually 
over-ambitious. The reason is that, since it is often impossible to supervise local 
implementation, an over-strict target will not only leave room for non-compliance but 
also help achieve the “real” policy target. As illustrated in Figure 11, although the 
“outer boundary” is the intended policy objective, the “legal boundary” has to be 
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much smaller in order to allow trespassing. In this sense, it is inappropriate to say that 
the Chinese farmland protection policy is a “failure” simply because its local 
implementation is poor. The policy is not meant to be implemented strictly in the first 
place.            
Another example is that the national government has announced some ambitious 
plans for controlling pollution and improving energy efficiency. For instance, the 11th 
FYP (2006-2010) sets the national objective of reducing the energy consumption of 
per unit GDP by 20% and the total pollution load by 10%. If achieved, it will be a 
tremendous contribution to improving the quality of the environment in China and 
mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is very clear that these 
targets were not set based on sound policy analysis - otherwise they would not be in 
the form of such neat numbers in the first place. As a matter of fact, few officials or 
researchers from the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)239 or the NDRC 
know for sure how these figures were derived.240 The China Council for International 
Cooperation on Environment and Development, a high-level advisory body to the 
Chinese government, thinks that these objectives are very difficult – if not impossible 
- to achieve,241 given that the Chinese economy is predicted to continue growing at a 
double-digit rate. Of course, this was by no means the first time for the national 
government to announce such plans. For instance, the 9th FYP and the 10th FYP each 
included an ambitious target regarding the amount of investment in pollution control, 
                                                        
239 MEP is the successor of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). SEPA was changed to 
MEP during a restructuring of the government in 2008.  
240 This is based on several conferences organized by the MEP that I attended in person. 
241 First Finance News (November 14, 2006)  
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but neither was achieved.242  
As a matter of fact, even the Family Planning Policy has started to allow some 
leeway, albeit implicitly, in recent years. Now, it is not rare for wealthy people to have 
more children than allowed. The penalty a couple will receive for violating the FPP 
rules is that they will be required to pay a fine and will lose their jobs in the public 
sector – which, literally, allows wealthy people working in the private sector to have 
more children. The case study in Dragon and Phoenix Municipality at large has found 
a few such cases. Such violations would have been impossible before the 1990s when 
punishment was very severe, often involving forced abortion. The reason for the 
relaxation is that the population pressure is not as high as before, and that the current 
population policy, if unchanged, will eventually lead to a net decrease of the Chinese 
population. (The current policy allows each couple to have less than two children on 
average. However, for the population to stabilize eventually, each couple should have 
two children243 on average.) Understandably, it is still too early to relax the FPP 
entirely due to the current demographic structure and growth rate. However, the 
implementation of the policy in recent years has been very unfair.        
The third type of policies and laws are intended to be vague and allow leeway 
explicitly. Clearly, the vague concept of “public interest”, based on which compulsory 
land conversion can be carried out, is such an example. Yet, no other example is more 
telling than The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (1997). Article 359 
of the law, for instance, states the following regarding the crime of bribing 
                                                        
242 A point made by Ma Zhong from the School of Environment, Renmin University, at a conference I attended in 
person. 
243 Actually, it should be approximately 2.1, taking into account immature deaths. 
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government officials:  
Those found guilty of bribing will be sentenced to less than 5 years of 
imprisonment; those found guilty of bribing in order to seek illegal benefits and 
resulting in serious damage to national interest will be sentenced to 5-10 years of 
imprisonment; and extraordinarily serious bribing cases will be subject to 10 
years or more or even life imprisonment… Bribers who report voluntarily their 
bribing activities may receive lighter or even be exempted from penalties.       
This, of course, is one of many articles that contain similar vague language. Local 
Judge A from County A comments that,  
This leaves a lot of room for Guan Xi. If one knows the judge or other public 
officials who can influence the judge’s decisions, one can receive a lighter or 
even no penalty.     
Accordingly, Local Official N from Phoenix Municipality makes the following 
comment:   
I think the police, the courts and the procurators’ office are three of the most 
“powerful” agencies (because they have considerable discretion in making or 
influencing decisions concerning people’s freedom - or economic interests at 
least).  
 Conflicting policies 
As discussed in Chapter 3, horizontal coordination among various government 
agencies is weak, and consequently the policies made by them often contradict each 
other. A good example is the inconsistency between the Comprehensive Land Use 
Plans and the Urban Plans of Dragon County, as described in Chapter 7. Sometimes, 
public officials may even make conflicting or bad policies intentionally in order to 
allow room for Guan Xi. Dragon County’s Local Official S provides an example:  
The Public Security Bureau (of Dragon County) has a rule that if one wants to 
become an official villager of a village, one needs to prove that he already owns a 
house in that village. However, the Housing Administration Bureau has a rule that, 
in order to buy a house in a village, one needs to prove that he is already an 
official villager of the village.  
This has been a very important issue for the villages located within or close to Dragon 
 258 
City because, as will be described in the next chapter, these villages are very wealthy 
and typically provide special benefits for the villagers. Needless to say, the only way 
for one to become an official villager of a village is to resort to Guan Xi.  
 Such conflicts do not just exist in the policies made by different agencies, but also 
in those made by the same agency. For example, in many Chinese cities, the education 
agency forbids public junior middle schools from admitting primary school graduates, 
whose average age is around 12, based on their test scores. Instead, students shall 
attend the public junior middle schools that are close to where they live. This policy 
sounds reasonable, because test scores reflect the current level of a student’s mental 
development, but not his development potential. In Figure 13, for instance, Student B 
lags behind Student A before the age of 15, but will eventually catch up and excel 
later on. Thus, admission decisions based on test scores are not fair to some students. 
However, some cities allow each junior middle school to have one or two so-called 
“experimental classes”, whose students can be admitted by the school based on its 
assessment of students’ merits in specific areas (particularly math, English, music and 
sports). Since the admission process is not transparent, Guan Xi has been playing a 
major role in it. The parents who do not have powerful Guan Xi have to press their 
kids to work exceptionally hard in order to acquire “merits” in those subjects so as to 




Figure 13 Illustration of Differences in Mental Development 
  Of course, this is just one of many examples of a similar nature. In China, it is 
common for an agency to make a rule, but then allow exceptions under “certain” 
circumstances. Agency leaders typically have significant - if not complete - discretion 
in determining who shall qualify for the exceptions. Such policies may not always 
have been made intentionally to conflict with each other. However, it is obvious that 
public officials are among the biggest beneficiaries, and thus have a weak incentive to 
make them consistent. 
 
3. Dragon’s Guan Xi networks 
In general, people use Guan Xi in order to obtain two types of benefits: 
“illegitimate” benefits that are impossible or difficult to obtain through normal means, 
or benefits which one is entitled to but which may slip away because ineligible people 
are using their Guan Xi in order to receive them. When one receives a favor from 
another person, the former is often, though not always, prepared to return a favor in 
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the future. For this reason, the more powerful a person is, the greater the chance he 
will receive favors from others – because powerful persons are more capable of 
returning favors.   
Guan Xi networks can be very powerful, as illustrated in Figure 14. For 
simplification, suppose Person A has two friends (B and C), who each have two 
friends (D, E, F, G), who each have two friends (H-O). Therefore, A has at least 14 
direct and indirect Guan Xi. Of course, this is just an illustration. In reality, each 
person should have more than two friends (i.e. direct Guan Xi) on average – So the 
number of direct and indirect Guan Xi one has can be very large. Theoretically, Guan 
Xi networks are capable of connecting all the people in a city in one way or another, 
because everyone has relatives, friends, classmates and neighbors, each of whom is 
connected to a different group of people – and so on.         
 
Figure 14 The Power of Guan Xi Network 
 
However, indirect Guan Xi is not as reliable as direct ones. (B and C are direct 
Guan Xi, and D-O are indirect Guan Xi of A.) The best way for A to overcome this 
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problem is to make friends with D, E, F, G through B and C, and then with H-O 
through D-G. On the other hand, any of A’s indirect Guan Xi (D-O) may want to make 
friends with A too – because everybody wants to have more direct Guan Xi.   
A most common means for realizing this in Dragon is to socialize through dinners. 
Suppose D organizes a dinner, and invites B, H and I. It is not rare in Dragon that B 
will bring one or two of his friends (such as A), and H and I may also bring their 
friends. In this way, A, B, D, H, I will get to know each other, and may become 
friends after having met at several of such socializing dinners. In the future, A may 
bring his other friends, such as C, to such dinners. It is possible that, in the end, 
everybody (A through O) gets to know everybody else, thus forming a Guan Xi 
network. Local Official M comments that, “(It is common for people to bring their 
friends to these dinners, because) it is not simply a way of introducing their friends, 
but sometimes also a way of showing that they are important because they have 
important friends.”  
Some Guan Xi networks, formed in this way, have relatively stable membership 
consisting of people with similar social status and background, and organize 
socializing dinners on a regular basis. Other networks are relatively loose, and exist 
on an ad hoc basis only.          
 In general, the members of a Guan Xi network are expected to take turns hosting 
or paying for these dinners. Those who host or pay more often are deemed more 
respectable, and are mostly people who hold important positions in the government or 
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large enterprises or can have the dinner bills reimbursed by their organizations in the 
name of “business dinners”.       
Concerning the importance of these socializing dinners, Local Official M 
comments that, 
You need to know a lot of people. The more people you know, the easier it is to 
do certain things. You never know which of your friends may help you… If you 
violate traffic regulations and get caught, your friend from the traffic police 
department may use his Guan Xi to excuse you from penalty. If you want your 
kid to enter into a good school, your friend from the education department may 
help you…  
Urban Resident B comments that,  
Some of those who have no dinners to go to may even be deemed “incapable” 
and looked down upon by their wives. It is one thing that you are invited but 
choose not to go, it is quite another that you are not invited at all.   
Of course, not all the wives take the same view. Many wives actually hate these 
dinners because they keep their husbands from coming back home on time and often 
make them drunk – which, incidentally, is a major cause of quarrels between 
husbands and wives. In addition, the frequency of these dinners is very high. Local 
Official K comments that, 
Some people seldom have meals at home. If you have an important position in the 
government (or enterprises) and if you want, you will have dinners to go to for 
all days. It is very difficult to refuse invitations. If your boss asks you to go along, 
you have no choice. How can you not go? If your other friends invite you, it will 
be okay to refuse them once or twice. Yet, if you refuse them often, they will no 
longer invite you. But, in that way, how can you make new friends? We live in a 
society where Guan Xi is essential for a lot of things. Besides, (if you do not 
attend these dinners), people will think that you are difficult to get along with.” 
These dinners are very burdensome to many people, for several reasons: First, 
they usually require drinking of spirit, and the amount of spirit one drinks is often 
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taken as an indicator for the degree of one’s sincerity towards friends – a custom that 
applies not only to Dragon, but also many other regions in China. It is therefore 
common that people become drunk at these dinners. Second, the dinners are very 
time- and energy- consuming. A significant proportion of local officials spend at least 
half of all evenings on these dinners. Many are unable to spend time with their 
families at leisure. Most local interviewees feel that these dinners are too many - but 
the problem is that they have no choice but to attend. For example, Urban Resident C 
explains the situation of her nephew, a teacher at a local professional school who 
spends at least 10 evenings each month with his friends, as follows:  
You bet that he does not like to drink so much spirit. He sometimes has to take 
turns to pay the bills, too. His wife quarreled with him a number of times for that. 
But what can he do? In his school, one’s performance is evaluated not only by his 
boss, but also by his fellow teachers. Therefore, he has to maintain good relations 
with them (in order to make sure that they do not make negative comments in 
their evaluation of him). Besides, he has other friends in addition to his school 
colleagues.  
Third, these dinners are usually organized in single rooms in relatively expensive 
restaurants, and therefore very costly. 
 Yet, from another perspective, the fact that these people have “no other choice” 
but to participate in these time-consuming and costly dinners indicates that the 
potential benefits from these dinners are at least equal to the costs, as illustrated by 
Figure 15. Of course, the benefits include, in addition to psychological benefits (for 
those who find these dinners entertaining), the potential favors that are to be expected 
from the Guan Xi developed through these dinners.  
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Figure 15 Optimal Number of Socializing Dinners 
 
Of course, these socializing dinners are by no means the only way for building up 
Guan Xi networks. There are various other ways, such as home visiting and gift 
exchanging - which are easy to understand and will not be discussed here. Guan Xi 
does not refer to relations between individuals only, but also to relations between 
organizations or agencies. For example, enterprises need to maintain good Guan Xi 
with the relevant government agencies; one agency needs to maintain good Guan Xi 
with others; and lower-level governments need to maintain good Guan Xi with 
higher-level governments. It is important to note that inter-organizational Guan Xi is 
much more powerful than inter-personal Guan Xi, because organizations are capable 
of mobilizing larger amount of resources in order to build up Guan Xi networks. 
The above descriptions should not be misconstrued as meaning that the people in 
Dragon are morally corrupt. On the contrary, they are kind and trustworthy in general. 
The point this section tries to make is that the individuals in Dragon, in order to 
pursue their own interests, have no other rational choice but to conform to a social 
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custom resulting from an un-transparent political system with conflicting or bad 
policies. Conceivably, most people would be better off if nobody engaged in these 
burdensome socializing dinners – but this would not be possible unless the 
macro-level political system is reformed. To put it in a different way, the people in 
Dragon do not believe that the law and other public institutions are capable of 
protecting their legitimate interests - Therefore, they have to resort to personal 
relations in order to protect themselves, or even take advantage of the system so as to 
achieve illegitimate interests.        
 
4. Implications of Guan Xi networks on the land conversion process 
The implications of Guan Xi networks on land conversion are not difficult to 
understand. Local Official A makes the following comments regarding local officials 
working in the county BLR and the county BOP: 
They are not separate from the society. They all have families and relatives (and 
therefore need to seek favors for them using Guan Xi). How can they pretend that 
they are not part of this? They have to live in this city…  
As indicated throughout the dissertation, a precondition for Dragon’s local 
governments, villages and developers to engage in informal land conversion is to 
maintain good Guan Xi with the relevant agencies or officials. To simplify the 
discussion, this section will focus on the Guan Xi between developers and public 
officials only.   
Imagine a developer who wants to engage in an “edge ball” land conversion 
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project, and needs to receive approval from the county government. For him, approval 
would be practically impossible through normal channels. Therefore, the only way to 
obtain approval is to get to know a key official responsible for granting approval. The 
developer has two options. The first option is to go to the official’s office, introduce 
himself, and then bribe him. This option seldom, if ever, works because public 
officials usually do not dare to take bribes from people they do not trust. The second, 
and preferred, option is to find out if any of his Guan Xi knows the official. Suppose 
one of his Guan Xi is a powerful person and knows the official well. When asked by 
the developer for the favor of introducing the latter to the official, the Guan Xi may or 
may not agree, depending on how close they are and whether he thinks the official 
will be able and willing to help.  
For simplification, let us assume that the Guan Xi agrees to introduce the 
developer to the official, and that the official agrees to help the developer. The 
developer will then provide gifts or other favors to the official in order to thank him. 
(Of course, the developer needs to thank his Guan Xi, too.) The official may even 
accept cash if he and the developer have developed an intimate relationship during the 
process.      
 A most important point to remember is that, in this case, if the developer’s Guan 
Xi is powerful enough, the official will not have much other choice but to help the 
developer unless he is not able to. Otherwise, he could distance a very powerful Guan 
Xi, whose help he may need for himself in the future.   
 Of course, the importance of Guan Xi is not just limited to approval for edge ball 
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projects. There are various other aspects regarding which a developer needs to resort 
to Guan Xi in order to maximize his profit. A first aspect relates to the location and 
size of the land made available by the government. If the government offers large 
parcels only, small developers may not have sufficient capital to participate in bidding 
for the land, whereas large developers will be in an advantageous position and engage 
in strategic behaviors. This is of crucial importance to developers because they need 
to operate their businesses continuously in order to achieve economic efficiency, and 
therefore hope to have a continuous supply of land. Conceivably, large developers 
have greater influence than small ones on the government in this regard.  
A second aspect relates to the provision of public utilities and services provided 
by the government. For example, the costs of servicing raw land are an important 
consideration in the financial calculations of developers. In China, there is no clear 
regulation regarding what kinds of services are required for developable land. The 
government is the sole provider of public services, such as transportation, sewer and 
pipelines, for newly developed land.244 Though developers can put in local streets 
and water lines within their projects,245 they must negotiate with the government 
regarding external public services.  
This can be a critical issue for some developers. Developer C, for example, 
established a private professional school in Township C in 2003. The Government of 
Township C helped Developer C acquire the land from Village H, because it was an 
                                                        
244 Public utility companies are responsible for building gas pipes or water lines, and charge fees to developers. It 
is part of the negotiation process.  
245 According to local officials and developers, the cost of land preparation in Dragon is about 70,000-80,000 yuan 
per mu, including road, lights, and water, etc. 
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important investment project for the township. The school now has more than 2,000 
students and is doing very well. However, the greatest difficulty for the school is that 
it does not have access to tap water. The reason is that it is built on rocky land at the 
foot of a hill, and that the tap water provided by the Water Company, owned by the 
county government, does not reach that altitude. The school has drilled a few wells, 
but no groundwater is accessible. It will cost several million yuan to build the 
facilities necessary for bringing tap water up to the school. The Water Company has 
been unwilling to make the investment, because the school is the only client requiring 
the service at the time. The school, on the other hand, does not have the financial 
capacity to do so by itself. The main source of water for the school is a small reservoir 
about 200 meters to its south, but the reservoir sometimes runs out of water. For a few 
days in 2006, the school had to buy bottled water for the students to drink and wash, 
and banned the students from taking showers at the school. This makes the students 
and their parents very unhappy. It also makes the owner of the school very nervous 
because the school may lose students if the water problem remains unsolved. For the 
time being, it is negotiating with the county’s Bureau of Water Conservancy to 
expand the capacity of the reservoir. For the long term, however, the school is hoping 
that the surrounding areas are developed soon, so that it becomes easier for the school 
to negotiate with the county’s Water Company to bring tap water up.                 
In general, it is easier for big developer to negotiate with the government 
regarding provision of such services. In some cases, they may even be able to install 
infrastructure, such as external road and water pipelines, by themselves. Small 
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developers depend more heavily on the government for such services, but usually 
have weak negotiating power.  
 A third aspect relates to a developer’s compliance with planning details. Before 
starting a project, a developer needs to send its design to the Bureau of Planning (BOP) 
for approval. The BOP has an evaluation committee composed of 5 people, including 
a vice mayor, the director and a vice director of the BOP, and two other planning 
officials. They vote to determine whether approval can be granted. A key criterion for 
their evaluation is whether a developer’s design complies with the designated building 
density and FAR requirements. In addition, the Detailed Controlling Plans (DCPs), 
developed by the BOP, includes such details as the distance between a proposed 
project and the adjacent existing buildings.  
 Such planning details can affect a developer’s profits to a significant extent, but 
are often negotiable between a developer and the planning officials. For example, if 
the DCP prescribes that a proposed building must be at least 10-15 meters from the 
fence of an adjacent entity, then it is up to the developer, who wants to build a larger 
building, to negotiate with the planning officials so that the latter could allow him to 
use the 10-meter limit. Moreover, a shrewd developer can go a step further and argue 
that the 10-meter minimum limit applies to the distance on the ground only, and that 
the second floor and above of the proposed building should be allowed to protrude out 
for 1 meter.  
Therefore, a developer who wishes to make the most out of the land must develop 
or maintain good relations with the planning officials. As Real Estate Developer B 
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comments,  
Actually, the “official” procedure for obtaining approval for the design of a 
development project is not complicated at all.246 The government now provides 
what it calls “one-station service”. All the government agencies have service 
desks in a large hall. One can go there and submit an application conveniently. 
Approval by the BOP could take as little time as one week. In some cases, it takes 
more time, because the evaluation committee of the BOP sometimes waits until it 
has received a minimum amount of applications.   
However, if one applies for permission that way (by going through the formal 
procedure only), his chance of obtaining approval is limited. One definitely 
should do a lot of “preparations” before going to the one-station service (to 
submit the official application). They need to “know” you. At least, the director or 
a deputy director of the BOP and the director of the BOP’s Planning Division 
need to know you in person.   
There is a lot of leeway with planning - that is why it is important to “talk to” 
them. 
Incidentally, according to the Beijing Evening News (October 28, 2008)247, eight 
senior officials in Chongqing Municipality responsible for granting planning approval 
were arrested between 2007 and 2008 due to corruption, and most of them had been 
involved in taking bribes from developers who wanted to have higher FARs. Corrupt 
acts like these are, of course, immoral. However, they may actually serve to improve 
the affordability of housing, and hence benefit home buyers, as will be discussed 
further in Chapter 11.  
The government also has other forms of control over developers. For example, 
the Bureau of Construction (BOC) is responsible for granting construction approval 
certificates to real estate developers. One condition for receiving the certificate is that 
a developer needs to make a deposit in the BOC to make sure that the construction 
workers hired by the developer be paid in time. The reason for such a requirement is 
                                                        
246 What he means is that the approval procedure for construction design is not very complex. As mentioned 
before, the approval procedure for land use is very complicated. 
247 Huang Huo (2008) 
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that, as mentioned in Chapter 5, it used to be common in Dragon for developers to 
delay paying or, in some cases, not to pay hired construction workers, leading to 
numerous disputes. A prior deposit in the BOC could prevent developers from doing 
so. However, the amount of deposit a developer has to make is often open to 
negotiation.  
Not surprisingly, private deals between developers and public officials are 
common and widely recognized as a major problem during the land conversion 
process.248 Public officials are usually very careful in accepting personal benefits. 
Small gifts are acceptable, but accepting valuable gifts and cash is in violation of the 
Criminal Law and therefore risky. However, developers are typically good at making 
public officials accept the personal benefits they provide. This is explained by a 
former party secretary of Laoshan District, Qingdao Municipality, Shandong Province, 
who was interviewed after being arrested in 2006 for taking nearly 5 million yuan 
worth of bribes, among other charges. During the interview, he confessed that there 
were many opportunities for corruption during the land conversion process and that 
developers gave bribes in such “tactful” and seemingly “well-intentioned” manners 
that it was often “difficult” for officials to resist. A portion of his confession is 
presented below:249 
The procedure for approving development projects seems to be very 
complicated: A developer needs to submit a land use application to the District 
Administrator; the administrator then passes the application to his deputy who 
then delegates the case to the Bureau of Land and Resources; then, the Director of 
the BLR delegates the case to the Land Division within the BLR; the Land 
                                                        
248 Market News (August 25, 2006); Information for Policy Makers (2006); Li Le and Wang Qiming (2007); Zhu 
Lijia (2006) 
249 Song Zhenyuan and Zhang Xiaojing (2006) 
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Division, after examining the case and completing relevant forms, reports level 
by level back to the District Administrator250…  
However, as a matter of fact, at each stage of this examination and approval 
process, only the No. 1 leader has real say. In general, I, as the highest leader of 
the district, could do whatever I wanted to. It is actually very easy for government 
officials to “scoop” money during land use planning and approval processes…  
Not many officials dare to take bribes from developers whom they do not 
know well. Therefore, developers usually need to get to know the officials first 
through their Guan Xi, invite them to dinners, and make ‘friends’ with them… 
This is a “typical” step-by-step approach by developers that would eventually 
turn officials from strangers to ‘friends’”.  
In most cases, it is the dominant strategy for both developers and government 
officials to keep bribery a secret among themselves because both taking and giving 
bribes are in violation of the law - which implies that the probability of getting caught 
on bribery is relatively low.  
Another example involves an anonymous developer from a city in Heilongjiang 
Province, reported by the Xinhua News Agency (which is China’s largest official 
news agency).251 This developer established a real estate company in 2002 with a 
partner. In order to develop a project, the company was required to deposit 15 million 
yuan in the government as “project guarantee deposit” according to the local 
regulation. However, if the company had done it, it would not have sufficient funds 
left to carry out the construction. Therefore, the company provided an official with 
personal favors including cash and gifts, and was allowed to reduce the deposit to 5 
million yuan. After acquiring the use right to a land parcel through auction, the 
                                                        
250 Nominally, the procedure is the other way round: An application is often submitted to BLR first, then reported 
level by level up for approval. The procedure described in the quote refers to actual circumstances where cases are 
brought to the district administrator directly.  
251 Cheng Zilong (2007)  
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company was required to pay the land conveyance fees, which were 11 million yuan, 
immediately. However, his partner had a close relationship with a high-level local 
official – so the company was not only allowed to postpone paying the fees, but also 
not to pay the full amount. In addition, the company was required to pay, before 
receiving the construction approval certificate, approximately 11 million yuan for the 
provision of infrastructure and utilities by the local government. However, after 
“talking” to an official, the company was allowed to pay the fees after the 
construction started, and not in full amount.  
Given the obvious reluctance of developers to speak openly, I did not attempt to 
investigate the private relations between developers and public officials in Dragon 
County. In addition, some first-hand information acquired during the field research in 
Dragon cannot be reported in this dissertation, due to its high level of sensitivity. 
Nevertheless, it suffices to say that developers maintain close personal - as well as 
business - relations with relevant public officials. A typical example involves a 
housing project located on the western side of a main road within the planned urban 
area of Dragon City. According to a local planning regulation approved by the 
People’s Congress of Phoenix Municipality, no development project can be allowed 
within 500 meters of that road. The project was suspended several times during its 
construction, because it had been started without official approval. However, it was 
completed in 2006 and is now one of the most expensive neighborhoods in Dragon 
City due to its proximity to the beach. It consists of a number of 6-story apartment 
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buildings in the south dwarfed by two 18-sotry apartment buildings in the north. Local 
Official A comments that,   
I am sure that he (i.e. the developer) finally obtained approval through his Guan 
Xi with higher-level governments. Dragon County did not have the authority to 
approve it, because the regulation was passed by the municipal People’s Congress. 
Only the municipal or higher-level government has the authority to approve a 
project like that. It was not designed according to the urban plan of the city either, 
because the urban plan was that there should have been no development projects 
in that area. Therefore, I do not think there was actually even a requirement for 
the project regarding building height or floor-area ratio. 
As expected, there are many local “rumors” about developers. It is beyond the 
scope of the dissertation to verify these stories. However, the fact that these and many 
other rumors of similar nature are widespread among Dragon’s local officials and 
residents indicates that the land conversion process is very un-transparent, and that it 
should not be surprising if they reflect some truth.  
A first rumor involves a land parcel, zoned for industrial use, located to the 
southwest of the new government building. It used to belong to Party A, who was a 
“land dealer”. Party A had no intention to carry out industrial operations on it, and 
sold it to Party B for 6 million yuan. Party B was not interested in carrying out 
industrial operations either, but bought the land because he had strong ties with the 
government and was capable of having the use of the land changed from industrial to 
real estate development. Party B reached a deal with the government. The latter 
auctioned the land for real estate development for 18 million yuan, most of which was 
returned to Party B.    
 A second rumor involves a land parcel located in Village S. It was sold to 
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Company A at an abnormally low price by the county government. The reason was 
that, a few years ago, the county government had a financial dispute with an external 
construction company that undertook a large construction project for the county 
government. The wife of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Company A was 
the president of the court where the case was tried, and used her personal influence to 
handle the case to the satisfaction of Dragon’s county government. This land parcel 
was, in a sense, a favor in return.  
 A third rumor involves a factory owned by Village R, located in the Dragon 
Economic Development Zone. The factory borrowed a large amount from a bank, but 
was not performing well and was on the verge of defaulting. The party secretary of 
the village, who knew a county leader well, lobbied the county government, and was 
allowed to use the land of the factory, which was zoned for industrial use, for real 
estate development. This enabled the village to repay its debts and make a large 
amount of money out of it. 
 
5. Summary 
During the planned economy era, Guan Xi was essential for allocating scarce 
resources. Nowadays, Guan Xi is still critical to the Chinese society, due to a highly 
centralized system, a large public sector, significant discretion of public officials in 
implementing laws and policies, and conflicting policies.  
Many people in Dragon devote much time and energy to building up Guan Xi 
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networks. This is a heavy burden to some people. However, most local people are 
trapped in it, because they cannot afford not to do it. Building up good Guan Xi 
networks is a precondition for carrying out informal land conversions by local 
governments, villages and developers. Developers are particularly good at building up 
Guan Xi with public officials, and there are many local stories in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 10 CONTRIBUTIONS OF INFORMAL LAND CONVERSIONS TO 
GROWTH VS. CRACKDOWNS BY HIGHER-LEVEL GOVERNEMNTS 
 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation looks at economic growth as a benefit for the various players in 
Dragon County. Some economists might question this premise, because they view the 
economic system as a subsystem of the sustaining and containing global ecosystem 
and think that continued physical economic growth is not possible since eventually 
the costs imposed by growth on the sustaining system become greater than the 
benefits of that growth.252 This dissertation shares such a global concern, but holds 
that, from the perspective of a county in a developing country, the quest for economic 
growth is a “rational” choice and has benefited the local people tremendously.  
Most existing land conversions in Dragon have been informal at the beginning. 
Many have obtained legal status by now, but most of them did not receive such status 
until long after they had already occurred. Dragon receives about 3,000-4,000 mu of 
developable land quota each year, but much of the quota is used for accommodating 
land conversions that have taken place in previous years, not the current year. This 
chapter will assess both the positive and negative contribution of land conversion to 
Dragon’s economic growth and social development, and describe two campaigns by 
the national government to crack down on the informal land market.   
                                                        
252 Herman Daly and Joshua Farley (2004), P57. 
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2. Contribution of land conversion to local economic growth 
Due to limited, unreliable local statistics, it is impossible to quantify the 
contribution of informal land conversions to local economic growth. However, it is a 
consensus among the local interviewees that Dragon would not have achieved such 
rapid growth if it had followed the national land policy in a strict manner. Although 
there is no feasible way to isolate the contributions of informal land conversions to 
growth from those of formal ones, it is fair to say – based on the discussions in the 
previous chapters – that the informal market accounts for much of the economic 
benefits achieved by Dragon County in the past decade.   
Contributing to the county’s fiscal revenue 
Dragon County’s fiscal revenue has increased rapidly and steadily in the past 
decade - from less than 100 million yuan in 1992 to almost 1.6 billion yuan in 2006, 
as shown in Figure 16. There are mainly two sources of fiscal revenue in Dragon: 
First, the fees collected by various local government agencies accounted for almost 
half of the local fiscal revenue in 2006. Second, taxes accounted for more than half of 
Dragon’s local revenue in 2006 and up to two thirds in previous years. They included 
local taxes (which accounted for about two thirds to three fourths of all tax revenue) 


















Figure 16 Fiscal Revenue of Dragon County, 1992-2006[253] 
 
The fees include various types. For example, the Public Security Bureau collects 
fees for various licenses it issues, the Transportation Bureau collects toll fees, and the 
BLR collects land conveyance fees, etc. In general, the fee collection process is not 
transparent, and the publicly available official figures are inconsistent. For example, 
according to estimates by the local officials interviewed, land conveyance fees alone 
account for at least one third to half of the county’s revenue in some years, but most 
of them are not reflected in the published official figures.  
Relatively speaking, the official statistics on tax revenue are more reliable.  
According to estimates by the local officials interviewed, industrial enterprises 
account for approximately two thirds of all the tax revenue of the county. Moreover, 
industrial enterprises located in Dragon City account for more than 90% of all the tax 
revenue from all industrial enterprises, and the majority of the former are located on 
land converted in the past decade. In 2006, the 14 largest enterprises accounted for 
                                                        
253 Source of data: Dragon’s Yearbook 2006; Report on the Finances of Dragon County, 2006 
 280 
54.3% of the total contribution of state taxes to local fiscal revenue. In particular, the 
three largest enterprises, including Home Appliances Company A, High-tech 
Company A and Milk Product Company A (none of which had obtained land use 
approval from higher-level governments at the time they started business in Dragon), 
accounted for 27.5% of the entire contribution of state taxes to local fiscal revenue in 
2006. Of course, the contribution of these enterprises is not limited to tax payments. 
The social benefits they generate are also large. Home Appliance Company A, for 
example, employs several thousand local workers, and supports a number of smaller 
enterprises that provide parts or services for it. 
Improving the financial situation of villages and townships 
The villages have benefited immensely from informal land conversions. A good 
example is Villages A, B and C. Village A is located in the Affordable Apartments 
area, B in the Dragon EDZ, and C to the north of Village A. 15 years ago, the villages 
were completely rural, and most villagers were engaged in fishing, aquaculture or 
agriculture. Among the three villages, the land of Village A was developed first 
(because of the Affordable Apartments Program), Village C later, and Village B last. 
As mentioned in Chapter 8, these villages typically rent land or workshops to 
enterprises and collect rents from them. They also built office buildings jointly with 
private companies. For example, Real Estate Company A built a large nine-story 
building on Village A’s land without going through the “official” land conversion 
procedure. (The building has been granted official status by now.) Now, the company 
owns the 3rd-9th floors of the building, and Village A owns the first two floors and 
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rents them to the County’s Bureau of Water Conservancy and several private 
companies as offices. Village A also has partial ownership to several other office 
buildings. According to an estimate by Local Official I, who once served in Village 
A’s villagers’ committee, the annual collective income of Village A is approximately 4 
million yuan. Villages B and C are even more wealthy than A, because they were 
developed after Village A, and the land value had increased by several fold by the 
time they started to be developed. 
As the villages now have strong financial capabilities, they are able to take better 
care of collective affairs. It is typical for the villagers’ committees of the urbanized 
villages to provide their villagers with free flour, edible oil or moon cakes for the 
Spring Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival and other important Chinese holidays.    
Some villages have even devoted efforts to improving the housing conditions of 
their villages. Although most villagers have their own houses, their living conditions 
are not necessarily great. Many young married couples have to live with their parents, 
because they cannot afford to buy new apartments. Village A, therefore, built two 
4-story apartment buildings on the village’s land for its villagers in 2001. Those who 
did not have housing of their own were eligible to buy these apartments at a price of 
less than 1,000 yuan/m2.  
The urbanized townships have also strengthened their financial capacity, not least 
because their tax revenue from an increasing number of new enterprises is significant. 
Now that they do not need to worry too much about their own financial problems, 
some start to pay more attention to farmers’ welfare. For example, Township B started 
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to implement an affordable apartments program in 2006 for the urbanized farmers in 
Villages A, B and G who do not have housing of their own. The site on which the 
apartment buildings were constructed used to be an industrial site. The first phase of 
the program, which consists of several hundred apartments, was completed in 2007, 
and the second phase is under construction. Most of the finished apartments are 
smaller than 90 m2, and sold at a price of 1500 yuan/m2 to eligible farmers.  
Even if this price was only about half the market price for the same location, 
many farmers had difficulty in paying, because they were among the low-income 
groups. For example, Farmer I and her husband, who had been living with her parents 
in Village A after getting married, bought such an apartment. It cost her 170,000 yuan 
in total, including buying the apartment, doing furnishing and buying furniture. She 
and her husband did not have so much money. Her father helped them make most of 
the payment. (In China, it is common for parents to help their children pay for 
housing.) Farmer I’s father earns about 700-800 yuan per month - including 400 yuan 
as a guard for a residential neighborhood and 300-400 yuan for helping the township 
government collect taxes - in addition to his regular income from pension and from 
renting several rooms in his house. Nevertheless, Farmer I thinks that she is very 
lucky because most young urban residents cannot afford to buy such nice apartments.      
A different interpretation of the intention of the township government in 
implementing this affordable apartments program is that it also wants to make money 
out of it. Since the cost of construction is approximately 800 yuan/m2 for this type of 
apartments and that the village does not need to pay land conveyance fees for its own 
 283 
land, there is a considerable margin of profit even if all other costs are taken into 
account.  
Incidentally, Dragon City, like most other small Chinese cities, does not have any 
of the three types of affordable housing described in Chapter 3. (The so-called “AAP 
apartments”, built in the late 1990s, were actually sold mostly to the middle class, and 
therefore were not “affordable housing” in its usual sense.) Dragon’s county 
government has allowed, though perhaps unintentionally, the informal market to 
provide housing, typically on land zoned for industrial use, for low-income groups 
through “edge ball” projects, as indicated in Chapter 5. This has turned out to be a 
desirable arrangement. Had the county government kept this role to itself, it would 
have been unlikely to have as much affordable housing. It is a usual practice in China 
that affordable housing is provided to a city’s permanent residents only. In Dragon, 
the “permanent residents” mainly include those working in the public sector and those 
from the urbanized villages. These people typically do not have serious housing 
problems. Those who need affordable housing the most are actually the so-called 
“mobile” population, i.e. those who have come to Dragon City from the rural villages 
or other, less developed regions. They typically work in the private sector and do not 
have official permanent resident status of the city.  
Generating jobs  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the majority of a farmer’s income is from sources 
other than farming. According to the estimates by local farmers, more than 80% of the 
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rural households do not depend on agriculture for their living. For many families, 
agriculture is only for the provision of grain or crop fuels.  
In the past, when Dragon City was small and under-developed, most rural 
workers went to Neighboring County A, which had been developed much earlier than 
Dragon County, and Phoenix City to work as construction workers or in foreign 
ventures. However, employment opportunities were limited, and it was not convenient 
to commute between home and work. The situation has changed dramatically in 
recent years, largely due to the rapid urbanization process spurred by land conversion.  
The real estate business itself has provided many jobs. In general, real estate 
development can be divided into three stages: preliminary land development, main 
construction activities, and interior furnishing. During preliminary land development, 
the relevant infrastructure needs to be put in place, such as roads, water pipes and 
power supply. The construction of buildings requires not just construction workers 
and carpenters, but also raw materials such as brick and iron & steel. Moreover, 
interior furnishing has been a booming business in Dragon. Typically, each urban 
household spends tens of thousands of yuan on the interior furnishing of their 
apartments. This requires furnishing workers and various kinds of raw materials such 
as wooden products, brick products, glass, alloy, kitchenware, toilet products, and 
heating pipes, etc. Therefore, the amount of jobs generated for the design, 
construction and furnishing of buildings and for the manufacturing of raw materials is 
very large. In addition, the real estate business has stimulated related services, such as 
housing sales agents and raw materials sales agents. In effect, the real estate business 
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has served to set the local economy going. As Urban Resident A describes the 
situation, 
In the past, each household typically put all its savings in banks, because there 
was no way for individuals to spend money. Now, many people have bought new 
and larger apartments. (Since their own savings are not sufficient,) some have 
borrowed money from their relatives or friends, some from banks. Most of the 
people I know do not have much money left in banks.      
It is not difficult to figure out what such an influx of investment means to local 
growth and job creation.  
The enterprises attracted to the city through investment promotion have also 
provided many employment opportunities for rural and urban workers, as described in 
Chapter 4. According to the local interviewees, as long as one is willing to work hard, 
it is usually not difficult to find a job that pays better than farming. The problem is 
that many locally born young people are not willing to take the jobs that require them 
to work too hard. Many jobs that require manual hard work are actually taken up by 
young people coming from the northeastern provinces, which are much less 
developed than Dragon County.  
A typical example is Village H, which has 340 households. Approximately 60 
percent of all villagers still engage in agricultural production, but only 30 percent at a 
maximum rely on agriculture as an important source of income. Some villagers work 
in the enterprises that rent land from the village, because there is an agreement 
between the enterprises and the village that people from the village have priority in 
getting hired. Some work in other enterprises located in Dragon City. In addition, 
many engage in transportation services, including privately owned public transport 
(such as mini-bus and taxi) and freight transport. In total, the village has 170 
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transportation vehicles. On average, one out of every two households has a vehicle.  
Some urbanized villages, such as Village E and Village F, have created 
considerable employment opportunities by themselves. The leaders of these villages 
are either exceptionally capable or have a relatively strong sense of responsibility 
towards villagers. They use the villages’ collective financial resources to run village 
businesses, and are doing very well. The party secretary of Village F, for example, ran 
a small village enterprise at the beginning, which has developed into one of the largest 
real estate enterprises in Dragon by now.  
Another example to show the contribution of informal land conversions to local 
economic development is the private professional school owned by Developer C 
mentioned in Chapter 9. The school was established in 2003 by acquiring land 
directly from Village H, and did not obtain official land use approval until 2006. The 
school now has more than 2,000 students, and benefits many people. First, it provides 
an opportunity for many junior middle school graduates from Dragon and other 
regions to receive further education. In China, all students are entitled to receiving 
nine years of education (i.e. primary school and junior middle school education). 
However, not all junior middle school graduates are qualified to continue formal 
education. Second, the school provides a number of short- and long-term jobs for 
farmers from Village H and nearby villages, including construction workers, chefs, 
drivers, and cleaning workers, etc. The school’s retail store, which is contracted to a 
farmer from Village H, is a good business that sells to a large student body. Local 
hotels and restaurants also benefit, because parents sometimes come to visit the 
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school from other regions. On weekends, students often need to take a mini-bus or 
taxi to go to the downtown, which is a few kilometers away, thus providing more jobs.         
In general, the investment promotion efforts by the county have helped Dragon 
City open up to the outside. In the city, one can hear all sorts of accents, because 
people have come from all over China to work in the city. As several interviewees 
observe, in the past, people flocked to Shenzhen254 for employment opportunities; but 
now, many young people from the northeastern and other less developed regions 
come to Dragon to do business or seek job opportunities. Within the old downtown 
area, there is even a Wenzhou Industrial Park, where all the business people from 
Wenzhou, a Chinese city whose people are famous for being good at doing business, 
locate their companies.   
Despite the success of investment promotion, Dragon County’s job market has 
two problems. The first problem is that the wage level is relatively low. Typically, a 
30-year-old worker with nine years of formal school education earns 600-1,200 yuan 
per month, which is much better than farming but 2-3 times lower than the salaries of 
civil servants and teachers. Therefore, young people who wish to receive higher 
wages have to go to larger cities or even foreign countries. For example, since the 
1990s, many young farmers in Dragon County have worked in South Korea, Japan 
and Singapore. These countries offer a special type of visa to enable young Chinese 
farmers to work in their countries for several years. Although they typically have to 
work very long hours, the payment they receive is as high as 10,000-30,000 yuan per 
                                                        
254 As mentioned before, Shenzhen is a new city built by the Chinese government in the 1980s to attract foreign 
investment. 
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month, depending on which country they go to and what type of jobs they do. One 
interviewee’s sister worked in Korea for several years. Her job was dish washing in a 
restaurant, and the payment was more than 10,000 yuan per month. Another 
interviewee, who was a welding technician, worked in Japan for one year in 2007, and 
earned more than 20,000 yuan per month. This level of payment is very attractive to 
young Chinese farmers. However, since the second half of 2008, there has been a 
dramatic decline in the demand for such “imported” labor by these countries due 
mainly to the global financial crisis.  
Of course, the proportion of young people working in big cities or foreign 
countries is small. Most people stay in Dragon County. Therefore, the supply of 
highly-paid jobs always falls short of demand, which explains why the wage level is 
so low. The recent financial crisis has had a strong impact on the county’s job market. 
As foreign demand declines, many export-oriented Chinese enterprises, such as 
electric appliances companies and food processing companies, are having a difficult 
time. As mentioned before, there are also a number of foreign ventures in Dragon 
County, which enjoy preferential treatment regarding tax and fees payment. However, 
these enterprises have suffered the most. By the beginning of 2009, more than ten 
foreign enterprise owners had stopped their production lines and left the county. 
Therefore, many people who used to work in the city have lost jobs and returned to 
their homes in the villages. 
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 Increasing the value of farmers’ housing 
Due to rapid urbanization spurred by widespread land conversion, the value of 
farmers’ houses has increased dramatically. As mentioned in Chapter 1, all the 
households of a village live in a concentrated area. Each household receives a land 
parcel of 12×16 m2 on average (with some variations), on which they build houses by 
themselves. Usually, five to six attached households form a unit. A village is 
composed of many such units, laid out in rows and blocks (See Figure 6).   
A traditional-type house for a rural household typically includes four rooms on 
the north, two to three rooms on the south, and an open court in the center (See Figure 
17). Since land value has increased dramatically in Dragon City in recent years, most 
households in the urbanized villages (i.e. Villages A-G on Map 4) have re-built their 
houses in such a way that there is little or no open court left. This is particularly true 
for houses facing main streets or avenues.  
 











Most of the houses have one story only, but there are also some gigantic two- or 
three-story houses. Farmers are generally free to build large one-story houses, but 
two-story or higher houses are, in principle, no longer allowed in the urbanized 
villages for two reasons: First, since all houses are attached to others, it does not look 
good if rich farmers build multiple-story houses while poor ones do not. Higher 
houses also block the views and sunlight of the lower ones – which has actually been 
a major source of conflicts among farmers in many villages. Second, and more 
importantly, it is foreseeable that, as the city continues to grow and land value keeps 
increasing, it would become economically desirable sooner or later to convert 
low-density farmers’ houses into higher-density residential or commercial buildings. 
When this happens, the farmers will have to be re-located, and compensation paid to 
them. The current local policy in Dragon is that the compensation paid to the existing 
house owners will be assessed according to market housing prices and the number of 
rooms or floor area of the existing houses or buildings. Therefore, in order to avoid 
paying too much compensation in the future, the county government forbids 
multiple-story houses in these urbanized villages.    
Most of the existing multi-story houses were built in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Many of the owners of these gigantic houses are actually not native to these 
villages. In the late 1990s, when Dragon City was expanding eastwards to the coast, 
many people who worked in the city saw the potential benefits of becoming “official” 
villagers of these villages, and transferred their Hu Kou (which, as mentioned before, 
is one’s “official” permanent address) to these villages. In order to solve housing 
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problems for these people, the villages sold residential lots to them as well as to some 
existing villagers who wanted to build larger houses. The villages were keen on this, 
because they could make some money out of it. In Village A, for example, several 
dozen such houses were built, and many of them have three stories and are worth at 
least 1 million yuan by now.      
Almost all the owners of these one- or multi-story houses have rooms to rent. 
Room renting is very popular because, as mentioned, the prices of housing have 
increased dramatically in the past 6-7 years. Many low-income people working or 
doing business in the city who cannot afford to buy their own homes choose to rent 
housing.  
The rental rate of a room ranges from about 100 yuan to more than 1,000 yuan 
per month, depending on location, size and the quality of interior furnishing. (It is 
mentioned in Chapter 5 that many new apartments bought for speculation purpose are 
left unoccupied. However, the farmers’ houses are more popular because their rental 
rates are lower.) Some households receive more than 2,000 yuan per month from 
renting their houses. Each household in Village A, B and C receives at least a few 
hundred yuan. Houses not facing main roads or streets are usually rented for 
residences, while those facing main roads or streets are rented for commercial uses 
such as construction materials stores, restaurants, mobile phone stores, barbers, 
groceries, glassware stores, and homemaking materials stores, etc.  
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3. Unintended consequences of investment promotion through land conversion 
The investment promotion efforts by the local governments have also produced 
some unintended effects. One major problem is tax evasion by the enterprises 
attracted to the county. As described in Chapter 4, Dragon’s county government 
provides preferential tax policies for new or foreign enterprises as a means of 
attracting investment. However, many enterprises take advantage of the loopholes in 
this policy. For example, some old enterprises have “transformed” themselves into 
“new” enterprises through internal reform or by establishing new operations with new 
names, which is a tactic called “cicada sloughing off its shell” by Sun Tzu in his 
famous book Sun Tzu on the Art of War meaning “creating a false appearance to 
mislead the enemy”. Likewise, some Chinese enterprises transformed themselves into 
“foreign” enterprises in order to receive favorable treatment with regards to urban 
construction taxes, education surtax and land use taxes, which foreign companies 
were not required to pay before 2007 according to Dragon’s local policy.        
Large companies usually have plants in more than one location, and it is natural 
for them to devise tax management strategies such that they pay as little taxes as 
possible. For example, they can “make” their profits occur in locations where local 
tax polices are most favorable. Many large companies are capable of doing this 
because they supply most of the parts or even raw materials by themselves for their 
final products, and therefore can manipulate their records of costs and benefits. In 
order to encourage tax payment, Dragon has a local policy to allow a portion of the 
taxes paid by an enterprise to be returned to the enterprise. These returned taxes are 
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called “bonus”, which is meant to be a reward to enterprises for their contribution to 
local economic growth. However, the rate of such returns is confidential and only 
known to the leaders of the county government and the managers of the affected 
companies. This, of course, is a potential source of corruption. 
Moreover, some enterprises attracted to Dragon have even had a negative impact. 
The best-known case is Fiber & Cloth Making Company A. The company, whose 
main manufacturing facilities are located in County B of Province X, established a 
factory in the Dragon EDZ in 1996. Dragon did not benefit much from the tax 
payment by the company, because the latter made most of its tax payment to County 
B where tax policies were more favorable. The main problem with this company, 
however, was not its tax payment, but the wastewater it discharged into River A. The 
water pollution and smell created by the plant were so serious that there were loud 
complaints from the residents living nearby. Eventually, the county government had to 
shut down the plant in 2006. This company did not lose, because it received a large 
amount of compensation for the land and other properties.  
Fiber and Cloth Company A is not an isolated case. Most of the enterprises that 
came to Dragon in the 1990s were relatively small in size, and some caused serious 
environmental problems. Since the city tightened environmental regulations a few 
years ago, a number of these enterprises have been relocated to the suburban 
townships. For example, in Village T, which is adjacent to the capital of Township D, 
a considerable amount of land is occupied by polluting enterprises, mainly rubber and 
leather factories that are no longer allowed in Dragon City. The same situation also 
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applies to some villages close to the capital of Township E. In the townships, 
environmental standards are lower, and the cost of labor is less. Moreover, these 
enterprises receive great hospitality from the township governments because, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the ability to attract investment is an important criterion used 
by the county government to assess the performance of township officials. However, 
some enterprises in the townships have also adopted strategies to evade tax payment, 
in the same way as the large ones in Dragon City. For instance, Dragon County has 
had a local policy since the early 1990s that export-oriented enterprises (EOEs) are 
eligible for favorable tax rates or even tax exemption. Therefore, many enterprise 
owners use their Guan Xi to obtain “EOE” status in order to save on taxes.  
These unintended effects are not necessarily attributable to the informal nature of 
land use per se. However, they illustrate the point that, although the informal land 
market makes the land system more responsive to local needs, it is clearly necessary, 
from the perspective of policy makers, to regulate informal land conversions for the 
good of the society. Otherwise, as will be explained later, the majority of the benefits 
from these informal land conversions will go to enterprise owners or local 
governments, whereas the environmental and social costs of the investment are borne 




4. Crackdowns by higher-level governments 
Although informal land conversions play a critical role in promoting growth, the 
MLR will organize crackdown campaigns from time to time – the reasons for which 
have been explained in Chapter 8. This section will describe two such crackdowns, in 
2003 and 2007 respectively, and discuss their impacts on Dragon County.  
 During the first crackdown in 2003, a number of informal land conversion cases 
were identified, and the developers involved were “penalized” by being forced to pay 
fines. The penalty, however, turned out to be a blessing for these developers, because 
their projects were granted “legal” status, as a natural consequence, after the fines had 
been paid. The amount of fines usually accounted for a minor portion of the actual 
benefits from the land conversions, and was often negotiable. Local government 
officials received no serious penalty of any kind.  
Therefore, the 2003 crackdown was a de facto amnesty for “illegal” land users. It 
is easily conceivable that an amnesty was perhaps the best strategy the national 
government could think of. Given the fact that informal land conversions had been so 
widespread, it would have been practically impossible to impose heavier penalties 
because, as an old Chinese saying goes, “the law cannot punish the public” (Fa Bu Ze 
Zhong). The MLR might be hoping, secretly, that, by granting an amnesty, it could 
enforce the developable land quota system more easily from then on, because it might 
then become practically possible to punish new violators, whose numbers would 
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presumably be much smaller. A direct result of the 2003 crackdown, however, was 
that more informal land conversions were encouraged, because people presumed that 
another amnesty would be given again sooner or later. Therefore, informal land 
conversions remained prevalent in Dragon and across the country after 2003.      
The second major crackdown campaign by the national government was more 
serious. In 2007, the MLR selected 90 cities, most of which were located in the 
economically advanced eastern regions where the demand for developable land was 
the greatest, to inspect their performance on farmland protection. Dragon was one of 
the cities selected.  
The objective of the 2007 crackdown was to identify “illegal” conversions of 
prime farmland and demolish the “illegal” buildings resulting from these conversions. 
The MLR compared satellite pictures taken in 2003 and 2007 respectively to identify 
land use changes on prime farmland during this period. However, not all the land use 
changes identified in this way were illegal, because some had been approved officially 
and some caused by uncontrollable reasons. Also, in many areas of Dragon County, 
farmers had built greenhouses to grow vegetables, which appeared to have caused 
land use changes on satellite pictures. Therefore, the MLR had to rely on Dragon’s 
county government to figure out which changes were legal and which were not. The 
county government designated a vice mayor to be responsible for the campaign, 
assisted by the BLR, the BOC and the Bureau of Public Security.  
Dragon’s county and township governments were in an awkward position during 
the campaign, because many of the informal land conversions since 2003 actually had 
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received permission from them. In such cases, the county government had to 
compensate the investors for their economic loss. However, it was obvious that the 
county government, facing financial pressure itself, was not capable of paying 
sufficient compensation if all the illegal buildings were to be demolished. Moreover, 
such compensation could seldom be in cash, because it was obviously in violation of 
government rules to make such payments out of the official budget. Conceivably, the 
compensation would include promises of personal favors to be provided by local 
governments in the future. Thus, it was in the best interest of the county government 
to devote much effort to lobbying higher-level governments in order to have as much 
leeway as possible during the execution of the campaign.  
On the other hand, the county government understood very well that it would not 
be able to get away easily this time unless it could convince higher-level governments 
about its “conscientiousness” in carrying out the crackdown. Therefore, it had to make 
some real efforts to assert its “support” for the policy. Although “covert” disobedience 
to central policies is a most salient feature of a top-down political system, “overt” 
resistance is seldom, if ever, a smart strategy for local officials who are most 
concerned about their personal political career. 
As expected, the crackdown campaign met with strong resistance from the 
affected land users. Most of the illegal buildings were located at the outskirts of 
Dragon city and of the township capitals. Some buildings were demolished, but most 
were kept. Which buildings were to be kept and which demolished depended on the 
personal relations of individual land users with local officials, and on whether a 
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building was a visible target that could be noticed easily by the inspectors from 
higher-level governments. In some cases, local governments and land users 
cooperated to avert the national policy. Local Official A comments that,  
There is always a way for a local government to avert national policies… 
Suppose a factory has workshops covering approximately 1,000 m2 and a walled 
open court covering 2000 m2. The factory could demolish the walls only and 
reclaim the court into farmland, so that it would look as if the factory has been 
demolished. (The factory’s operation would not be affected significantly, since the 
workshops are kept.)  
 It was apparent that the higher-level governments actually did not expect all 
illegal buildings to be demolished, and the amount of illegal buildings that had to be 
demolished depended on the extent to which they were satisfied with the efforts made 
by the local governments to execute the policy. As Local Official A comments,   
I do not think they actually expected all of the buildings to be demolished 
(because they knew very clearly that it was impossible), but they might, secretly, 
have set a minimum percentage (below which they would assume that the local 
governments had not tried hard.)  
The greatest resistance to the campaign came from the farmers who had built 
workshops or houses on their own land or on land leased directly from villages. A 
typical example involved Township H, one of the most developed townships in 
Dragon County located to the north of Dragon City. The farmers living close to the 
township capital have a national reputation for being good at manufacturing textile 
machinery. They built workshops or large houses on land leased from villages, and 
were doing well with their businesses. They were angry after being told that their 
buildings were illegal and had to be demolished. Local Official F observes that,  
These farmers were very angry for a good reason. Last year, they were praised by 
the government for having set up a model for building up “New Socialist 
Countryside”255, and their success stories were televised on the county’s official 
                                                        
255 Which is a national program whose objective is to improve the living standard of farmers.  
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television. Just one year later, the government went there to tell them that their 
buildings were actually illegal and had to be demolished. The farmers were not 
only angry, but also puzzled by the government’s dramatic change of heart.   
The confrontation between the local governments and the affected farmers during the 
crackdown became very severe. The county government had to send the police in 
some cases to take down illegal buildings by force. Farmers threatened local officials 
responsible for the crackdown by saying that they would do “anything” to protect 
their properties. It was no joke, because some farmers had invested their lifetime 
savings in these buildings, and some had borrowed money from relatives. Therefore, 
the local governments were very concerned about potential escalation of the 
confrontation, which was likely to result in injuries or even deaths.  
It was thus not surprising that most of the buildings had to be allowed to remain. 
For example, in Village L, most of the houses built on prime farmland were fined 15 
yuan for every m2 of land area occupied, and were allowed to continue to exist. Even 
so, the owners of the houses were very displeased. Farmer E comments that,  
The construction of these houses had been encouraged by the township 
government. The project had been regarded as an “investment promotion project”. 
Some of the owners of these houses had even received a certificate from the 
township government for their contribution (to the local economy) and an award 
of 5,000 yuan. They did not understand why the government had changed their 
mind so soon, and were puzzled about who should represent the government. I 
heard that the relevant township leaders were “punished” for their lack of 
supervision by being assigned to similar positions in other townships…      
As a usual practice, some county-level leaders had to be “scapegoats” in order to 
show that the campaign had achieved expected outcome. A Vice Major, a former Vice 
Mayor, and the Director of the County BLR each received party’s disciplinary 
warnings; but, other than that, their political careers were not affected. As a matter of 
fact, the county government of Dragon was thought to have done such an excellent 
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job in cooperating with the higher authorities during the crackdown campaign that the 
Director of the County BLR was invited to a national land administration conference - 
as the representative of a “model” county for land administration - to introduce the 
successful experiences of Dragon County in implementing national land policies.  
From a national perspective, the 2007 crackdown campaign issued a serious 
deterrent, but could not be effective in correcting informal land conversions, for 
several reasons: First, only fewer than 100 out of at least 600-700 Chinese cities were 
inspected during the campaign. Second, the campaign targeted informal conversion of 
prime farmland only, whereas other types of informal conversion were unaffected. 
Third, the national government had to rely on local governments to execute the 
crackdown. The incentives of local governments to cooperate became weaker level by 
level down, allowing for much room for lobbying. In addition, local governments 
could always figure out ways to avert national policies.  
 This crackdown campaign was also incapable of demonstrating the 
“determination” of the national government to implement the farmland protection 
policy in a strict manner. It is easily conceivable that if the national government had 
been really determined, a much more effective way would have been to hold local 
mayors and party secretaries accountable, and remove them from office if necessary. 
The fact that this was not done showed, again, that the national government wanted to 
continue to leave some leeway for local governments.        
From a local perspective, the campaign had some consequences. First, it created 
social tension between the affected land users and the government. Second, it had a 
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negative impact on Dragon’s local economic and financial situation. Third, it was 
likely that the county and township governments promised personal favors to some 
existing users so as to take down their buildings in order to fulfill the requirements by 
the national government. This might give rise to corruption problems in the future. 
Fourth, the political careers of the relevant local officials were not affected, but the 
campaign served as a deterrent against informal conversion of farmland. In the future, 
incidence of informal farmland conversion is expected to be significantly lower, but 
will depend on people’s assessment of the probability that they may get away and the 
level of potential benefits they can receive from such land conversion. Conceivably, 
this crackdown will effectively deter small developers or farmers who do not have 
strong backing from local governments. Therefore, a direct result may be that land 
supply will become more scarce in the future, allowing only those with strong 
political backing - and thus lower risks - to engage in informal land conversion and 
receive even greater benefits.      
 
5. Summary  
 The informal land market in Dragon has been critical for the rapid economic 
growth of Dragon County in recent years. Local government leaders, developers, 
villages, farmers and urban residents all benefit from informal land conversion.  
Two crackdown campaigns by the national government, in 2003 and 2007 
respectively, had different consequences - the former being largely nominal, and the 
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latter more decisive and serious - but neither stopped, or was meant to stop, informal 
land conversion.        
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CHAPTER 11 EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY CONSEQUENCES 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the efficiency and equity consequences of the Chinese 
land conversion process, and concludes that, given the existing political institutions, 
the land system functions reasonably well as far as economic efficiency is concerned, 
but is highly inequitable.  
 
2. Concepts of efficiency and equity 
 Efficiency and equity are the two policy objectives of land administration. They 
are interwoven rather than separate. This section explains these two concepts and their 
relationship.    
Efficiency 
As mentioned in the Preface, efficiency means putting land to its highest and best 
use. The concept of efficiency for land use is based on that of “land rent”, which was 
explained by Ricardo in terms of differences in land fertility in Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation (1817). In the Ricardian theory, there is a fixed total supply of 
land, but the land varies widely in quality, relative to the purpose. It is the differences 
in quality that give rise to the rents. 
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Von Thunen (1826) developed a complementary land rent theory that explained 
rent in terms of locational differences with respect to a central market. Figure 18 
shows the land rent gradients of commercial, residential and agricultural land uses. To 
the left of distance A, land should be put to commercial use which produces the 
highest land rent; whereas to the right of distance B, land should be used for 
agricultural purpose. In other words, if market price could accurately reflect the value 
of land, land should be put to the use that gives the highest market price.  
Of course, this is an over-simplified model based heavily on agricultural 
productivity in Ricardo’s case and transport considerations in Von Thunen’s case. In 
reality, land value is affected by many other factors, such as the quality of the 
neighborhood, and proximity to public transport, parks, good schools, or beaches, etc. 
Moreover, in a dynamic world, land value changes over time. What appears to be the 
highest and best use at one time may turn out to be inefficient over the long term.   
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In general, public dialogues regarding distributive justice revolve around the 
categories of equality, need, desert, and choice.256 However, there is no consensus 
among philosophers regarding an appropriate balancing of all these factors and what 
distributive justice really is.257 
Utilitarians are concerned with the maximization of the total benefits, not the 
distribution. The maximization of benefits may require taking away from someone 
and giving to someone else. Individual people are means, not ends. Rights are not 
necessarily inviolable, except in so far as they promote a greater total good. The 
implication of this view for land conversion is that the interest of some people can be 
sacrificed for a larger public interest.  
Libertarian liberals, such as Kant and Nozik, think individuals cannot be 
sacrificed for the sake of a general good. People are treated unjustly if their rights are 
violated. In their view, if the original acquisition of a holding is right, and the transfer 
is right, then the subsequent acquisition of that holding is just, and no one else is 
entitled to that holding. The implication of this view for land conversion is that if the 
process is just, then the result is justified.  
Egalitarian liberals, such as Rawls 258 , think that inequality can lead to 
stigmatization and unfairness in the political process, and therefore public policies 
should favor the least advantaged. The implication of this view for land conversion in 
                                                        
256 Bill Galston (2002) 
257 The summary of philosophical views in this section draws on John Arthur and William H. Shaw (1991);  Jean 
Hampton (1997); and James Rachels (2002)  
258 John Rawls (1971) 
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the Chinese context is that farmers, or the economically disadvantaged, are entitled to 
preferential treatment. 
Some philosophers, such as Rachels, think that, in determining whether people 
are treated justly, we need to consider both rights and what people deserve.259 They 
think that what people deserve depends on their past actions. The implication of this 
view for land conversion is that the owners of land are not entitled to all the increment 
in land prices, which is largely due to urbanization.  
Relationship between efficiency and equity  
From a societal perspective, land use efficiency requires that the aggregate rents 
of all land shall be the highest over time. However, land use has “externalities” i.e. 
land use in one area may affect the value of land in other areas. For example, a landfill 
may lower the value of its neighboring residential land, whereas a park does the 
opposite. Therefore, various governments typically use planning as a tool to regulate 
land use.  
However, in his 1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost”, Ronald Coase argued 
that, if property rights are clearly defined and there are no transaction costs, a private 
market can in fact deal with externalities. If one is negatively affected by the action 
(i.e. an “externality”) of another, the former can always pay the latter to stop it. Such 
bargaining will always lead to efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of 
property rights. So, at least in theory, the main problem of externalities may be equity 
                                                        
259 Rachels (2002) 
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rather than efficiency. In practice, the Coase Theorem often does not hold because 
some externalities involve so many parties with poorly defined property rights that 
trading through Coasian bargaining becomes impossible. Nevertheless, a private 
market is capable of addressing at least some local externalities. Therefore, it is 
desirable for government to clarify property rights and create institutions that 
minimize transaction costs so as to allow misallocation of resources to be corrected as 
cheaply as possible.    
The Coase Theorem also applies to the trading of land use rights between farmers 
and developers during the land conversion process. A developer can buy land use 
rights from a farmer so as to put the latter’s land to a higher and better use. Coasian 
bargaining will make both parties benefit and lead to efficient allocation of land 
resources, provided that trading in land use rights is possible and there are no 
transaction costs. In reality, the bargaining process is more complex because it 
typically involves intervention by planning authorities. In the Chinese context, the 
government serves as the agent between developers and farmers. As described before, 
it buys land at fixed prices from farmers, but allows developers to bargain with it. 
(This monopoly power by the government may be changed soon. As mentioned, the 
CCP central committee just passed a resolution in October 2008 to allow some 
collectively owned lands to enter into the land market directly. This will be discussed 
in Chapter 12.) The following section will discuss the effects of this process.             
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3. Efficiency and equity consequences of the Chinese land conversion process 
This section summarizes the efficiency and equity consequences of the Chinese 
land conversion process from the following aspects: land supply control, informal 
land market, land speculation, quality of land use plans, information asymmetry, 
competitiveness of the land market, Guan Xi networks, and the complicated 
procedures for seeking development permission, etc. 
 
3.1 Land supply control 
As suggested earlier, the reason for the state to control land supply is that the 
externalities (whether negative or positive) of various land uses are often not captured 
by market rent prices. This is illustrated in Figure 19.260 Suppose the total amount of 
land available (AB) is divided by two uses, urban and rural. (For simplification, this 
ignores quality and transportation differences among different pieces of land.) The 
market demand curve for urban use is D-urban, and the market demand curve for rural 
land is D-rural. If left to the market without government intervention, the efficient 
market equilibrium will be C: the amount of land for urban use will be AC, and the 
amount of land for rural use will be BC.  
                                                        
260 Figures 19, 22, 23 and 25 are used in Evans (2004a) 
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Figure 19 Effects of the Externalities of Land Use 
 
However, land use has externalities. For example, farming contributes to food 
self-sufficiency, employment in the agricultural sector, prevention of urban sprawl, 
and protection of rural and environmental amenities, etc. 261  If these positive 
externalities were internalized, the demand curve for rural land in Figure 19 would 
become D’-rural. Urban land uses contribute to local fiscal revenue, generate 
employment opportunities, and ease housing prices in cities, etc., but may also lead to 
pollution and traffic congestion. Suppose the net externalities of urban land use are 
positive and, if internalized, shift the demand curve of urban land use to D’-urban. 
Therefore, the amount of land for urban uses should be AC’, and the amount of land 
for rural uses should be BC’. In reality, of course, most of these externalities of land 
use cannot be internalized in market land prices, so there is a need for the state to 
allocate the amount of land for different uses. China’s farmland protection policy can 
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be seen in this light. In theory, it is an effort by China’s policy makers to try to 
achieve land use efficiency through imposing a limit on the amount of developable 
land and thereby correcting market failures in allocating land resources.    
Efficiency consequences 
Figure 20 shows the effect of land supply control. (Again, this is a simplified 
model, based heavily on transportation considerations and ignores differences in land.) 
It restricts the amount of land permitted for urban uses to OY2, and raises the price of 
urban land from P1 to P2. The key question for policy makers to consider is how much 
OY2 should be, or how large the difference between P2 and P1 should be.  
 
Figure 20 Effect of Land Supply Control 
 
Theoretically, this can be calculated. An efficient outcome of land conversion 
requires that  
Rent of urban land (P2) + Net benefits of the externalities of urban land uses = 
Rent of agricultural land (P1) + Net benefits of the externalities of agricultural 
land uses 
Therefore, (P2 – P1) should be equal to the net benefits of the externalities of 













Regrettably, most externalities are extremely difficult – if possible at all – to 
quantify. Although economists may use certain methods such as Contingent Valuation 
Models to estimate the benefit and cost of some externalities, the results of such 
estimates are almost always controversial. In all likelihood, a giant model devised for 
the purpose of determining a land supply control target for a large country like China 
would be too complex and controversial to be of much - if any - practical value to 
policy makers. Moreover, each local area is a special case, so a model is needed for 
each place.    
Thus, although there is a theoretical basis for land supply control, it is impossible 
in practice to base such policies on a scientific analysis. Consequently, policy makers 
end up having to determine a land control target in a highly arbitrary manner. For the 
same reason, it is impossible for this dissertation to evaluate in an accurate manner 
whether the Chinese farmland protection objective is set at a reasonable level.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the market values of urban and agricultural 
lands at the urban fringe. This, as said, may not enable the dissertation to draw a firm 
conclusion regarding whether the farmland protection target is too tight or too loose, 
but will provide a background for a discussion of the efficiency consequences of the 
other aspects of the land conversion process.       
In Dragon, the market prices of land for real estate development were at least 
600,000 yuan/mu for any location at the urban fringe of Dragon City in 2005. (This is 
a very conservative estimate. Actually, in most locations in the Dragon EDZ, the 
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prices have been more than 1.5 million yuan per mu since 2006.) As mentioned, the 
duration of the use right to the land auctioned for real estate development is typically 
50-70 years. Assuming a low discount rate of 0.03 and 70 years of use right, the 
annual net income from the land is at least 20,000 yuan per mu.262    
As regards the value of farmland, there can be two measures. One is the net 
income from farming, which, as described in Chapter 2, is about 600 yuan/mu at most 
in Dragon County. According to this measure, the price difference between land for 
real estate development and farmland is about 30 times (i.e. 20,000 yuan/mu divided 
by 600 yuan/mu) at least. It should be noted that, when the farmers in Dragon County 
say that their net income from farming is 600 yuan/mu, they typically do not regard 
their own labor as a cost. Otherwise, their net income from farming will be even less. 
Another measure of the value of farmland is leasing prices, which, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, are usually less than 300 yuan/mu in Dragon County. According to this 
measure, the price difference between land for real estate development and farmland 
is at least 60-70 times (i.e. 20,000 yuan/mu divided by 300 yuan/mu). This creates 
presumption, if not proof, of inefficiency. 
The case study in Dragon also shows that land supply control has had two other 
visible effects: First, it has had a significant impact on people’s expectations about 
future land scarcity, leading to widespread speculation on land and housing. As 
described in Chapter 5, many apartments are left unoccupied, which is clearly 
inefficient.  
                                                        
262 Assuming a discount rate of 0.05 and 70 years of use right, the annual net income from the land would be at 
least 30,000 yuan per mu. 
 313 
Second, it serves to prevent urban sprawl. Most new developments are 
concentrated in Dragon City and the township capitals. There are not many scattered 
or leapfrog developments except in Industrial Park A and B. Commercial, residential 
and retail developments are usually mixed, thereby reducing the need for 
transportation. Except in villages, there are hardly any single-family houses on large 
lots. Given China’s land scarcity, such compactness of development can be viewed as 
an indication of efficiency, because it promotes high-density development and saves 
land for higher and better uses in the future. Three factors seem to have contributed to 
such relatively compact development: First, informal land conversions have to occur 
at locations close to Dragon City or the township capitals. Otherwise, they would be 
too visible and thus become easy targets for crackdown by higher-level governments. 
Second, most investors and developers would not choose to locate their projects at 
isolated sites, which usually lack public infrastructure (such as tap water, power and 
sewer system) and related services. Third, single-family housing is, in principle, 
forbidden by the national government due to land scarcity. This, however, should not 
be construed as meaning that there is no low-density development in Dragon. As will 
be discussed later, the density of some development projects could have been higher 
so as to make more efficient use of land. However, it is fair to say that, other things 
being equal, a land supply control is conducive to promoting high-density 
development.    
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that there are some existing international 
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studies263 dealing with the effects of land supply control on the prices of land and 
housing in other countries, such as the US, European countries, Japan, and South 
Korean. One of the most studied topics is the effect of Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) 
on land value in the US. UGB is a line that separates urban land from rural land. Land 
within UGB can be developed, while land outside the UGB may not. Its main purpose 
is to encourage compact urban development. The UGB is updated periodically in 
order to accommodate development needs. Since 1973, UGBs have been implemented 
in some US cities, particularly in the State of Oregon, which is seen as a land use 
laboratory264 and where a number of empirical studies have been conducted on the 
impacts of the UGB on land value. Nelson (1985, 1986) finds that land values outside 
the UGB were lower than inside, and Knaap (1982, 1985) concludes that the effects of 
the UGB were significant in the Portland Metropolitan Area. Knaap and Nelson (1992) 
argue that an UGB, if appropriately determined, could improve short-term efficiency, 
because information about future land use policy is capitalized into land values and 
market participants react accordingly in order to avoid bad investment decisions 
caused by lack of information about future development.265 
Of course, in addition to the UGB, there are other types of zoning requirements in 
the US. These zoning restrictions typically contribute to higher land and housing 
prices. Theoretically, they would have to – unless they are not binding. Empirical 
studies by Glaeser et al (2002, 2003) show that zoning restrictions often have a 
                                                        
263 Fischel (1990); Knaap (1992); Mori (1997); Lee (1997), P. 1072; Cheshire & Sheppard (2000), quoted by 
Evans (2004)   
264 Knapp and Nelson (1992) 
265 Knaap and Nelson (1992), P63 
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significant effect on housing supply and hence housing prices, and measures of 
zoning strictness are highly correlated with high housing prices in US cities. 
Land supply restrictions that are similar to the UGB in the US also exist in other 
countries, such as Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and the UK. In Japan, according to 
the Urban Planning Act of 1968, most cities and the surrounding areas were 
delineated into “urbanizing areas”, which should be developed within approximately 
10 years after the delineation, and “urbanization-curbing areas”, where development 
should be curbed.266 Korea also imposes stringent controls on land use. In Korea, 
only about 5 percent of the land surface is in any urban use, whether housing, 
commerce, or any other urban type.267 In particular, green belts are set aside to 
restrict urban development. This has had an impact on land value. Between 1962 and 
1993, the land prices for Korea’s 12 largest cities increased by 791 times. The average 
annual inflation adjusted increase in urban land values in Korea during this period 
was 11.3%.268 In the UK, virtually all “developments” have been subject to planning 
permission, and applying for planning permission often proves to be a lengthy and 
costly process.269 In the Netherlands, in order to prevent inundation of the land 
caused by sea erosion and sinking ground levels, the national planning authorities 
forged links with provincial and local planning authorities under which the 
municipalities act as both planning authorities and the supplier of building land at the 
                                                        
266 Mori (1998) 
267 Kim & Kim (2000), p.1162 
268 Lee (1997), P. 1072 
269 Barlow (1993); Bramley (1993); Evans (1991); Adams et al. (1992); Mori (1997) 
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local level.270  
Some existing international studies also document a large difference between the 
values of land for urban uses and those for agricultural use in these countries. For 
example, Mori (1997) notes that the difference in Japan is about 50-150 times in 1993, 
as compared with 50-400 times in the UK in the 1980s and 129 times in the southeast 
of England in 1991. Evans (1991) notes that such large differences in land values are 
a form of inefficiency, and that land supply restrictions serve to “preserve millions of 
acres unspoiled for the few and spoil the urban environment for the many”.271 He also 
notes that, as obtaining planning permissions becomes financially profitable, it leads 
to rent-seeking expenditures that results in “no useful economic benefits, only a 
deadweight loss”.272  
Equity consequences 
The distributional impacts of land supply control are not even across all the 
players in Dragon, as summarized below:  
First, farmers do not receive a fair share of the increased benefits from land 
conversion. The prices paid to farmers whose land is converted are not determined 
through bargaining, but are set by the government and stay relatively fixed at a low 
level. However, one reason why most farmers choose to defer to the government 
during compulsory land conversion is that farming is a very unattractive means of 
making a living. Some “nail” farmers may receive more by adopting appropriate 
                                                        
270 Needham (1995); Badcock (1994); Mori (1997) 
271 Evans (1991), P861 
272 Evans (1991), P869. 
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strategies. However, if too much resistance from farmers is anticipated, the local 
governments may choose to avoid certain locations or use force to suppress nail 
farmers.    
Where land is not converted due to land supply control, the farmers do not 
receive any compensation for protecting farmland. In general, the villages located 
close to Dragon City are much wealthier than those in remote areas. In particular, 
farmers in the urbanized villages have benefited from the increased value of their 
houses, because they can rent rooms to people working in the city who cannot afford 
to buy apartments. The benefits from room renting are not insignificant, but modest. 
The reason is that, as discussed in Chapter 10, the local governments forbid farmers 
from building new multiple-story houses in order to avoid paying too much 
compensation to these farmers should it become necessary to convert their houses to 
higher-density development in the future. 
The dissertation finds that working or living in the city provides psychological 
benefits for many people. Historically, there has been a large gap in the quality of life 
between cities and rural areas. Cities provide much convenience that rural areas do 
not have, such as proximity to schools, hospitals, shopping malls, and recreation 
facilities, etc. Therefore, farmers living far from Dragon City or township capitals 
look forward to urbanization. 
Second, land supply control favors big developers. Due to limited supply of land, 
the cost of establishing businesses increases for industrial developers as land is more 
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expensive. It is very difficult for small businesses to acquire land, unless they have 
Guan Xi with key officials in the local governments. On the other hand, large 
enterprises often acquire land at a low cost and receive favorable tax treatment 
because they are deemed capable of making greater contribution to local economic 
growth.  
Real estate developers are affected by land supply control in two ways. First, 
since land price is higher, they have to substitute land with capital. Second, it is 
difficult for them to have a succession of land supply so as to keep labor and manage 
cash flow more efficiently. Before the early 2000s, the land market was much less 
mature, so the real estate companies having close ties with the local governments 
were able to make a fortune with low cost and accumulate sufficient capital for future 
development. By now, the land market has become more competitive because all land 
for commercial real estate development is sold through open auctions. It is thus less 
easy for them to make large profit, even for those having close ties with the local 
government.      
Third, land supply control makes planning officials very powerful since 
development permissions are scarce. Most public officials are cautious in take bribes 
in the form of cash or valuable gifts, but are practically safe to accept certain types of 
personal favors in return for those they provide to others. The case study in Dragon 
did not attempt to investigate exchanges of personal favors between public officials 
and developers. However, it is obvious from the discussions in Chapter 9 that personal 
gains in one form or another by public officials are a natural consequence of land 
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supply control.    
Fourth, land supply control creates a public anticipation about rise in housing 
prices, leading to widespread housing speculation by Dragon’s urban residents, as 
described in Chapter 5. This contributes to sharp rises in housing prices since the late 
1990s, making housing unaffordable to low-income urban residents. On the other 
hand, many smart middle-class people have benefited significantly from housing 
speculation. 
Lastly, most of the developable land quota received by Dragon County is kept for 
Dragon City. As described in Chapter 4, each township receives some land in the EDZ 
or the two industrial parks to locate its “investment promotion projects”. Despite 
being a good way of promoting economic efficiency, this investment promotion 
model may have contributed to a widened gap between Dragon City and the remote 
townships, for two reasons: First, farmers living far from Dragon City do not have 
convenient access to employment opportunities offered by new investment. Although 
it is common for young people from remote townships to work in Dragon City, many 
people over the age of 50, particularly married women, stay at home. In contrast, 
farmers living close to Dragon City, regardless of age and gender, are much more 
likely to be employed in non-farming sectors due to more job opportunities and 
proximity to the workplace. A second reason is that the remote townships are losing 
young and educated people to Dragon City and other more advanced areas. Due to a 
lack of infrastructure and educated labor, these townships may have been caught in a 
“poverty trap”. Moreover, some of them have even become new locations of 
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heavy-polluting enterprises, as described in Chapter 10.   
 
3.2 Informal land conversions 
Figure 21 is an illustration of the workings of the informal land market in Dragon.  
The higher-level governments undertake crackdown campaigns on the informal 
market from time to time. Each campaign typically lasts for a few months, but is 
denoted by a single time (T1, T2 or T3), for simplification. The amount of land 
conversion decreases significantly following each crackdown, but increases gradually 
over time. The timing, frequency and intensity of each crackdown depend entirely on 
the wavering political will of the national government, and therefore are not 
predictable to the local governments or other local players.  
Each crackdown effort does not last for a long time for two reasons: First, The 
relevant authorities usually do not have the financial capacity or human resources to 
sustain such crackdown efforts, because non-compliance is by no means unique to 
land policy only, but is a general phenomenon across many policy areas. Once a 
critical mass of violators has been formed in multiple policy areas, it is very difficult 
and costly to crack down on all of them. Second, such crackdowns serve as a deterrent 
for potential trespassers in the future, but are not intended to eliminate the informal 
market entirely, as discussed in Chapter 10. 
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Figure 21 Illustration of the Frequency and Intensity of Crackdowns 
 
Efficiency consequences 
The efficiency consequences of the informal market are as follows: First, Guan Xi 
is partly a substitute for pricing, and provides a channel for individuals to influence 
the local governments, making a rigid planning system responsive to actual needs 
and thus more efficient. However, people have to devote much time and financial 
resources to building up and maintaining Guan Xi networks, which is very 
burdensome. Many people would definitely be better off if nobody engaged in such 
efforts. In this sense, Guan Xi networks are inefficient.  
Second, in order not to attract attention, the private parties engaging in 
speculative or “edge ball” activities often have to do silly things to assert that they are 
not doing what they are doing. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 5, some land 
speculators have built workshops that are completely useless except to help them 
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pretend that they are not what they are. This is clearly inefficient. In some cases, edge 
ball players have to develop commercial or residential projects according to the 
density requirements made for industrial use, thus preventing some land from being 
put to higher-density use.      
Third, the crackdowns, whose purpose is, in Chinese terms, to “kill a chicken to 
frighten the monkeys”, has had a negative effect on Dragon’s local economy and 
reduced the welfare of a large group of beneficiaries of informal land conversions. 
Therefore, the crackdowns are economically inefficient in themselves. A more serious 
consequence of these crackdowns is that they bring down the supply of land to lower 
levels and widen the gap between demand and supply. Insofar as the beneficiaries of 
the informal market are concerned, it is fortunate that each crackdown effort does not 
last for long due to a lack of resources and particularly of determination by the 
national government, such that the informal market may resume soon after. 
Equity consequences 
Almost all the local players have benefited from the informal land market, but to 
varying degrees. First, villages benefit from renting land to industrial enterprises. 
Other things being equal, a village’s financial situation differs tremendously 
depending on whether and how the village engages in informal land conversion, as 
discussed in Chapter 10. When informal conversion involves reserve land only, the 
village collective typically keeps all the benefits. The village leaders are supposed to 
report any earnings of the collective to the township, but are generally thought to have 
benefited personally in one way or another from informal land conversion.  
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Second, farmers benefit from the employment opportunities generated by informal 
land conversion by villages. In particular, the farmers living close to Dragon City 
have benefited the most. Wealthy villages are also able to take better care of collective 
affairs, improve infrastructure, and even provide affordable housing for farmers.  
Nevertheless, farmers are the most vulnerable players during land conversion. A first 
reason for this is that, absent an independent judicial system, farmers do not have the 
political or financial capacity to seek political protection should there be any disputes 
between them and the other players. A second reason is that individual farmers have 
to rely on capable village leaders to build up Guan Xi with the local governments in 
order to enjoy the benefits of informal land conversion. Some individual farmers do 
engage in informal land conversion themselves by building up workshops or large 
houses, but often become the easiest targets for crackdown by higher-level 
governments, for lack of political backing, as described in Chapter 10.  
Third, developers need to maintain good relations with local governments in 
order to receive permission or political protection for informal land conversion. 
Theoretically, the greater the probability of receiving development permission or 
political protection, the more time and financial resources a developer is willing to 
spend on building up Guan Xi with public officials – and vice versa. Thus, big 
developers have an advantage because they have more resources. They may not be 
always successful in trying to obtain permission or political protection, but will 
benefit in the long term from the sum of all their efforts. Small developers, on the 
other hand, are less capable of diversifying risks, and are thus constrained to devote a 
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large amount of resources to building up Guan Xi if the probability of receiving 
development permission is low.  
 Fourth, since the other players depend on their support – or at least their implied 
permission for informal land conversion, government officials typically receive 
personal favors. In addition, informal land conversion helps promote local economic 
growth and make Dragon a modern-looking city. This is an important political 
achievement for local government leaders, who are generally regarded as being 
“bold” and “capable” by their bosses at provincial and municipal governments and by 
Dragon’s local officials and developers.                       
Fifth, informal land conversions have played an essential role in building Dragon 
into a vibrant city with modern infrastructure, wide roads, and nice-looking buildings 
– which people enjoy working or living in. They also make housing more affordable. 
In particular, some low-income urban residents benefit from “edge ball” housing 
projects, which have much lower prices than “official” ones. Moreover, the people 
running restaurants or gift shops benefit from the socializing dinners or gift 
exchanging activities aimed at building up Guan Xi networks.  
Sixth, the informal land market also has inter-jurisdictional consequences. The 
jurisdictions whose political leaders are more bold and more adroit at building up 
Guan Xi with their higher-level bosses typically benefit more.  
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3.3 Land speculation 
As mentioned, the concept of “highest and best use” must be seen in a temporal 
context. What appears not to be the “highest and best use” at one time may turn out to 
be the desirable land use option from a long-term perspective. This is illustrated in 
Figure 22. Before T1, farming is the best use for land. As the city expands to the rural 
area, industrial use starts to generate higher rent than farming from T1. However, land 
may continue to be used for farming until T2 when it will be converted to residential 
use. The reason is that, as the place becomes more and more densely populated, 
residential use will eventually produce higher rent than industrial use at T3. The 
decision will depend on land speculator’s expectations of the future rents of various 
uses and his calculation – discounting rents in future years at an appropriate interest 
rate - of which use can produce the highest aggregate rent across all years, and also 
depend on the costs of one use toady changing to another use tomorrow. 
 
Figure 22 Temporal Effects of Land Use 
 
As a result of urban and economic growth, the price of land generally increases 
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higher uses; the other is higher density (i.e. land is substituted with capital). However, 
construction cannot easily be built and demolished soon after. Therefore, holding land 
out of development, in some cases through private speculation, has a role to play.  
In the Chinese system, the temporal allocation role is designed to be played by no 
one but the government. In particular, the national government does not allow 
developable land to be held idle by a private party for more than two years. However, 
as described before, this policy is not followed in Dragon and many other Chinese 
cities. In Dragon, private parties typically acquire land at low cost in the name of 
“investors” through Guan Xi. Since the land acquired in this way is usually zoned for 
industrial use, the speculators need to wait for a good opportunity in order to develop 
“edge ball” real estate projects on the land by themselves or to sell the land back to 
the government at a higher price for real estate development.     
It is fair to say that, to a large extent, the local governments in Dragon have 
allowed, though perhaps not intentionally, private parties to take over the temporal 
allocation role. In general, private land speculators have improved land use efficiency 
through saving land for higher uses. One such example is Industrial Park A, which, as 
mentioned, was planned for industrial use at the beginning but has been re-zoned for 
residential and commercial use. Most of the land in the park had been sold to 
“investors” before the re-zoning, but the park is still largely empty because most of 
the so-called “industrial investors” are actually land speculators and have saved the 
land from immediate industrial development.   
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Another example is the Dragon EDZ, which has a mixture of industrial, 
residential and commercial developments. Many of the industrial enterprises 
established in the late 1990s and the early 2000s have become “out of place” by now. 
Fiber & Cloth Making Company A and some rubber making companies, for example, 
have been shut down or relocated to suburban townships. Some enterprises, such as 
the Dragon Paper Making Company, have even affected negatively the housing prices 
of nearby neighborhoods and the quality of the life of the residents living close by, as 
will be described later. Some do not have negative externalities, but are not making 
the best use of the land, which could already be put to higher uses. In contrast, most of 
the “holes” (i.e. undeveloped land) in the EDZ are land acquired by private parties for 
speculative purpose. From an economic perspective, these holes serve to meet an 
increasing demand for residential and commercial development, due to the rapid 
expansion of the city, without requiring demolition or relocation of existing 
developments.      
In general, private parties should perform better than the government in playing 
the temporal allocation role, other things being equal. The main reason is that private 
parties have much stronger incentive than the government to maximize benefits from 
land conversion. In addition, public officials usually do not stay in the same positions 
for long, due to promotion or shifting of jobs within the government. They are 
primarily concerned with their own present political interests, rather than the interests 
of their successors in the future.  
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However, private speculators face serious constraints in trying to achieve 
efficiency. Since private land speculation is illegal, they need to wait for convenient 
opportunities to realize their profits. Sometimes, even if the timing of land conversion 
seems not to be optimal, they have to hasten their decisions simply because there is a 
“political” opportunity available. For the same reason, they may have to postpone 
their decisions at other times. To put it in a different way, the decisions of private 
speculators regarding the timing of land conversion often have to be based on when 
they can obtain sufficient support from the government through Guan Xi networks, 
not on when they think their profits will be the greatest.  
The equity consequences of land speculation in the Chinese context are also clear. 
By allowing private land speculation, local governments give away a large portion of 
the land conversion benefits to developers. The reason behind this must be that public 
officials benefit more from giving this role away to their Guan Xi than from retaining 
it for a public purpose.  
 
3.4. Effects of the quality of land use plans 
The quality of Dragon’s land use plans (i.e. the CLUP and urban plans) has 
affected efficiency and sometimes equity in two ways: a lack of a long-term vision, 
and the degree of detail.     
Lack of a long-term vision  
The importance of long-term certainty provided by land use plans can be 
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illustrated using Figure 22. A developer who is confident about the long-term plan of 
an area would choose to convert farmland to residential use at T2 in order to achieve 
long-term efficiency. Absent a long-term plan with a reasonable degree of certainty, 
the same developer may have to pursue short-term gains by choosing to convert the 
farmland at T1. 
 As described in Chapter 4, Dragon’s land use plans lack a long-term vision, and 
are subject to constant changes. Consequently, incompatible land uses are not rare in 
Dragon. Some of them are probably unavoidable, because it is impossible for planners 
to predict future demand for and supply of land in an accurate enough manner and the 
implementation of land use plans is always influenced by the political processes of a 
society. However, many of the incompatible land uses might well have not occurred if 
the county government had been more forward-looking under an improved 
institutional structure.  
Incompatibility is most evident in the Dragon EDZ, where residential and 
industrial sites are mixed. As mentioned, the current EDZ area was largely 
undeveloped before the mid-1990s. In order to promote investment, the county 
government provided much land in the EDZ to investors at low prices. By the time the 
county government made up its mind to develop a new city center on the eastern coast 
by implementing the AA1 and AA2 programs in the late 1990s, industrial sites already 
accounted for much of the land, and many of them were at some of the best locations 
in the EDZ. It is apparent that at least some of these locations should have been 
reserved for residential or commercial, rather than industrial, purposes, had the county 
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government of the time had a clearer vision about the city’s growth. As the value of 
the land occupied by these industrial enterprises has increased rapidly, it has already 
become economically desirable to convert these sites to higher uses, but this is often 
difficult because the government needs to pay a large amount of compensation to the 
existing land users in order to buy out their land use contracts.     
Perhaps the best example to illustrate the efficiency consequences of incompatible 
land uses in the Dragon EDZ is the Dragon Paper Making Company, a 
government-owned enterprise located about 1 km to the east of Main Road D on the 
northern side of Main River A. Before 1994, the company’s main manufacturing plant 
was located on the western side of Main Road B on the outskirts of the old downtown. 
As the city expanded eastwards rapidly and people became aware of the pollution 
problems caused by the plant, the county government decided to move the plant to its 
current location, which had been bought by the company from Village B at a price of 
approximately RMB 30,000 per mu. A portion of the old site was auctioned by the 
county government for real estate development in order for the company to cover the 
cost of the relocation.  
It has turned out to be a bad decision to have selected this site, which is now a 
densely populated residential area. However, at the time, the area around the site was 
almost completely empty, and the county government did not expect that it would 
decide by itself soon after to develop this area into a new downtown. After the 
relocation, the company continued to cause water and air pollution. Several years ago, 
in response to higher environmental standards and mounting complaints by the 
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residents living close by, the county government required the company to build a 
wastewater treatment plant. The plant is financed partly by the company and partly by 
the county government, and is used to treat both the company’s and municipal 
wastewater. Therefore, water pollution seems not to be a problem any longer. 
However, the smell from the pulp making process persisted for some time longer, and 
affected the value of the real estate properties in the neighboring areas to a significant 
extent. According to local residents, the prices of the apartments in the immediately 
adjacent areas of the plant were, on average, approximately 700-800 yuan/m2 lower 
than apartments in comparable locations. The apartments located on the north of the 
plant suffered the most, because the wind mostly comes from the south, which is the 
direction of the ocean. The situation has improved by now because the company has 
been buying, instead of making, pulp since 2007. Incidentally, the company’ business 
has been declining since then - partly because buying pulp is more costly than making 
it. The recent financial crisis has made the situation even worse, and many workers 
have been laid off by the company. 
Incompatible land uses like this are both an efficiency and an equity problem. It is 
an efficiency problem because the total economic value of the real properties in the 
area is lowered due to the existence of the plant. It is also an equity problem because 
an industry creates a local externality but the public has to bear the social cost. In 
theory, the paper making plant should compensate the affected neighboring 
community for their losses. However, Coasian bargaining does not occur in this case 
because the plant does not need to receive permission from the people living nearby in 
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order to discharge pollution and, as discussed in Chapter 6, the courts are almost 
useless in resolving disputes like this.    
Incompatible land uses also exist in the Affordable Apartment Program (AAP) 
area. As mentioned, the AAP apartments were built in the late 1990s by the county 
government in order to attract people to live in the EDZ. Some of the apartments face 
the beach directly. As the land value in the area skyrocketed in recent years, a number 
of high buildings with more than 12 stories have been built, dwarfing the 6-story 
apartment buildings. There are already discussions regarding whether the first two to 
three rows of the AAP apartments facing the beach shall be removed to make room 
for higher-density and higher-value commercial development. However, this seems to 
be unlikely in the near future because of the high cost of compensating the existing 
apartment owners.     
The recent planning for the “Three Urban Clusters” by Phoenix Municipality 
provides a long-term vision, and has the potential of improving land use efficiency. 
However, this long-term plan does not contain much detail and is no more than three 
circles drawn on the map. Even the county BOP officials have no idea how the 
clusters are to be developed. In addition, the plan has a very high degree of 
uncertainty, because it is impossible for Dragon to receive enough developable land 
quota to develop these areas unless the existing national land policy is changed.  
Degree of detail  
As discussed, Dragon County’s CLUP and CUP have a high level of generality 
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and vagueness. However, the Detailed Controlling Urban Plan contains such detailed 
land use requirements as types of land use, development density, building height, FAR, 
and infrastructure requirements, etc. These planning details provide some degree of 
certainty for developers and speculators, but may also reflect mistakes that require 
inefficient development actions. One example is building density and height. As 
illustrated in Figure 23, land with higher prices usually has higher development 
density and building height, since developers will substitute capital for expensive land. 
Therefore, density or height requirements should be seen from a temporal perspective. 
As land value increases as a result of urbanization, height and density requirements 
need to be adjusted in a timely manner to reflect such changes. 
 
Figure 23 Relationship between Land Price and Development Density 
 
In Dragon, economic factors are not an explicit consideration, though often taken 
into account intuitively, by planners in determining density and planning details. 
Currently, almost all the residential buildings in Dragon have six stories, even in the 
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county government wants to have taller buildings, mainly for the reason that taller 
buildings make the city look “modern”.  
The local planners are responsible for determining planning details for Dragon 
City. However, developers, in pursuit of profit maximization, typically use their Guan 
Xi to negotiate with the planners for higher-density developments, as described in 
Chapter 9. Such negotiations may involve corruption, but often have a practical effect 
of improving land use efficiency by making development density more reflective of 
actual demand.       
 
3.5. Effects of information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a key source of inefficiency in land use because it 
prevents the affected parties, particularly developers and land speculators, from 
making the right calculations for profit maximization. It also affects equity because 
some parties can take advantage of their superior information to receive more benefits. 
The case study in Dragon shows that information asymmetry exists in three sets of 
relationships due to a rigid top-down system:  
First, it exists between different levels of government. As discussed before, local 
governments have to guess about the extent to which informal land conversions are 
allowed by the higher authorities. This has resulted in some land conversion decisions 
having to be reversed during the crackdown campaign of 2007 - which is clearly 
inefficient.  
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Second, information asymmetry exists between developers and local governments. 
Developers who engage in edge ball or EFRL/EDNR projects have to guess about the 
possible reactions of the local governments to their projects. Typically, they need to 
use their Guan Xi to confirm their guesses, or lobby the relevant public officials not to 
“pay attention”. The time, energy and even money involved in such efforts could 
surely have been spent in other, more constructive ways. In addition, developers have 
to be responsible for acquiring, from the local governments, land use planning 
information, which is not publicly available in any useful form. For example, the 
Detailed Controlling Urban Plan of Dragon City is a most important document for 
developers. However, it is a very thick document, and the entire county has three 
copies only, all kept within the county BOP.         
Third, information asymmetry also exists between farmers and the other players. 
Unlike developers, farmers generally do not have the awareness or capacity to acquire 
land use planning information from the government in an active way. This has had 
some efficiency consequences. For example, as described in Chapter 10, some 
farmers in various townships built workshops on their own land without knowing for 
sure the level of risks associated with such informal land conversion. They face much 
greater risks of being cracked down upon by higher-level governments. Another 
example is that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, many farmers from Village H assumed 
that compulsory land conversion would take place on their land but did not know 




3.6. Effects of the degree of competitiveness of the land market  
The government controls - at least nominally - the land conversion process. 
Therefore, if the sole purpose of the government is to generate revenue, it is possible 
for it to exercise monopoly power, such that the amount of land made available for 
development is less than the socially optimal level. In Figure 24, the socially optimal 
amount of land made available for development is Q*. However, since the marginal 
revenue curve of a monopoly lies below the demand curve, the optimal amount of 
land made available for development by the monopoly is Qm, which is less than Q*. 
 
Figure 24 Effect of Monopoly on the Amount of Land Made Available for Development 
 
In reality, the county government of Dragon does not seem to have engaged in 
such strategic behavior, mainly for the reason that the developable land supply quota 
received by Dragon County always falls short of demand. Therefore, the county 
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 Another possible form of strategic behavior is that the county government may 
deliberately change the mix of urban land uses such that they generate the largest 
amount of revenue. As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two means of revenue 
generation through land conversion: selling land for real estate development through 
auctions, or providing land to industrial investors with a view to generating tax 
revenue. Relatively speaking, the former generates revenue in lump sum rapidly, 
whereas the latter yields tax revenue slowly but for many years. This is illustrated in 
Figure 25. Suppose all the land on a local market is divided between commercial and 
industrial use. The demand curve for commercial use is D1, and the demand curve for 
industrial use is D2. On a competitive market, the allocation should be AY1 for 
commercial use and BY1 for industrial use, such that the price of the land is P1. If the 
government has monopoly power, the optimal mix of land use for it would be AY2 for 
commercial use and BY2 for industrial use, because the marginal revenue curves (D1’ 
and D2’) of a monopoly for these two types of land uses lie below the demand curves 
(D1 and D2). Therefore, in theory, if one could figure out the demand curves for 
various land uses in an accurate manner, it would be possible to compare the actual 




Figure 25 Effect of Monopoly on the Allocation of Land between Different Uses 
 
In practice, it is very difficult to do a quantitative analysis on this. Moreover, the 
case study in Dragon indicates that the local governments are unlikely to have 
supplied less land for commercial development in a deliberate manner, for two 
reasons: First, it is clear from the discussions in Chapter 9 that a public official often 
has a higher incentive to serve the needs of his Guan Xi than the collective needs of 
his institution, such that the government – as an institution – has weak control over 
the informal land market, and therefore is incapable of influencing land prices at will.  
Second, facing financial pressure, a local government has incentives to sell more 
land for real estate development because, by doing so, it collects land rents in lump 
sum for the next 50–70 years. Industrial and infrastructure development contributes to 
local economic growth, but does not generate revenue rapidly or directly. Since the 
land to be auctioned for real estate development must already have been approved by 













higher-level governments, local governments tend to use as large a part of the 
developable land quota as possible for real estate development while allowing the 
informal land market to satisfy the demand for industrial or infrastructure 
development.  
On the other hand, it is obviously also difficult for a county government to 
engage in strategic behavior by supplying too much land for commercial real estate 
development, for two reasons. First, land supply is very scarce. Second, selling land 
for commercial development through public auctions requires approval from the 
higher-level governments, which is complicated and time-consuming. In general, the 
decisions of the county government on when and where to sell land for commercial 
real estate development are often ad hoc.  
Of course, this does not mean that the land market in Dragon is fully competitive, 
because only big real estate developers and those having Guan Xi with the 
government are capable of surviving and making a large profit on the market. 
However, the case study in Dragon does suggest that it is not easy for a few 
developers to dominate the land market due to a large number of competitors – 
including those from other regions - at land auctions. More importantly, the 
composition of real estate developers is very complex, including formal real estate 
companies, edge ball players, and even villagers’ Committees - who are impossible to 
control.   
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3.7. Effects of complicated development approval procedure  
As described in Chapter 8, the procedures for obtaining development permissions 
are very complicated and slow, which is a key reason for EFRL. Many EFRL projects 
are able to receive permission in the end, but some are not so fortunate and rejected. 
Although approval from higher-level authorities is not a precondition for an EFRL 
project to continue to exist, this has led to inefficient land use in some cases. For 
example, the proposed iron and steel project in Township F and I, described in 
Chapter 8, was initially rejected and stopped by higher-level governments although all 
the land required had been acquired and undergone initial development. If not for the 
recent global economic financial crisis, this project would not have received approval. 
Before its final approval, the land was held idle by the local governments for a couple 
of years – which was clearly inefficient because it should have continued to be used 
for farming. The ownership of the land had been transferred from villages to the 
government. The local governments did not allow farmers to come back to farm the 
land, because the former were afraid that the latter might refuse to leave when the 
land was to be needed by the government again. This project had also put a significant 
financial pressure on the county government because, as said, it had paid for land 
acquisition and initial land development but could not hope to recover the cost in the 
near future.  
Relatively speaking, the approval procedure for real estate development on the 
land acquired through auctions is much simpler. The reason is that land auctions 
cannot be organized unless approval has already been given by the relevant 
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higher-level authorities; therefore, the land acquired in this way is granted land use 
approval automatically. However, as described in Chapter 9, a developer still needs to 
talk to the county BOP and BOC regarding development designs and 
construction-related issues if he wants to maximize his benefits.  
In terms of equity, complicated procedures tend to favor big developers over 
small ones, since the former have great financial capacity to sustain business 
operations and manage cash flows. Moreover, big developers typically have stronger 
Guan Xi with planning authorities and can thus obtain approval more easily.     
   
4. Summary 
The efficiency consequences are difficult to assess due to many variables and 
their complex interactions. Overall, the system seems to be doing reasonably well in 
terms of pure economic efficiency, mainly for three reasons: First, the informal 
market serves to make the system respond to local needs through Guan Xi networks, 
and contributes greatly to local economic and social development. Second, the land 
supply control imposed by higher-level governments has had the practical effect of 
preventing urban sprawl and promoting high-density development. In this regard, the 
Chinese farmland protection policy has served similar functions to those of the Urban 
Growth Boundaries that exist in Oregon and some other regions of the US. Third, the 
Chinese law sets a uniform standard regarding compensation to affected farmers 
during compulsory land conversion. Such a law, when implemented by a powerful 
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government, raises serious equity concerns, but on the other hand has had the effect of 
minimizing transaction costs. Therefore, many large-scale infrastructure projects are 
able to be carried out and generate social benefits rapidly. Fourth, there is no clear 
indication of monopoly on the land market by local governments or developers, due 
partly to widespread informal land conversion activities and partly to the scarcity of 
land supply. 
However, the case study also reveals various forms of inefficiency. Many of them 
are probably unavoidable under any system, but some can clearly be prevented had 
the system been designed in a better way. First, from a societal perspective, efforts to 
build up Guan Xi networks represent an economic loss, because most people would be 
better off had such efforts been unnecessary. Second, crackdowns on the informal 
market are necessary, from the perspective of the national government, to preserve the 
authority of national policies, but have had a practical result of disrupting a 
mechanism that serves to fix the shortfalls created by existing policies. Third, due to 
the informal nature of private speculation, private parties face political constraints 
regarding the optimal timing of land conversion, and often have to do silly things to 
assert that they are not doing what they are. Fourth, the land use plans of Dragon 
County lack a long-term vision and are subject to constant changes, leading to 
incompatibility and other forms of inefficient land uses in Industrial Park A and the 
Dragon EDZ. Fifth, information asymmetry exists between levels of the government, 
and between the government and the other players. This has resulted in significant 
efficiency consequences, such as the economic loss caused by the crackdown 
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campaigns by the national government in 2007. Sixth, the procedure for seeking 
development permission is very complicated, representing another form of 
inefficiency.    
The case study also suggests that all the players including farmers - the most 
disadvantaged group - have benefited from land conversion. However, the distribution 
of the benefits is highly unfair, for several reasons: First, the stronger receives more. 
Due to the absence of any independent referees, the land conversion process is 
governed largely by the “law of the jungle”. The stronger and the tougher glean more 
benefits. Specifically, three groups benefit the most: The first group includes those 
who are either powerful or have powerful “direct Guan Xi”. They acquire land at low 
costs and benefit from speculation or by engaging in edge ball projects. The second 
group includes those who are shrewd, bold, or lucky. They understand very well that a 
best way to make a fortune rapidly is to exploit the “opportunities” that are only 
possible under an opaque political system. In the 1990s, they rented land directly from 
villages because they wanted to do business or that they saw the potential to make a 
fortune out of the land. Later, when the value of land increased dramatically, they 
managed to develop sufficient Guan Xi to formalize such land use, and then either 
sold the land back to the government for real estate development or engaged in “edge 
ball” real estate projects by themselves. The third group includes the so-called 
“middle-class” people, consisting mainly of company managers, self-employed 
business people, some teachers, and some public servants. They do not have the 
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financial or political capacity to acquire land, but are able to benefit from housing 
speculation.  
Second, the public, particularly farmers, are excluded from the land use planning 
process and land conversion negotiations. Village leaders often have stronger 
incentives to collude with township officials than represent farmers, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Local governments carry out compulsory land conversions in the name of 
“public interest”, the determination of which is at the complete discretion of 
individual government leaders. Farmers do not have a final choice - to sell or not - 
regarding land conversion decisions.  
Third, the public revenue from land conversion lacks accountability. As 
mentioned earlier, the increases in land value are mostly a result of urbanization, so 
private land owners are not entitled to all the benefits from land conversion. Therefore, 
the government has a legitimate role to play in distributing the benefits of land 
conversion. However, under the existing Chinese political structure, there is not an 
effective accountability system to supervise the spending of the public revenue 
generated from land conversion. Land conveyance fees are often not reflected in the 
regular budget of the government, and local officials care more about satisfying the 
needs of their own Guan Xi and impressing their bosses at higher-level governments 
with “image projects” than about responding to the needs of the people they are 






















INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
As discussed in Part II, the existing system for land conversion relies heavily on 
informal Guan Xi networks to respond to local needs, and is socially unfair. A typical 
textbook’s design of an institutional framework to improve the system in a 
fundamental way would look like Figure 26. Under such a new system, the various 
players are empowered to influence each other through effective “formal” channels: 
the government works in a decentralized and transparent manner; an “independent” 
judicial system is responsible for settling disputes; and, the media, the civil society 
and the general public supervise the system by exercising the right to free speech.   
 
Figure 26 A Typical Textbook’s Design of A Fair Land Conversion Game  
(Dotted Frames Indicate “Transparency”) 
 
Unfortunately, such an institutional framework is not practical in China, at least 
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or even threaten the political power of the existing regime. Second, from the 
perspective of the existing regime, a fair and participatory policy framework will 
inevitably increase transaction cost and thus have a negative impact on economic 
efficiency - the single most important policy objective of the regime.      
Part III will discuss these issues in China’s historical policy context based on the 
findings from the case study in Dragon County. Chapter 12 will summarize the main 
lessons from the case study, and assess policy options. Chapter 13 will discuss the 
tradeoffs between efficiency and equity in a historical context but with a view to the 
future. 
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 The Chinese land policies appear to be “too stringent” and “over-centralized”. In 
reality, they do a reasonably good job in responding to local needs and achieving 
economic efficiency – but at the cost of fairness. This chapter summarizes key 
messages from the case study in Dragon and assesses various policy options for fixing 
the system. It argues that any attempt to fix the system is unlikely to be a fundamental 
solution unless the existing political institutions are reformed.  
 
2. Key messages from the case study 
The national government imposes a very stringent land supply constraint, creating 
a large gap between demand and supply. Guan Xi networks serve as an invisible hand 
to alleviate the high demand for land through an informal market, and thereby 
improve the efficiency of land use. The case study identifies many forms of 
inefficiency due to such factors as the lack of a long-term vision and information 
asymmetry, but many of them are probably not avoidable under any system. The 
purpose of the periodic crackdown campaigns by the national government is not to 
eliminate the informal market, but largely to warn the players not to go beyond certain 
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limits. 
However, the distribution of the benefits from land conversion is highly 
inequitable, because the process is subject to the “law of the jungle”, favoring the 
powerful, the wealthy and the bold rather than those who are poor, needy and 
compliant.   
 In particular, the following themes arise repeatedly throughout the dissertation:  
Growth vs. conservation 
 In essence, the conflicts surrounding the farmland protection policy are about the 
choice between growth and conservation. Conceptually, these two policy goals may 
be balanced. In practice, it is impossible to know what an efficient allocation of land 
is. The national government sets a farmland protection target, but is actually confused 
about its own decisions. The local governments are even more confused, but have an 
easier choice from their perspective between the low profitability of farmland and the 
large benefits from land conversion. 
Centralized planning vs. local non-compliance 
The case study shows that local non-compliance with national policies is 
inevitable, for two reasons: First, compliance is impossible, because the national 
policies for promoting growth and for protecting farmland conflict with each other. 
Second, non-compliance is so widespread that the national government often has to 
acquiesce. Consequently, it would be foolish for a local government to comply with 
the national policies in a strict manner.  
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 Widespread local non-compliance has had two consequences: First, the farmland 
protection target has to be set at an “over-strict” level, in order to allow room for local 
non-compliance. Second, there is information asymmetry between the national 
government and the local players. The national government deliberately does not state 
its policy objectives in an explicit way, whereas the local players collude to conceal 
information about informal land use.   
The case study also shows clearly that, under a highly centralized system, 
higher-level governments have tight control over the appointment of local officials, 
but not over the complex and omnipresent local Guan Xi networks. Therefore, 
although individual officials have much power, the government - as an institution - is 
incapable of achieving certain designed policy objectives or combating corruption.  
Market economy vs. opaque political system 
An opaque political system does not get along with a market economy. The 
reason is that government intervention is necessary to correct market failures (i.e. the 
inability of the market alone to deal with “externalities”)273, but such intervention is 
typically subject to the manipulation by public officials and their Guan Xi who pursue 
their own interests. The liberalization of the housing market in the 1990s has created a 
huge demand for land and given rise to a booming real estate industry. However, the 
control of scarce land resources by the government has led to a host of private deals 
between public officials and developers.  
                                                        
273 As discussed before, Coase argued in his famous 1960 article that the market can actually address at least some 
local externalities. But government intervention is necessary in situations where transaction costs are high and 
property rights are poorly defined.   
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Ambiguity of policies vs. abusing of power by public officials  
Ambiguity is a key feature of many Chinese policies, including the land policies - 
such as the comprehensive land use plans, the legal stipulations regarding land 
property rights, and the concept of public interest. There are mainly two reasons for 
this: First, it is difficult to prescribe all situations, which vary significantly across 
regions and change over time, for policy implementation. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, clarity in policies will reduce the power of public officials and the 
government in general. If, for example, the concept of “public interest” were specified 
in a meticulously detailed way and that there existed an independent judicial system 
to ensure strict implementation, the government might lose much of its current power 
during compulsory land conversion. It is easily conceivable that, in a society where 
everything is governed strictly by laws that are not subject to personal interpretation 
by public officials on ad hoc basis, political control by a particular group would be 
very difficult. To put it in a blunt way, vague policies and laws give some people a 
most powerful tool to control others.  
Exclusion of the public from policy making vs. distrust towards the government 
During the land conversion process, appointed public officials have absolute 
power, with the public excluded from decision making in any formal way. In many 
ways, the Chinese political system is designed to resemble the state described by 
Thomas Hobbes - who thinks that the world is a state of nature in which people are 
self-regarding and therefore in constant conflict with each other, and that there shall 
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be a master with absolute power to rule. The problem is that such a state may not be 
regarded as legitimate by those being ruled. The case study in Dragon County reveals 
a deep distrust by the public towards the local governments. The omnipresence of 
Guan Xi networks indicates that political power often provides better protection for 
property rights than the law. The deference of the farmers to compulsory land 
conversion decisions often represents helplessness and even indifference, whereas the 
resistance by the “nail” households is a form of open defiance against the legitimacy 
of public decision-making.     
 
3. Review of piecemeal fixes to the land system 
The previous chapters have described a number of policies attempted by the 
national government in the last few years to fix the land system. Most of these 
policies, which all seem to have good intentions, have had limited or even negative 
impact, for two reasons: First, as discussed earlier, in a highly centralized system, 
policy-making is one thing, but compliance is quite another. As a famous Chinese 
saying goes, “whenever there is a policy from above, there is always a 
countermeasure to evade at the grass-root level”.274 Second, and more importantly, 
these policies typically address individual “plays”, not the “rules of the game”. It is 
also important to remember that the informal market, which is essential for making 
the existing land system work, is a very complex and dynamic system governed by 
both formal rules and informal Guan Xi networks. Therefore, isolated attempts to 
                                                        
274 This is called “Shang You Zheng Ce, Xia You Dui Ce” in Chinese. 
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address single surface problems may mess things up or make the system unworkable. 
Below is a brief review of the recent piecemeal fixes, followed by a brief discussion 
of an un-regulated area identified through the case study. 
Increasing the level of compensation to farmers 
Dragon’s county government increased the level of compensation to farmers for 
compulsory land conversion, and established a pension system for those who lose 
land. This may be seen as a local response to the pressure from higher-level 
governments to reduce the number of land conversion related disputes. The 
compensation reform has reduced, to a significant extent, the number of protests by 
farmers, but also made it easier for local government to take land from farmers.  
Requiring “open” and “transparent” land sale  
The requirement that the use right to land for commercial development must be 
sold through “open” and “transparent” auction processes has increased competition 
among developers, and reduced their collusion with local governments. However, 
another recent requirement that industrial land shall also be leased through similar 
processes is clearly impracticable. The reason is that, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
qualifications of industrial enterprises do not depend on land lease prices only, but 
more on their potential contribution to local economic and social development, which 
essentially requires subjective judgment by local officials.  
Reforming the land administration system 
The transformation of the local BLRs from “dual-track” into “single-track” 
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agencies aims at reducing the influence of local government leaders on them. 
However, as the case study in Dragon County shows, the reform has produced no 
remarkable effect due to the omnipotence of local Guan Xi networks.  
Efforts to reduce land speculation by developers 
The policy that land, once acquired by developers, cannot be held out of 
development for more than two years aims to increase land supply so as to ease 
housing prices, but has had the practical effect of forcing land speculators to adopt 
socially inefficient approaches to evade the rules, as discussed in Chapter 11.  
Strengthening supervision over land conveyance fees 
A recent national policy requires that land conveyance fees must be turned in to 
the official treasury first before being used by a local government.275 This may 
prevent irresponsible spending by local governments to a certain extent, but are 
unlikely to stop or reduce corruption in a fundamental way unless the system becomes 
transparent.276  
Crackdowns 
The periodical crackdowns on the informal market are essential for the national 
government to assert its authority in a central planning system, but have produced 
undesirable efficiency and equity consequences, as discussed in Chapter 11 and 12.    
                                                        
275 Ministry of Finance (2006) 
276 Lu Jun (2006)  
 355 
An un-regulated area 
So far, the distribution of the benefits from the conversion of land from one urban 
use to another has been an unregulated area. The main reason is that such conversion 
is a local matter, and varies from case to case. For example, the relocation of some 
large industrial enterprises from the city to the suburb may result in many people 
becoming unemployed. Therefore, the level of compensation paid by the government 
to these enterprises has to be high, in order to compensate the unemployed workers 
and pay the cost of relocating the manufacturing facilities and constructing new 
infrastructure such as roads. In other cases, the conversion of the land occupied by 
“land speculators” may require a much lower level of compensation.   
From a local perspective, the lack of regulation in this area has resulted in some 
“edge ball” housing projects, benefiting the existing land users and some low-income 
people. Attempts to regulate this area will eliminate an important source of affordable 
housing for low-income groups, and will therefore require the government to establish 
a formal affordable housing program to make up for it.   
 
4. Assessing a recent, more fundamental fix to the system  
In October 2008, The Third Session of the 17th CCP Central Committee passed a 
resolution277 to deepen rural reform. The most important measure of the reform is 
that farmers’ grain land contracts with their collectives shall remain unchanged for an 
                                                        
277 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (2008) 
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“infinite” period.278 This new policy aims to give farmers more land tenure security, 
so that land can be taken better care of and the transfer of land use rights can be 
promoted.279 However, transfer of rural land use rights shall not involve changes in 
collective ownership or land use type. There are two primary drivers for such a policy: 
First, there have been an increasing number of farmers working in cities, so there is an 
urgent need to create a market to enable them to transfer their farming rights to others 
easily. Second, it makes economic sense to consolidate small units of farmland into 
larger ones so as to improve agricultural efficiency. The real effects of this new policy 
remain to be seen. As discussed in Chapter 2, the transfer of farming rights has 
actually been happening in Dragon County for a number of years, but is not a 
widespread phenomenon for certain reasons.      
The CCP resolution also states that, in carrying out compulsory land acquisition, 
the government will distinguish between public interest and commercial development. 
Land acquisition for the purpose of commercial development will gradually be more 
restricted, and the existing compensation system for compulsory land acquisition shall 
be improved. While the language of the resolution is vague and detailed regulations 
need to be developed, this policy reflects the CCP’s recognition of the seriousness of 
the social tensions created by compulsory land acquisition as described in this 
dissertation.    
Another important reform introduced in the resolution is that collectively owned 
lands located outside planned urban areas and already used for non-farming 
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development will be allowed to be traded on the land market directly, without 
requiring the transfer of ownership from collectives to the state. According to Chen 
Xiwen, Director of the General Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee’s 
Leading Group on Rural Development, such lands mainly refer to those occupied by 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) established in the 1980s and the 1990s. 280 
Since some of these TVEs have been out of business by now, some of their lands are 
either left idle or not made best use of. Therefore, it is desirable that such lands be 
allowed to enter into the formal market. However, Chen Xiwen acknowledges that 
detailed regulations need to be developed in order to put this new policy into practice. 
For example, one issue is how to define TVE. According to The Law on Township and 
Village Enterprises, a TVE is an enterprise established by a rural collective or farmers. 
In reality, however, there are not many such enterprises. Most enterprises in rural 
areas are actually joint ventures with investors from cities or even foreign countries.       
The policy should also apply to the collectively owned lands occupied by farmers’ 
houses located outside planned urban areas, but, again, relevant laws and regulations 
are yet to be worked out.      
This new policy is not surprising. Starting in the late 1990s, the MLR has 
organized a series of surveys to study the feasibility of allowing collectively owned 
lands to enter into the primary land market directly.281 Since 2002, the MLR has 
approved six regions in several southern provinces, where economic development is 
most rapid and the demand for land is very large, to pilot this new mechanism. In 
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particular, Guangdong Province passed a draft regulation on June 23, 2005 to allow 
the transfer of collective lands on the primary land market directly at a provincial 
scale.282 Earlier, the MLR had submitted a legal proposal for promoting this new 
mechanism at a national scale to the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2003. The 
NPC rejected it for being in conflict with the existing Land Administration Law, 
according to which collectively owned lands can be used for three “non-farming” 
purposes only – the enterprises run by village collectives, the public infrastructure of 
villages, and farmers’ housing. Despite such legal obstacles, the MLR seems to be 
confident that the existing laws will be revised sooner or later, and thus has been 
promoting the piloting of this new mechanism in a proactive manner.283  
Zhou Qiren, a professor from Beijing University, describes two approaches 
adopted by some villages or farmers in some southern provinces to get around the 
legal obstacles. 284  In the first approach, adopted in Nanhai municipality of 
Guangdong Province, some villages have built workshops on their land and rented 
them to industrial enterprises, and the rental fees are divided between the collectives 
and the farmers. In this way, the collective becomes a de facto “share-holding 
company”, and the lands of the farmers become the “equities” of the company. In 
other words, the farmers who contribute land are the company’s shareholders, and 
thus have the right to claim the yields of their shares. In the second approach, adopted 
in some areas in Kunshan Municipality of Jiangsu Province, the villages lease their 
lands to farmers, who then raise funds by themselves to build workshops to be rented 
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to industrial enterprises. The rents are then divided by the village and the farmers. 
Both approaches enable collectively owned lands to go onto the primary land market 
directly, but appear to be used by “village-owned enterprises” and therefore in 
conformity with the Land Administration Law. (Such approaches are certainly not 
unique to these regions only. For example, Dragon is not a pilot region of the 
proposed mechanism, but some variations of the same practices exist on an informal 
basis, as described in Chapter 8.)      
Some scholars285  believe that the existing land system will be significantly 
improved if this new mechanism is allowed at a national scale, and have proposed that 
collective-owned land shall entail the same property rights and have the same prices 
as state-owned land.286 Such a reform has two major advantages: First, it will break 
up the monopoly of the government on the primary land market, and allow developers 
to negotiate directly with villages and farmers on a formal basis. Consequently, 
farmers would have more say. Second, since only the use rights to land are transferred, 
village collectives will retain the ownership. This means that, in the case that the land 
were to be privatized in the future, farmers and villagers’ committees would still be 
guaranteed a voice regarding the initial distribution of the land.  
Despite these advantages, such a reform cannot be a cure for most of the problems 
identified through the case study in Dragon, due to several limitations: A first 
limitation is that it is unlikely for collectively owned land to be allowed for 
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commercial real estate development. For example, the pilot program in Guangdong 
Province has effectively liberalized the conversion of collectively owned land from 
farming to industrial use, but does not allow such land to be used for real estate 
development. 287  The reason for this is easy to understand. The conversion of 
industrial sites to commercial uses provides a major source of revenue that is much 
needed by local governments. Therefore, the proposed reform, even if approved by 
the NPC, would probably do no more than formalize what has already existed in 
practice on an informal basis.    
A second limitation is that government officials will not lose much of their power, 
because they will still dominate the land conversion process through assigning 
developable land quotas, making zoning requirements, approving construction designs, 
and imposing environmental standards, etc. Without the personal support of the 
relevant public officials, any direct negotiations between developers and farmers 
would result in nothing but “informal” deals.  
A third limitation is that the government can still take land from villages in the 
name of public interest.288 As indicated by the case study in Dragon, the users of the 
land acquired by the government include both public and private entities. In the case 
that a land parcel is acquired in the name of “public” interest but then used by a 
private party, it is difficult to determine whether the actual land use complies with the 
intended “public” interest or to separate the motives of the government from those of 
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the private parties.289 Therefore, the reform cannot prevent the government from 
acquiring land for the purpose of satisfying the private motives of public officials or 
their Guan Xi.   
 
5. Assessing other policy options 
This section discusses a few policy options for the future, and argues that their 
success will be contingent on reforming the existing political institutions as a first 
step.    
Relaxing the farmland protection target 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, a main basis for China’s stringent farmland protection 
policy and the developable land quota system is grain self-sufficiency considerations. 
Actually, the debate over whether it is acceptable for one country to import grain from 
others has had a long history. In 1815, the British Government feared that relying on 
imported grain would be dangerous for Britain - lower prices would reduce laborers' 
wages, and manufacturers would lose out due to the fall in purchasing power of 
landlords and farmers290 - and passed the Corn Law to protect domestic grain prices 
against competition from less expensive foreign imports.291 When the Corn Law was 
abolished in 1846, it contributed greatly to the industrial expansion of the nation. 
Britain's dependence on imported grain in the 1830s was 2%; in the 1860s it was 24%; 
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in the 1880s it was 45%.292 By 1881, the number of urban laborers had increased by 
53,496 since 1871.293 Many of these were previously farm workers who migrated to 
the cities to find employment, despite agricultural laborers' wages being the highest in 
Europe.294 
Similarly, some Chinese economists have questioned grain self-sufficiency as a 
reasonable or desirable policy goal for China, for at least two reasons: First, China 
does not have a comparative advantage in grain production, and therefore should 
consider importing grain. Second, with a large trade surplus, China needs to import 
more. Mao Yushi (2007) summarizes these points as follows:   
Why are we so hypersensitive towards food security? A plausible explanation is 
that the great famine of the early 1960s was too scary to us… (However,) one 
reason for the famine was that (the regime of the time) chose not to resort to the 
international market. Grain was in very short supply at the time, but, instead of 
importing grain, the regime exported in 1959 more than 4 million tons of grain, 
which would have been sufficient to feed 20 million people for a year.  
In case our grain falls short of supply in the future, we can surely resort to 
import. Some people say that import is not reliable. However, more than 60% of 
the grain consumed by the Japanese is imported, and they do not feel that it is not 
reliable… Assuming that we import 30 million tons of grain, which will be a 
record-high amount, the cost will be $4.5 billion. (In 2006,) we had an export 
volume of $ 970 billion. This means that we only need 0.5 percent of the export 
volume to import grain. Some people are worried about a possible grain ban on 
China imposed by other countries. I would say that, if that happened, we must 
have done something against the wishes of the entire world - in which case, the 
Chinese people would not be able to live a good life anyway even if we have 
grain to feed ourselves. In practice, a shock to the import of oil would be far more 
disturbing to China than that of grain. The reason is that we have built many grain 
depots, and we have abundant grain reserve. However, we have almost no oil 
reserve. The new oil reserve we are trying to build up will not be available for use 
within three years. We are exporting grain, but need to import 40% of the oil we 
use. (If we can manage our oil supply), it is groundless for us to be worried about 
food security.  
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 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Tianze Economic Research Institute, headed by 
Mao Yushi, released a report entitled Grain Security and Farmland Protection in 
December 2008.295 The report argues that the world as whole has sufficient grain 
supply. During the last 50 years, the world population has increased by approximately 
150% and per capita grain consumption has increased by 17%, but grain prices have 
deceased by half. The report also points out that China’s year-to-year grain production 
fluctuates by approximately 3-4%. Even in the worst possible (i.e. 
once-in-a-hundred-years) case, China needs to import only 11 percent of its total grain 
consumption, which is around 50 million tons – about 10 percent of world’s annual 
grain trade volume.             
Along the same lines, Li and Wang (2002) think that China’s accession to the 
WTO provides opportunities for China to utilize the international grain market and 
specialize in areas where it has comparative advantage:296 
(China’s accession to the WTO provides opportunities for it to combine) the 
import of land-intensive food products with the export of labor-intensive 
agricultural products (so as to) make full use of the world market… and improve 
the allocation of domestic resources. The international division of labor, 
according to the principle of comparative advantage in international trade, is 
likely to make China a big grain importer, but not a big food importer. Net import 
of grain is likely to be offset by a net export of other food products. The argument 
for grain self-sufficiency is understandable but not acceptable in the new era. 
Besides, a grain self-sufficiency strategy means that China needs to have a 
large domestic grain reserve, which is costly and inefficient... To rely more on the 
international market would be more effective than having a massive reserve. 
Despite such counter-arguments, grain self-sufficiency stands firm as a basic 
national policy. One concern of the Chinese policy makers is that the international 
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food market may not be reliable if China does become a large grain importer. The 
sharp rises in food prices on the international market in the last few years seem to 
have contributed further to this concern. According to a world bank report297, by the 
end of February 2008, the international wheat prices had increased by 181% and the 
prices of food in general increased by 83% during the previous three years. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization points out that 37 countries have experienced food 
crises, and the World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick warns that rising food prices 
on the international market may make 100 million people in the developing world 
even poorer.298 Food crop prices are expected to remain high in 2008 and 2009 and 
then begin to decline as supply and demand respond to high prices299; however, they 
are likely to remain well above the 2004 levels through 2015 for most food crops.300  
Many factors affect the demand for and the supply of food, such as population 
growth, changing diet and natural disasters. In addition, some countries are 
developing bio-fuel due to energy security considerations, further constraining the 
global food crop supply.301 The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in June 
2008 that global food output should rise by 50 percent by the year 2030 to meet the 
rising demand and as much as 15 billion to 20 billion U.S. dollars would be needed 
yearly to boost production.302  
A second argument for food self-sufficiency is that food is different from most 
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other commodities including oil, because food crises tend to have a stronger impact 
on the poor. People are affected to different degrees by rising grain prices, depending 
on whether they are producers or consumers, how much they produce or consume, 
and their ability to withstand grain price inflation. In general, poor people, especially 
those in urban areas, suffer more from rising food prices.303 For example, a recent 
World Bank paper304 analyzes the impacts of higher prices of key staple foods on 
poverty, taking into account direct impacts from changes in commodity prices and 
impacts through changes in wage rates for unskilled labor. The results show that, in 
six of the eight countries considered, price increases for staple foods were associated 
with a significant rise in poverty. Averaging across these eight countries, the increase 
in food prices between 2005 and 2007 is estimated to have increased poverty by 3 
percent.  
Due to a fear of inflation induced by rising food prices, the Chinese government 
has been controlling grain prices tightly. Although this has benefited the poor in urban 
areas, the Chinese farmers are not able to benefit from the rising food prices in recent 
years. This, together with the rising costs of agricultural production, contributes to the 
low profitability of farming and thus a lack of incentives for farmers to engage in 
farming. Many farmers simply leave their land idle.305  The grain reserves are 
intended to ensure grain security in case of natural disasters or public emergencies, 
but are often used for the purpose of keeping grain prices at a level much lower than 
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those on the international market.306 For example, the difference in grain prices 
between China and the international market is so remarkable that grain smuggling 
from China to other countries has been widespread since early 2008.307 
Another argument for food self-sufficiency is that a food crisis may not 
necessarily incur greater economic impact than an oil shock, but is more likely to 
trigger panic and even social turmoil. So far, China is producing enough for itself. 
China’s grain reserve-consumption ratio is much higher than 17-18%, the level 
deemed by the international community as desirable for food security.308 However, if 
a food crisis does strike, the political as well as economic risks may be tremendous. 
For example, during a rice crisis in early 2008, some rice exporting countries such as 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Egypt banned all or part of their rice exports, causing 
significant panic for some rice importing countries.309  Although China was not 
affected by this crisis in a significant way, there is a concern that similar food crises 
and panic could occur in China if it relaxes its efforts in ensuring grain 
self-sufficiency. 310  This is clearly a biggest concern of China’s top leadership. 
China’s Minister of Agriculture Sun Zhengcai recently commented that “China has 
such a large population that no other country will have the capacity to help China if a 
real food crisis occurs in China.”311   
Nevertheless, the international experience shows that flexibility in meeting the 
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demand for food is positively correlated with per capita income.312 In other words, 
the higher the per capita income, the greater the flexibility in meeting the demand for 
food. No modern economy has ever failed to meet the demand for food by its 
people.313 Moreover, China could utilize the international food market to diversify 
the types of food imported from various countries to minimize the risks associated 
with domestic supply fluctuations due to natural disasters.  
In sum, the debate over food self-sufficiency is about the trade-offs between 
reducing the risks associated with possible food crises and saving land for uses that 
are higher than food production. Nevertheless, as far as its relevance to farmland 
protection is concerned, such a debate is relatively unimportant. In other words, even 
if there are good reasons to question food self-sufficiency as a reasonable or desirable 
policy goal, they shall not serve as a sufficient basis for relaxing the current farmland 
protection target, for two reasons: First, although the existing farmland protection 
target appears to be over-stringent, the actual amount of farmland converted is much 
more, due to widespread local non-compliance. Relaxing the control on developable 
land supply may lead to another round of “land enclosure movement”,314 exceeding 
any seemingly “reasonable” farmland protection target. Second, the case study in 
Dragon indicates that stringent land supply control actually promotes compact 
development, which, from a long-term perspective, is economically efficient.   
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Privatizing farmland 
It has been a hot issue in recent years whether China should privatize farmland. 
The proponents generally think that land privatization will improve agricultural 
productivity and promote the urbanization process. For example, Steven N.S. Cheung 
from Hong Kong University315 thinks that it is important for the surplus rural labor to 
move to cities. There has already been massive migration from the rural areas to the 
cities; but it is far from enough, because a country with a high percentage of rural 
population cannot be wealthy, and that farmers cannot be wealthy if they stay in the 
rural areas. An easy way to tackle this problem is to grant private land ownership to 
farmers, and allow them to sell their land so that they can have money to go to the city 
to try their “luck”. Then, it will be the market - not the government - that will take 
care of them.  
 However, the opponents of land privatization argue that a rushed massive 
migration of farmers to cities will create slums at the urban fringe and consequently 
many social problems. Wen Tianjun, Dean of the School of Agricultural and Rural 
Development, China Renmin University, explains this view as follows:316   
In many developing countries, urbanization is being achieved through large-scale 
slums… Poor people from the rural areas go to cities and live in crowded slums. 
For example, in India, many farmers who have lost land lack the basic conditions 
for survival. The proportion of the rural population living under the poverty line 
is as high as 36%. Some of them have migrated to the slums in cities, but still 
lack basic conditions for survival…In cities, farmers cannot enter into private 
lands… and therefore have to live on public lands adjacent to roads, railways or 
rivers. India needs to develop infrastructure, but a practical difficulty is how to 
deal with the slums where millions of people live. The difficulty of land 
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acquisition and the resulting conflicts are easily conceivable… (Similar situations 
exist) in other developing countries, such as Bangladesh, Mexico and Brazil. I 
have visited many slums in a number of countries in the last few years. The living 
conditions there are unbelievable. Many people have criticized me (for being 
against privatization) in recent years… The reason is that they have not seen (the 
miserable living conditions in the slums) by themselves   
In fact, there are already some slums in China. For example, there are such 
places at the fringe of Beijing. Some scholars may argue that this is an inevitable 
effect of urbanization, and is a “normal phenomenon”. However…a concentration 
of millions of poor people will inevitably lead to social turmoil…  
This argument is based on the assumption that a farmer is more likely to lose land 
under private ownership than collective ownership, because farmers tend to sell their 
land if they need money. This, the opponents fear, will contribute to a widening of 
income disparity, and cause social stability.  
Yang Xiaokai, another proponent of land privatization, thinks that these concerns 
are counter-intuitive. 317  He argues that land privatization will only abolish the 
privileges of village leaders in the administration of collectively owned land, but will 
definitely not make the farmers poorer. Under the current system, when some farmers 
move to cities, they have no choice but to give up their shares of the collectively 
owned land. If unwilling to give up the land, they need to come back periodically. 
Therefore, the collective ownership of land binds the farmers up, and hampers 
urbanization and industrialization, which is neither efficient nor equitable. If land is 
privatized, farmers will be free to sell the land. Since the prices of the land that is 
freely transferable will be much higher than the current levels, land privatization will 
actually make farmers better off.   
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As regards the fear that farmers may end up in slums, Yang Xiaokai argues that 
land privatization cannot make the situation worse. When a farmer moves to the city, 
he does not even need to sell his land. He could lease the land to others, so that he 
could not only collect rents, but also retain the right to taking the land back in case he 
is not successful in the city. He could also use the land as collaterals to obtain loans 
from banks in order to do business.  
Along the same lines, Qin Hui, a professor from Tsinghua University and a 
proponent of land privatization, also thinks that it is illogical to predict that farmers 
will be worse off if their land is privatized:318   
It is illogical to argue that the use right will provide more guarantee for farmers 
than the ownership to farmland. What (the opponents) actually mean is that the 
owners of land will have less rights than the tenants. This is nonsense… As is 
known to all, the so-called ownership includes a bundle of rights, including the 
right to use (among others). In other words, ownership entails the use right to 
land, but not vice versa. If a farmer has ownership to a piece of land, he naturally 
is guaranteed the use right to the land. Even if he voluntarily transfers the use 
right to others, he is free to take it back. However, if a farmer has the use right to 
a piece of land only, the bundle of rights is more limited, because the owner of 
the land can take it back… (This is so obvious,) but some people want to make us 
believe that giving the ownership of land to farmers will cause them to lose land 
while (giving them the use right only) will provide them with more guarantee. 
The tenancy system that existed in (the first half of the 20th century) has been 
most terrifying to (many people). People generally assume that the tenancy 
system was caused by the merging of lands due to the private ownership of land 
and the free transfer of land rights, and that the tenancy system was largely 
responsible for the social crisis and farmers’ uprisings of the time. This argument 
may be one of the strongest by the opponents of land privatization. But how much 
do they really know about the history of China and of the land tenure system? … 
We often (say things) without doing quantitative analysis… There exist various 
samples of land rights distribution in various regions during the 1930s and the 
1940s… According to my analysis, the Gini Coefficient for the concentration of 
land rights was 0.53 in China before the Land Reform (in the 1950s). A 
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horizontal comparison shows that almost all other countries had a higher Land 
Rights Gini Coefficient than China. In other words, the level of land rights 
concentration in China was among the lowest. There were indeed social crises at 
the time, but how can you say that it was because of the over-concentration of 
land resulting from private land ownership?         
Most of these discussions cited have been “underground”, so to speak. Open 
debate on land privatization is a still largely a taboo on official media or formal 
journals. The reason is that land privatization conflicts with the socialist ideology, an 
important basis of which has been public ownership.319 China has already privatized 
many state-owned enterprises, as mentioned in Chapter 5, and recently passed the 
Property Rights Law320, which deviates from the traditional socialist ideology by 
providing a legal basis for the protection of private properties including real properties. 
However, the private ownership of land is obviously a very different matter, because 
it will essentially lead to a loss of control by the government over the farmers, who 
account for more than 60% of China’s population. Moreover, land privatization will 
inevitably make compulsory land acquisition more difficult, because the 
compensation standards and the costs of negotiating with many private land owners 
will presumably be much higher than their current levels. This will have a significant 
impact on the ability of local governments to generate revenue through land 
conversion. Therefore, from the perspective of the government, private land 
ownership will be a serious constraint to growth and thus unacceptable. It is easily 
conceivable that land privatization will require a fundamental transformation of the 
Chinese public finance system. The attitude of the CCP leadership on this issue seems 
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to be very clear. Chen Xiwen, Director of the General Office of the CCP Central 
Committee’s Leading Group for Rural Development, stated at a press conference in 
January 2007 that, “ I do not see the prospect of land privatization in China”.321  
Even if the ideological and public finance obstacles are overcome, land 
privatization cannot be a fundamental solution to farmers’ problems, given the 
existing political system. The reason is that public officials will still abuse their power 
to carry out compulsory land conversion in the name of “public interest”.322 To deal 
with such a problem, Qin Hui (2006) suggests that the bundle of land rights granted to 
Chinese farmers shall be larger, and the power of the government to acquire land from 
farmers shall be more restricted than in other countries. However, this, again, would 
essentially limit the capacity of local governments for revenue generation, making it 
politically unacceptable.  
Moreover, it would be difficult and tricky in practice to determine the initial 
distribution of land ownership. If the existing users of land were to become the 
owners – which is probably the easiest way for initial distribution - then land 
privatization would become a process of granting land ownership to those who have 
taken land from farmers in a highly unfair manner through informal means. In 
addition, the reserve lands, which account for a large proportion of collectively owned 
lands, may become easy targets of those who are powerful enough to manipulate the 
privatization process. Fairness in the initial distribution of private ownership rights 
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will have to be contingent on having a transparent and participatory political system 
in the first place.  
Decentralizing land use planning and administration authorities  
Much has been said about the impracticability and lack of responsiveness of 
central planning. An alternative to this kind of one-size-fits-all approach would be to 
delegate authorities to local governments so that policies can respect local situations 
more. Unfortunately, local officials in China are accountable to their higher-level 
bosses only. Therefore, a centralized system is essential for checking the powers of 
local officials. Absent political control and supervision from above, corruption by 
local officials might be even more prevalent, contributing to a faster concentration of 
wealth into the hands of the powerful and the rich. On the other hand, the party and 
the national government are presumably very reluctant to decentralize, because doing 
so will weaken their political control over the bureaucracy and hence the people. 
Establishing an independent judicial system  
 An independent judicial system for land conversion is out of the question, for two 
reasons: First, those who exercise the law cannot be free from the influence of Guan 
Xi networks. Second, for an independent judicial system to be effective, there should 
be clear policies and laws. However, as described earlier, many Chinese laws and 
policies are intended to be vague or ambiguous. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
no society can rely on its judicial system alone to protect the rights of its citizens, 
because the judicial process is reactive only. 
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6. Summary  
Although being unfair and sometimes inefficient, the Chinese land conversion 
process is actually a reasonably well-functioning system, given the existing political 
institutions. The recent attempts to fix the system have had limited or even adverse 
effects because they address the symptoms, not the causes, of the problems.  
A recent trend to formalize direct negotiations between developers and villages & 
farmers seems to be a feasible approach to address certain problems, but is certainly 
not a fundamental solution. The success of future policies will hinge on the 
willingness and capability of the existing regime to carry out substantive political 
reform that can make the government more transparent and accountable.  
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CHAPTER 13 FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION 
 
1. Introduction  
The land conversion process in Dragon provides an illuminating example of 
public policies trying to achieve efficiency at the cost of equity. China’s national 
leaders have recognized – correctly - that economic growth is essential to the 
rejuvenation of a country with more than 1.3 billion people and an unhappy modern 
history of national humiliation, as described in Chapter 3. The massive resources that 
the nation was capable of mobilizing in its relief efforts for the devastating earthquake 
disaster that occurred in Sichuan Province in May 2008 were a clear indication of the 
importance of economic growth to the country and its people. 
Unfortunately, the case study in Dragon also shows that efficiency and equity 
often come into conflict under the existing political system. The centralization of 
power is necessary for the national government to maintain political control - which 
means that informal markets favoring the powerful and the wealthy have to be 
allowed for the sake of economic efficiency. As has been discussed in Chapter 12, the 
success of future attempts to address this dichotomy - such as rationalizing policy 
objectives, clarifying property rights, decentralizing authorities, or establishing an 
independent judicial system – is at least partly contingent on a fundamental political 
reform as a precondition.    
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This chapter will discuss briefly the impacts of this tension, and argue that the 
current utilitarian approach of pursuing economic efficiency at the cost of equity is 
not sustainable. Ultimately, the solutions to the problems identified by the case study 
in Dragon County lie in establishing an effective check-and-balance political system 
as a first step.         
 
2. Dichotomy between efficiency and equity 
In Chinese history, many uprisings occurred because farmers were unable to 
make their ends meet, and the leaders of these uprisings typically advocated “robbing 
the rich and helping the poor”. The CCP was not an exception to this. During the 
vying for power with the nationalists between the 1920s and the late 1940s, the CCP 
won support from the farmers and the working class, which accounted for the 
majority of the Chinese population, with its egalitarian doctrine. Soon after the 
establishment of the P. R. China in 1949, the CCP re-distributed land to farmers on an 
egalitarian basis. The “ideal” communist society, pictured by the CCP, was one having 
such abundant resources and goods that everyone could take whatever he needed and 
that even egalitarian distribution would become unnecessary. According to the 
standard political science textbooks for middle-school students prior to the 1980s, the 
rich acquired their wealth through exploiting the poor; thus, wealth was often 
associated with evil, and poverty deserved sympathy and conveyed a sense of glory. 
Of course, the egalitarian approach was neither equitable nor efficient, because it 
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ignored desert and discouraged hard work. To overcome this problem, the CCP 
devoted much effort to propagate the doctrine of “self-sacrifice” for the common goal 
of communism. Applications of the doctrine included the people’s communes prior to 
the late 1970s, the program of migrating young people from cities to rural areas in the 
1960s, and the family planning policy since the 1970s. A main problem with this 
communistic approach has been that the so-called “public interests” often reflected 
the narrow interests of individual political leaders only, sometimes resulting in 
tremendous suffering by the Chinese people. As a result, the Chinese economy 
stagnated and lagged farther behind developed countries.  
In the late 1970s, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping abolished the egalitarian 
doctrine. He was well aware that a large gap in the level of economic development 
between China and developed countries would ultimately weaken the CCP’s political 
control, and that economic growth was an essential condition for the party to retain its 
political power. He established the Household Responsibility System and gave 
farmers the right to make their own farming decisions on an individual basis. In order 
to promote growth, he encouraged “a small group of people to become rich first”. 
China opened up to the outside world and allowed the market to play a role in 
allocating private goods and services. These policies deviated from the traditional 
egalitarian doctrine of the socialist ideology. In order to deal with this inconsistency, 
the CCP argues that the socialist ideology has to adjust to changing situations, and 
calls the new market-based approach “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”.  
The economic reform since the 1980s has promoted economic efficiency greatly. 
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Between 1978 and 2006, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.67%, 
which was much higher than the world’s average level of 3.3%; the per capita 
disposable income increased from 343 yuan to 11,759 yuan for urban residents and 
from 134 yuan to 3,587 yuan for rural residents; and the national fiscal revenue 
increased from 113 billion yuan to 3.93 trillion yuan.323 
However, in the meantime, the Chinese leaders have been very reluctant to carry 
out political reforms, which is understandable because any political reform, if 
effective, would challenge the party’s rule. This practically means that economic 
efficiency has to be achieved at the cost of equity, as illustrated by the case study in 
Dragon. 
This tension between efficiency and equity is by no means limited to the land 
conversion process, but exists in almost every economic area where the government 
has a role to play. It is obviously impossible - and indeed unnecessary - for this 
dissertation to provide an exhaustive list of all the areas where unfair activities are 
prevalent. However, for the purpose of illustration, a few examples are given below. 
The privatization of some SOEs in the late 1990s and the early 2000s has served 
to improve economy efficiency, but turned out to be a process of fortune making for a 
small group of people, as mentioned in Chapter 5. There are, of course, many other 
ways for SOE managers or powerful officials to “launder” public resources. For 
example, they typically establish their own private companies, jointly with or in the 
                                                        
323 Liu Zheng (2007) 
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name of their relatives, friends or other Guan Xi, so that they can use their economic 
or political power to transfer public resources from the SOEs to their private hands 
through “formal” business transactions.324         
Another area is the construction of pubic infrastructure. During the planned era, 
the government was responsible for the planning, construction and operation of 
infrastructure. However, public infrastructure was always in short supply, as indicated 
by the example of train tickets in Chapter 9. Now, the government is still responsible 
for planning, but typically contracts the construction and often the operation of public 
infrastructure to the private sector. Compared with the past, this is a significant 
improvement in economic efficiency, and has contributed greatly to infrastructure 
development. For example, by the end of 2005, China’s total mileage of highways 
reached 41,000 km, which was the second longest among all the countries in the 
world.325 According to the planning by the Ministry of Communications, China will 
invest 2 trillion yuan to build 51,000 km of new highways between 2005 and 2030.326 
The highways have contributed greatly to economic growth. However, corruption has 
been prevalent at each and every stage of highway development and use, such as 
project approval, fund raising, contracting, quality checks and toll fee collection.327 
Many public officials have been arrested due to corruption charges, including 
provincial-level transportation bureau directors and vice directors, project leaders, and 
other officials responsible for tendering, contracting or construction supervision; and 
                                                        
324 Quoted in Yang Guang (2004)  
325 China Investment Consultation Network (2006, 2007) 
326 China Investment Consultation Network (2006) 
327 Hong Kong Commercial Daily (March 10, 2008); Chen Feng (2008); Law Evening News (August 27, 2004)  
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some have even received capital punishment.328 A main form of illegal benefits for 
transportation officials is the “commission” paid by the private companies who want 
to obtain contracts. Since the investment in a highway project is typically in the 
magnitude of at least hundreds of millions of yuan, the commission received by the 
officials is often in the amount of tens of millions of yuan.329 It is also common for 
the private companies to use raw materials of inferior quality in order to save costs for 
themselves and for building up Guan Xi with the relevant officials. The spending of 
the toll fees collected from highway users often lacks supervision, and is another 
source of corruption.         
Similar acts are also common during public procurement. China has a very large 
public sector, so the amount of money involved in public procurement is very large. 
However, it is an open secret that public officials often receive personal favors from 
the private providers of goods and services.330    
Often, those with political power even develop poor regulations deliberately so 
that they can benefit personally. A typical case is the public health system in Dragon 
County. Prior to the 1980s, each township in the county had a public hospital 
managed by the government, and each village had a rural doctor (nicknamed 
“bare-feet doctor”) paid by the government. Now, the township hospital, though still 
publicly owned, is responsible for its own revenue and expenditure; and the bare-feet 
doctors are allowed to set up their own clinics in their villages. This has improved the 
                                                        
328 Hong Kong Commercial Daily (March 10, 2008) 
329 Law Evening News (August 27, 2004) 
330 He Yonghai (2007); Shen Lianqing, quoted in Economics Advisory News (March 19, 2007); Chang Yiqing 
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efficiency of the public health system. However, there has been competition between 
the township hospital and the village clinics for patients. In general, the village clinics 
are doing reasonably well, because villagers typically do not want to travel to the 
township hospital except for relatively serious diseases. However, the township 
hospital has the authority to supervise the operations of the village clinics. In order to 
increase their own benefits, the hospitals of some townships require the village clinics 
to buy medicines from them only. Consequently, the village clinics have to pay prices 
that are much higher than the prices at which they can buy medicines directly from 
other certified medicine suppliers. This has reduced the profits of the village clinics to 
a significant degree. The bare-feet doctors are unhappy, but have no choice but to 
defer.   
In a research paper, a ministerial-level study group receiving training at the 
Central Party School, which is the CCP’s highest-level training school for senior 
leaders, states the following in 2006:331 
Most serious is inequity in the process…. The income of those  working in the 
“monopoly” sectors332 (particularly high-level managers) is too high; enterprises 
with different ownership structures receive differential treatment in paying 
income taxes; there have been collusions between SOE leaders and public 
officials during the privatization of SOEs; some people make a large fortune by 
taking advantage of “inside” information or spreading fraudulent information; 
some exploit the farmers though land acquisition or acquire state-owned land 
through Guan Xi or bribery; and, farmers (who work in cities) often do not get 
paid…  
Inequity in access to the market is often reflected in the setting or the 
implementation of the relevant rules. Overall, the rules are often set to be 
over-strict, but their implementation tends to be loose. The level of strictness 
                                                        
331 Lou Jiwei (2006) 
332 The monopoly sectors refer to coal, oil, power, and to some extent telecommunications and banking sectors. 
The enterprises are mostly state-owned, and have monopoly on the market. 
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often depends on who are involved. For example, (if a self-employed person) 
intends to set up a small enterprise, the rules are very strict… and many 
unnecessary administrative licenses are required (due to the rent-seeking intent of 
those who make the rules). (A different example is that) the exercise of 
discretional authority in granting approval or making court decisions is, to 
varying extent, influenced by Guan Xi or the economic (and social) status of 
those involved… and is usually associated with corruption…          
It is worth reminding that corruption is often a necessary condition for efficient 
allocation of public resources in the Chinese society. However, other things being 
equal, those who are powerful or already wealthy benefit more than others. Therefore, 
widening of income disparity is inevitable.       
     
3. Income disparity as a most important social problem 
Prior to the 1980s, income disparity was not a serious issue, not only because of 
the party’s egalitarian approach, but also because, under a planned economy, the elite 
groups of the Chinese society used their Guan Xi networks mainly for acquiring 
scarce public services and not so much for direct economic benefits. The situation has 
changed dramatically with a liberalized economy: Public officials can now translate 
their political power into direct economic benefits for themselves or their Guan Xi.  
The gap between the rich and the poor in China is widening.333 According to the 
World Bank’s Development Report 2006, China’s Gini Coefficient increased from 
0.16 in the pre-reform era (i.e. the late 1970s) to 0.47 in the new century. Among the 
127 countries surveyed by the World Bank, only 29 countries had a higher Gini 
                                                        
333 Lin Yifu, quoted in People’s Daily (January 14, 2008); Pan Yan (2008) 
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Coefficient than China – and among them, 27 were from Latin America and Africa, 
and only 2 (i.e. Malaysia and the Philippines) from Asia. Some scholars estimate that 
the actual Gini Coefficient could be at least 10 percent higher than the official 
statistics,334 due to the existence of “invisible” income. Invisible income often takes 
non-monetary forms, such as medical care, access to education resources, and 
unemployment insurance, etc.335 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 9, people within 
Guan Xi networks often exchange personal favors, much of which are unlikely to be 
reflected in the official statistics on income.  
According to the statistics by the National Development and Reform Commission, 
China’s fiscal revenue increased by 32.4% and the profits of enterprises by 36.7% 
between 2007 and 2008, while the disposable income of urban residents grew by 
12.2% only and the average net income of rural residents by 9.5% only. 336 Even 
though these figures may not be precise (due to fraudulent statistics as discussed in 
Chapter 3) and are just approximations of the real situation, they indicate that the 
working class is receiving an increasingly smaller share of the total national income. 
Many public officials, scholars and others echo this point. For example, Zhang 
Xiangping, Member of the NPC and Director General of the Department of Labor and 
Social Security of Hunan Province, comments that,337 
The share of workers’ income in the total national income is decreasing 
continuously, and has already reached the warning line… The income gap is 
widening between regions, between sectors, and between enterprises.  
                                                        
334 Li Shi and Yue Ximing (2004)  
335 Li Shi and Yue Ximing (2004)  
336 Xinhua New Agency (Mar. 7, 2008) 
337 Xinhua New Agency (Mar. 7, 2008) 
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Lin Yifu, Member of the NPC and currently Chief Economist of the World Bank, 
points out that,338 
I think the most outstanding structural problem is that the structure of income 
distribution is not reasonable, and the polarization trend will continue. The 
structure of the national income is such that the income from capital is going up 
whereas the income from human labor is going down. Currently, many conflicts 
and problems during the economic development process have resulted from this 
phenomenon.   
Pan Yan, a journalist from the Liao Wang Magazine who has been reporting widely on 
issues related to income disparity in China, makes the following statement in an 
article on January 14, 2008,339 
Compared with the “upstarts” whose wealth accumulates so rapidly, such as real 
estate developers and the middle- and high-level managers in the “monopoly 
sectors”340, even the so-called “middle class”, who are highly educated and 
working hard and honestly in the competitive sectors, are feeling that they are 
continuously sinking down the social “pyramid”, let alone the working-class 
people whose number is almost limitless.       
It is also important to note that the existing income gap has been developed within a 
very short period. Therefore, compared with the countries with a level of income 
disparity that is similar to that of China but has evolved through many generations, 
China faces much greater challenges.341  
The Chinese government has clearly recognized the seriousness of the issue, and 
is trying a number of policies, such as designating minimum wages for urban workers, 
establishing a social safety net, and limiting maximum wages for the monopoly 
sectors. The 17th Congress of the CCP, held in 2007, points out that the trade-offs 
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341 Lou Jiwei (2006)  
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between efficiency and equity shall be dealt with appropriately in both primary and 
secondary distribution, and that secondary distribution shall focus more on equity.342 
Along the same lines, the Report of the Government to the 11th National People’s 
Congress states that the government will develop relevant policies to increase the 
income of farmers and the working class, and establish a mechanism to ensure 
transfer payment for the poor.343  
It is easier said than done. These policies, even if developed appropriately and 
implemented effectively, are incapable of narrowing the gap between the rich and the 
poor. The reason is obvious: if a society allows burglary but in the meantime asks the 
burglars to share some stolen goods with others, the burglars will either conceal what 
they have stolen or simply steal more.       
 
4. Future policy direction 
The case study in Dragon County suggests that, although the Chinese publics 
show a deep distrust towards the government, their dissatisfaction is diluted to a 
significant degree by the improved living standards they have experienced in the past 
three decades or so due to rapid economic growth. For the same reason, the existing 
regime seems to be hoping that, as long as the economy keeps growing at a rapid 
speed, there would be no serious threat of uprisings. In other words, given its 
unwillingness and perhaps inability - due to potential strong resistance from the 
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beneficiaries of the existing system - to carry out political reforms, the existing regime 
thinks that the best way to retain political control is to sustain rapid economic growth. 
However, the danger of this strategy is that, with prevalent corruption and rapid 
polarization, the pressure from those living at the bottom will keep building up.   
China’s current economic situation may be seen as a fast-moving vehicle, a 
slow-down of which may trigger many social conflicts to manifest themselves - a 
situation similar to the one depicted in Jan De Bont’s film Speed, in which a bomb on 
a city bus will be triggered to explode if the speed of the bus drops below 50 miles per 
hour. The recent financial crisis is a potential trigger for social turmoil. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the national government has set a target that the economic growth rate in 
2009 shall be at least 8 percent. It is feared that a growth rate of lower than 8 percent 
may bring some social conflicts to the surface.344 As a precautionary measure, the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which is China’s police headquarters, announced 
in February 2009 that it would send inspection teams to various regions to ensure 
social stability.345 Surveillance by the police is no doubt essential for maintaining 
social order under certain circumstances, but clearly cannot be the ultimate solution.  
As far as future policy direction is concerned, the existing regime of China has 
two options: The first option is to reform the existing political institutions, and 
establish a system that is similar to the one depicted in Figure 26. However, such a 
reform will not come about easily due to the complexities of overhauling the existing 
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system. The second option is to maintain the sole focus on economic efficiency 
without attempting to eradicate the roots of potential social conflicts - which is clearly 
not sustainable. Just as a bus has to stop at crossroads or for fuel, an economy has to 
slow down or even stagnate at some points due to various internal or external shocks. 
Ultimately, the social pressure that builds up has to be released in one way or another. 
When that happens in an eruptive manner, the consequences can be very disruptive to 
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